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ABSTRACT
PLATO'S PROJECT FOR EDUCATION
IN THE EARLY SOCRATIC DIALOGUES
MAY 1996
HEATHER LYNNE REID, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
What is the role of philosophy in education? This timeless question may best be
answered by examining Plato's earliest dialogues in which he makes a case for philosophy
as the centerpiece of education. I call this effort Plato's project for education and
interpret the Apology, Crito, Charmides, Laches, Ion, HippiasMinor, Euthyphro, and
Lysis as an integrated attempt to promote philosophy as education in ancient Athens.
Plato accepted arete (excellence, virtue) as the proper goal of education, but his
interpretation of arete as a distinctly moral quality required a new approach to
education.
Plato recognized that the quality in a doctor that makes her aim at what is good
for her patient is distinct from the skill that enables her to choose the most effective
treatment. Against traditional education, which emphasized social standing, professional
skill, and the accumulation of information, Plato focused on the moral dimension of
human beings and prescribed philosophy as a means for developing it. Memorization of
information and tuition in practical skills may help us in our particular crafts, but it does
little to improve us morally. This task must be undertaken separately through examination
V
and reflection. Success will be judged not by one's peers, or even by one's government,
but by the gods themselves who adhere to a universal idea of goodness.
Plato's conception of arete as the health of the soul precipitates a new approach
to education that focuses on philosophy and presents Socrates as its hero and martyr.
Health of the soul, like health of the body, is something that requires constant labor and
attention, and yet may never be perfected. In Plato's project, the ignorant Socrates and
the dialogues themselves become indirect teachers by exhorting students to care for their
souls and to appreciate the task. The promise that arete can be achieved through the
pursuit of moral wisdom is given in the words and actions of Socrates. Like his ancient
friends, the reader struggles to understand Socrates and from this struggle emerges
philosophy: the love and pursuit of wisdom; the proper education for aiete.
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CHAPTER 1
PLATO AS AN EDUCATIONAL REFORMER
History has come to revere Plato as a philosopher, political visionary, and great
literary stylrst. All of these things he was. If we ask how Plato saw himself, however, the
answer might be: as an educator, even an educational revolutionary. While Plato's
founding of the Academy is perhaps the most concrete indication of his interest in
education, there is, behind all of his writings, a project for educational reform. Plato's
educational interests are explicit in the Republic and Laws, and education is generally
recognized as a key topic in the I^tagoias, Meno, Euthydemus, and Goigias. This
dissertation will focus, however, on Plato's educational project in his earliest, shortest,
and most Socratic dialogues: Apology, Ciito, Ion, lEppiasMinor, Charmides. Laches,
Euthyphio, and Lysis. ^
1.1 Connecting Plato and Education in the Earliest Dialogues
Many scholars have written about Plato's theory of education, but almost none of
them has considered his earliest works. The fact is, Plato never announces an educational
project in these dialogues and only occasionally addresses pedagogical issues directly.
The earliest dialogues focus on arete [dpexfj, excellence, virtue] and so are thought to be
ethical works, but it is precisely their concern with arete that identifies them as
educational. During Plato's lifetime, the nature of arete and how to achieve it was the
topic of a large social debate — one ultimately about education. Arete had long been the
accepted goal of education, and now poetic, aristocratic, and sophistic accounts and
approaches to arete were facing off on center stage in Athens. Plato entered the debate
with a moral account of arete and a prescription of philosophy as the best activity for
‘ For an explanation of my selection and characterization of these dialogues, see the appendix.
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achieving it. His defense of this view against rival accounts and methods makes up
Plato s project for education in the early Socratic dialogues.
l .l rl Cpnnecting Philosophy and Education with
Existing scholarship on Plato's theory of education largely ignores the earliest
dialogues, but the intimate connection Plato saw between philosophy and education is
widely recognized. Field (1930, p. 18) says Plato "was before anything else a teacher."
Friedlander (1958, p. 85) suggests that Plato inherited philosophy and education as a
connected whole from Socrates. In many ways, Plato's works cany on Socrates'
educational mission. Even scholars who concentrate on the Republic and Laws have
acknowledged that the educational theories expressed in these works reverberate
elsewhere in Plato. Nettleship's TheoiyofEducation in Plato's Republic widens its
focus well beyond its namesake dialogue, concluding at one point that the study of
philosophy for Plato just is "true education" (1935, p. 155). Noting that the Republic
and Laws are educational treatises on education w'hich perform the very services they
examine. Lodge (1947, p. 169) asks, "And as to the other dialogues, of which of them is
not the same statement approximately true?" In his comprehensive work on Greek
education, Paideia. Jaeger (1943, p. 85) concurs, concluding that Plato always focused
"on the problem of the philosophical assumptions underlying all education."
Havelock and more recently Robb recognize a connection between Plato's
dissatisfaction with traditional education and his famous attack on poetry in the
Republic. Interpreting the attack in light of research on the roles of literacy, orality, and
Homeric epic in Greek education, they see it not as an aberration, but as a reasoned move
against the "custodians of the traditional Hellenic paideia" and "perpetuators of the
shoddy forms of thinking" (Robb 1994, p. 173). Explains Havelock (1963, p. 12),
2
"Once It IS appreciated that the poets are central to the educational apparatus, the
successive critiques of poetry fall into place." Plato recognizes and criticizes the
educational use of poetry in the earliest dialogues as well.
The few commentators who venture beyond the Republic and in examining
Plato s educational theory still gravitate toward the more complex early works: Meno,
Protagoras and Goigias. While Teloh’s SocraticEducation in Platons EarlyDialogues
focuses on Socrates the teacher rather than Plato the educational theorist, it still
recognizes the educational theme of several early dialogues, concluding that "what does
hold together these dialogues is a picture of Socrates the educator" (Teloh, 1986, p. 3).
The real educator in these early dialogues, however, is Plato, who brilliantly develops the
character of Socrates to breathe educational life into the medium of literature.
The fact that research on Plato's educational theory has virtually ignored the earliest
dialogues reveals a failure to recognize the importance of arete in ancient Greek
educational theory. Arete was the traditional goal of education in ancient Greece, as
illustrated at Euthydemus 273d where Socrates calls the sophists' alleged ability to teach
arete a "godsend" and declares himself and all his friends in need of instruction.^ Plato
accepts arete as the proper goal of education but has his own ideas about what it is and
how it might be achieved. Hence the earliest dialogues seek to define arete and
prescribe philosophy as a means for achieving it. Arete is the glue that binds philosophy
and education together for Plato. Whenever arete is discussed in the dialogues, Plato is
working on his theory of education.^
The conventional translation of arete as 'virtue' has contributed to the tendency to
overlook its educational significance. Alternative translations such as 'excellence', and
^ For more on arete as the goal of education see: Hippias Major 283 - 284; and Tiniaeus 87b.
^This is recognized by Grube (1980, ch. 7).
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'goodness' better suggest the role of an educational objective/ In fact, agathos [ayaQoq,
good] is the adjective corresponding to the noun arete and the idea that education
should produce good people is anything but controversial. When the sophists and
Socrates agree that they want Cleinias' education to make him agathos at Euthydemus
275a and 282e, they reinforce the idea that he is to acquire arete. Since being agathos
had everything to do with performing good actions, arete is profitably understood as that
quality which enables a person to do good things.^ Indeed Meno defines aiete at 77b
as the "desire for beautiful things and the ability to attain them." This ancient Greek
connection between arete and the making of good choices and doing of good actions
shows the scholarly description of the early dialogues as ethical to be accurate. The fact
that arete was the central goal of education, shows these ethical dialogues to be an
integral part of Plato's educational project.
Every educational theory had its own idea of what arete is and how it can be
acquired. Plato criticizes these theories in the earliest dialogues then reestablishes arete
as excellence of the soul and prescribes philosophy as the means for achieving it. Hence,
for Plato there was really no important distinction between education and philosophy.^
As the great philosopher of education John Dewey (1993, p. 30) said in lecturing on
Plato, "However far apart philosophy and educational theory may later have become, in
their beginnings they were strictly identical." Perhaps Plato is addressing his readers,
ancient and modern alike, when he has Laches say to Lysimachus:
'Marrou (1956, p. 1 1) calls the translation of arete as 'virtue' "ludicrous," preferring
"
'valor' in the
chivalric sense of the word — the quality of the hero." Nettleship (1935, p. 146) explains arete as doing one's
specific work well. Field (1930, p. 103) secs arete simply as the noun corresponding the adjective 'good'.
^ Vlastos, (1991, p. 210 - 21 1) explains Socrates' principle of the sovereignty of virtue as the making
of good choices. Sec also ApoJogv 28b, and Crito 48cd.
‘Jaeger (1943, p. 85) says Plato's philosophy seeks a solution to the problem of educating people.
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Tm surprised that you're asking us for advice on your sons' education and you
arent asking Socrates here
. . . (^Laches. 180bc)^
LI -2 The Historical Motivation for Plato's Prniprt
That Plato's early philosophical thought should focus on education was made nearly
inevitable by his historical circumstances. As fate would have it, Plato came of age during
a time when Greek education was already at a crossroads, struggling to adapt to massive
social and political changes in Athens.® Heroic performances on the battlefield and
athletic field were losing importance compared with eloquent performances in the
assembly. As education became available to more than the aristocracy, the battle raged
over whether arete could be taught. Meanwhile, the sophists arrived hawking education
designed to win glory in the new Athens. Aiete seemed to go from an aristocratically
inherited trait to a commodity for sale in the agora. At the same time, literacy was
becoming widespread and it looked as though the future of education would revolve
around the written rather than the spoken word. For Plato, these changes pointed to a
moral relativism that threatened (and perhaps eventually destroyed) Athens. Education
was important to Plato because arete was such an obvious social priority.
It would be a mistake to paint Plato as a complete educational revolutionary since
many of his efforts aimed to preserve threatened educational traditions. Although he
disdained the aristocrats' emphasis on reputation and physical appearance, Plato
cherished their tradition of sunousia (a\)VO\)aia, association, mentoring). Similarly, he
approved of Homer's attempt to provide moral standards but he disapproved of the
Homeric criteria for arete and the way poetry was used to indoctrinate youth. Finally,
Plato shared the sophists' intellectualism, but he sensed that they lacked worthwhile
^All translations of Laches in this chapter arc by Lane (1987) unless otherwise noted.
“This fact is noted by several classical scholars including: Beck (1964), Havelock (1963), Robb (1994),
Kagan (1991 ), Dover (1974), Marrou (1956), and Field (1930).
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standards and balked from their attempts to sell arete as a commodity. What made
Plato's educational project so innovative was that he adapted rising technology in an
effort to preserve the best aspects of educational traditions.
Plato's worries about the state of Greek education were part of a widely-held
concern about moral decline in Athens, especially among the youth.^ Part of the problem
stemmed from democratic reforms requiring more time to be spent on the affairs of the
state and less on the care and education of the youth, as the concerned father Lysimachus
laments in the Laches :
Now, we have decided to take these boys in hand, in so far as we possibly can,
and not — as most parents do when their children have reached their teens — let
them do whatever they want; now is the time to start doing our utmost to take care
of them . . . we blame our fathers for allowing us to run wild once we became
teenagers, while they were busy with other people's affairs. (179b-d)
The general Laches agrees at 180b that neglect of the children is a problem for "everyone
involved in the affairs of our state" and then points to Socrates as one of the few elders
who still tries to improve the youth. Ironically, Socrates' Platonic interlocutors include
youths who later go bad. As I argue below, however, these dialogues reveal the youths'
moral flaws rather than Socrates' apparent failure as a teacher. The problem, as Plato saw
it, was that there wasn't enough of Socrates to go around.
A second problem precipitated by democratic reform and the rise of the sophists was
the erosion of moral standards derived from epic and myth. The advent of verse and then
writing enhanced the accuracy of preserved poetry, but that accuracy revealed its
inconsistencies and eroded its reliability as a moral guide. Both Protagoras (at 339 -
’Field (1930, p. 116) notes happily that this moral decline spawned some great contributions to ethics.
‘“Dover (1974, p. 130): "It was recognized that poets had from the very first told many irreconcilable
versions of the same myth, so that mythology in their hands had always been a creative art, not the transmission
of a sacrosanct tradition with different embellishments." See also Havelock (1963, p. 97): "In the context of
current needs [Plato] was content to identify the previous functional role of poetry with clarity and vehemence
in order to reject it as a dangerous obstacle to intellectual progress."
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347) and Socrates (at Meno 95 - 96) point out poetic contradictions to challenge the
poets' reliability as moral guides. Worse than the poets' own contradictions was their
reports of contradictions among the Gods which contributed to widespread religious
decline in Plato's Athens." Socrates comes out at Euthyphro 6bc as seriously doubting
the poetic accounts of enmity among the gods.
Euthyphro's conviction of his rightness, a characteristic common in Socrates'
interlocutors, is further evidence of the religious decline. Explains Dover (1974, p. 133),
the Greeks had a keen sense of human fallibility which, combined with the tendency to
think of superhuman powers as reacting against human success "had the great advantage
of tending to discourage in the individual unshakable conviction of his own rightness."
Yet Euthyphro, Plato's most religious character, is so convinced of his own rightness that
he doesn't ponder the consequences of unjustly prosecuting his father. While Plato does
not explicitly associate the infallible with the divine, he clearly makes an effort in the
early dialogues to contrast human fallibility with the ideal. Socrates' avow'al of ignorance,
despite the oracle's declaration that he is wisest among men ( Apology 21a), shows a
keen respect for the limits of human knowledge.
While Athenian doubts about poetry and myth may have been well founded, they
left a moral vacuum that was filled with the volatile replacement of mass opinion.
Socrates and Plato are legendary in their disdain for hoipolJoi [oi TCO^^oi, the many].
In Laches, Socrates expressly rejects the recommendations of the multitude:
Yes, because I think that if a decision is to be made properly, then it must be made
on the basis of knowledge and not numbers [i.e. a majority]. (184e)
The problem with hoipolio! is that they are easily influenced by clever arguments and
emotional appeals. The sophists, in fact, specialized in teaching skills such as rhetoric
"Dcspland (1985, p. 52) says Apology shows the "moral bankruptcy of the traditional religious ethos."
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and enstic specifically designed to influence the masses and so win favor in the new
Athens. Plato makes the situation tragically clear at Apology' 38d, where Socrates
blames his conviction on an unwillingness to sway the massive jury by emotional means.
Socrates' trial and conviction was perhaps the most powerful indication to Plato that
Athens was in need of educational reform. But several factors converged to make the age
during which Plato lived and wrote a time of great educational change in Greece.^^
Historical events such as democratic reforms, the rise of literacy, the demise of religion,
and the arrival of the sophists, combined to produce a moral crisis and doubts about
education in ancient Athens. As the flawed dogmatism of the poets was giving way to the
pragmatic relativism of the sophists, Plato saw that crisis spiraling out of control. The old
system had failed to support cultural change and a new system was needed. We can see
what role Plato played in educational change by exploring the role educational change
plays in Plato's early dialogues.
1.1.3 The Mythopoetic Ideal of Arete
The towering figure in the history of Greek education, indeed in the history of Greek
communication and cultural unity, was Homer. Since Homer's poetry was understood
and shared by nearly every Greek tribe long before they could understand each other's
dialects, it gave Greece a cultural and moral uniformity long before such a thing seemed
possible.^^ Furthermore, epic poetry provided moral leadership and ethical standards in
ancient Greece. A fragment from Xenophanes of Colophon (ca. 550 b.c.) reveals this
‘^Beck (1964, p. 313) calls 450 - 350 b.c. an era of educational revolution. "In this period, the emerging
educational trends of the previous thousand years crystallized into their definitive form... Mythopoetic thought
has given way to philosophic exposition . . ."
‘^Plato’s eventual theory of forms may also be profitably interpreted as a response to this crisis. Field
(1930, p. 116) says Plato was just one of many "laboring to rediscover some standard of right conduct."
"See Robb (1994, p. 54): "No small part of the function of the Odyssey as paideia in oral Greece was
to inculcate a respect, pan-Hellenic and deeply felt, for the institution of xenia. "
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function proclaiming that, "Since the beginning from Homer, all have learned proper
conduct. The prevalence of poetic quotations in the ethical conversations of Plato's
own dialogues only confirms epic's role as the ethical touchstone of Ancient Greece.'^
Promoters of musical education thought that ai^te could be achieved by following
the example of epical heroes,^^ Several of Plato's characters appeal to epical precedent or
memorized verse when considering an ethical matter. The most famous example of this
phenomenon is Euthyphro's m)rthopoetic belief that he should prosecute his father:
For these same people worship Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods.
They agree that he put his own father in bonds for unjustly swallowing his
children; yes, and that that father had in turn castrated his father for similar
reasons. Yet me they are angry at for indicting my father for his injustice. So they
contradict themselves: they say one thing about the gods and another about me.
( Euthyphro 5e - 6b)^®
Strangely, Euthyphro never bothers to question the story about Zeus, nor does he worry
that the analogy between Zeus' situation and his own might not hold. Socrates mocks his
confidence in treating a myth like knowledge, but Euthyphro's attitude was a normal
consequence of the way poetry was used in education.
At Protagoras 325d - 326a, the role of poetry in education is explained:
. . . and when the boys have learned their letters and are ready to understand the
written word as formerly the spoken, [their teachers] set the works of good poets
before them on their desks to read and make them learn them by heart, poems
containing much admonition and many stories, eulogies, and panegyrics of the
good men of old, so that the child may be inspired to imitate them and long to be
like them.*’
Quote IS Robb's translation from J. Lcsher, Xenophanes ofCohphon: Fragments (Toronto, 1992).
Sec Robb (1994, p. 81-2). Sec also Marrou (1956, p.lO) and Kagan (1991, p. 20-21); "Homer wais the fountain
of wisdom and the model of Greek behavior."
“Havelock (1963, p. 43): "If Plato could deal with poetry as though it were a kind of reference library'
or as a vast tractate in ethics and politics and warfare and the like, he is reporting its immemorial function in an
oral culture and testifying to the fact that this remained its function in Greek society down to his own day."
'^Scc, for example, Protagoras 325d - 326a.
“All translations of Euthyphro and Apology are by Allen (1984) unless otherwise noted.
“All translations of Protagoras are by Guthrie (1956).
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Homenc verse was recited to and memorized by schoolboys in order to present them with
heroic models they would be compelled to imitate. This way of teaching via mimesis
[u.lM-'naiq, imitation] was renowned for its effectiveness^® and reinforced by Homer's
account of the education of his own heroes.^^ Although Plato acknowledges the
effectiveness of mimesis (in Repubiic IH, for example), he criticizes it heavily as moral
education because of the ivay it works on the soul:
There is a third form of possession or madness, of which the muses are the source.
This seizes a tender, virgin soul and stimulates it to rapt passionate expression,
especially in lyric poetry, glorif>ang the countless mighty deeds of ancient times for
the instruction of posterity. ( Phaedrus 245a)^^
Poetry influences the emotional part of the soul, bringing its audience into a state of
aesthetic rapture and therefore bypassing critical reason. The emphasis on indoctrination
and memorization exacerbates that problem by pushing wholesale acceptance and
performance of the stories rather than analysis and discussion. As an ethical guide poetry
offers vivid and compelling examples, but they are fbced in the circumstances of another
time and of dubious help as reference. As Athens drifted further from the world of
Odysseus, the analogies stretched and became less and less effective.
In addition, poets were stoiytellers whose true aim was to please their audience.^^
The poets' and rhapsodes' role as entertainers brought into question their ulterior motives
as educators. Plato makes the absurdity of this situation clear in the Ion, where the
rhapsode readily admits that he appeals to his listeners' emotions to draw them in and
^“Robb (1994, p. 33) calls epical verse "a complex and surpassingly successful discourse of social
education and control. The later Greek word for this phenomenon was paideia, a near perfect choice [since]
paideia involves an unconscious, willing acceptance of ancestral models, even as a pais, a boy, models himself
on his male elders, his father and his older brothers, and his most admired peers, normally the best warriors or
best athletes. It is a process as old as our species and, .especially for adolescent males, effective beyond
telling." See also Jaeger (1939, p. 310).
At Iliad ix 524 ff., for example, Achilles' tutor Cheiron tells the story of a mythic warnor to counsel
him dunng a battle.
“All translations of Phaedrus are by Hackforth (1952) unless otherwise noted.
“a similar point is made by Beck (1964, p. 205).
10
transmit his message almost subliminally. Ion is not bashful about acknowledging that
his ability to manipulate emotions directly affects his income:
At each performance, I look down on them from up there on the platform as they
weep and look at me with dire emotion in their eyes, in amazement at my stoiy.
1 n’
^ attention to them - since if I make them ciy I shall
augh all the way to the bank, whereas if I provoke their laughter, it's I who'll do
the crying, for loss of money. ( SSSe)^'*
Even if the poet or rhapsode's message comes through him from the god, he is unable to
analyze the message and unwilling to field questions. The verse is accepted as doctrine,
its authority unquestioned.
Poetry hadn't always been so unyielding. In its oral form, Homeric poetry managed
to preserve the ideals of while simultaneously letting them evolve.^® Oral stories
designed to indoctrinate morally are normally changed by the speaker to be most relevant
to their intended target. A grandfather emphasizes the similarities between his grandson
and the hero of his bedtime story. This technique allows the ethical examples to evolve
and remain relevant to successive generations. Writing a story down, however, freezes it
in time and stops the evolution that keeps it relevant. For Homeric poetry, this process
began when the epic was set to verse which made it easy to memorize and recite with
accuracy. The advent of writing now threatened to grind the process to a halt.
Homeric verse was surely among the first of lengthy things to be written down, but
it's transmission, like most of the rest of Greek education, remained primarily oral even
into Plato's day.^^ In fact, Plato's attack on mousike [fiOtiaiKT), music -- which includes
All translations of Jon arc by Saunders (1987) unless otherwise noted.
“Beck (1964, p. 32 - 33) calls Homer "both conservative and progressive - conservative inasmuch as
the older standards tended to become embedded in the formulae of the epos, and progressive in the sense that
newly evolving standards also found their place, in some cases displacing, in others existing with, the old."
“See Havelock (1963, p. 43).
“Kagan (1991, p. 162): "Most citizens could read to some degree, but there was not much to read, and
they did not read much. Most learning took place by listening to speeches, usucilly in poetic meter, or by seeing
what there was to sec. The Athenians heard rhapsodes sing Homer's epics, choruses and individuals sing lyric
and elegiac poetry, and they saw and heard tragedies and comedies, which involved speech, song, and dance."
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poetry] in the Republic is evidence that the rhythmic recitation of Homeric verse was
still used for moral indoctrination.^* Additionally, while the existence of writing allowed
the stories to be written down and memorized with even more accuracy and precision,
setting poems to music helped to bypass the critical intellect during the educational
process:
The music-masters by analogous methods [to the school masters who make the
children learn epic poetry by heart] instill self-control [aco(ppocTV)vr|c;] and deter
the young from evil-doing; and when they have learned to play the lyre, they teach
them the work of good poets of another sort, namely the lyrical, which they
accompany on the lyre, familiarizing the minds [dvayKOt^ODaiv oiKeio\)CT0ai
xaiq v|/v^aT(;] of the children with the rhythms and melodies. By this means they
become more civilized, more balanced, and better adjusted in themselves and so
more capable in whatever they say or do; for rhythm and harmonious adjustment
are essential to the whole of human life. ( Protagoras 326ab)
Note that anangkazo [dvayKOC^co] means "to force, compel, or constrain;" while
oikeio [OIKBIOCO] means "to make one's own." Guthrie's 'familiarize' may be more
graphically replaced by 'forced to make one's own' or 'forced to accept'. This method of
teaching morality via absorption and performance of epical stories was effective and
hence accepted despite its drawbacks. The Socratic idea of teaching by asking questions
and the Platonic method of writing dialogue, were drastic revisions to this poetic
tradition.
1.1.4 The Aristocratic Tradition
In addition to destroying the adaptability of educational poetry, the rising tide of
literacy threatened to sweep away two aristocratic educational traditions that Plato hoped
to preserve: the educational mentoring called sunous/a and the roundtable discussion
known as the symposion [cri)|i7c6aiov, symposium]. Plato worried that the act of
^®See Robb (1994), p. 191.
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discussing issues with one's mentors or peers would be replaced by the solitary act of
reading. As much as was possible, however, Plato attempted to adapt and incorporate
these traditions into his reforms^’ Sunousia and symposia survive in Plato's dialogues
and, as far as we know, they survived at his academy
Where Plato disagreed with the aristocrats was on their conception of arete. Pindar
championed the aristocratic view that arete was acquired through bloodlines and not
schooling.^^ The aristocrats therefore believed that education could do little more than
help a nobleman achieve his destiny; hence all others should be excluded.^^ While Plato
was sympathetic to some aspects of aristocratic education, his focus on the excellence of
the soul rather than the excellence of the body sets him apart.
The aristocrats go so far as ic connect the arete of a man with the beauty of his
body. As Marrou (1956, p. 44) explains, the central ideal of aristocratic education was
kalokagathia [KOt^tomyaeia] or "being a man both beautiful and good." It combined
the moral aspect of being good (agatkos ) with a reverence for being physically beautiful
or kaJos. This concept is criticized in both Charmides (157 ff.) and L}sis, 206c:
He [Lysis] was easily the best looking, and deserved to be called not just
handsome [KoXog] but rather handsome and good [KCxXog xe KOtyaOog].^^
Socrates makes it clear, however, that he is interested in the beauty of souls not bodies.
Upon seeing the beauty of young Charmides’ face and hearing others remark that the
beauty of his body is even greater, Socrates inquires about the beauty of his soul and
suggests that they strip that and look at it rather than his body (154de). The constant
” Ironically Socrates and Plato are both responsible for eroding the traditions of sunousia since they
removed education from the familial and tribal circle and initiated the institutionalization of education in
Athens. Still Plato retained both traditions in his Academy. See Robb (1994, p. 35 and 204).
’"See Robb(1994, p. 35)
"'See Pindar, Nc/ncans (111,57-8); Oiympics (VIII, 59-61); P^ihian Odes (II, 131, 176).
”See Marrou (1956, p. 40),Perk.inson (1980, p. 5), and Jaeger (1939, ch.lO).
”AI1 translations of Lysis are by Watt (1987) unless otherwise noted.
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reminders that Socrates lacked physical beauty despite the beauty of his soul further
betray Plato's disagreement with the ideal of kaJokagathia.
Plato appears to agree with the aristocratic idea that a man's arete manifests itself in
battle, however, since at Laches 181ab Socrates' past performance in battle is taken as a
sign of his arete. There is a crucial difference between a good action resulting from true
arete, and what merely appears to be a good act. The aristocratic ideal focuses on
appearances and fails to distinguish between a good reputation and a truly good man.
Aristocrats themselves found their theory self-contradictory, however, when the
battlefield gave way to the athletic field as the arena where arete would manifest itself
and athletes of lesser birth arrived victorious at the Olympic Games.^^
The belief that common citizens could achieve arete was taking hold in Athens,^^
and as the athletic ideal gave way to a political one, the ambition to do well in the
political arena supplanted the desire for glory in battle or on the athletic field.” But the
new political arete made the same mistake that the heroic and athletic ideals had: it
confused the appearance of arete with its true existence in the soul. Charmides first
describes sophrosune in terms of its outward appearance as quietness (159b).
Euthydemus and Dionysodorous think they can teach arete by showing how to tie a man
up in logical knots before an audience.^* While he tried to preserve the aristocratic
’^See, for example, Alcibiades' comparison of Socrates to a silene statue that is ugly on the outside but
has the images of gods within ( Symposium, 215ab)..
Plato illustrates this changing of the guard of arete with the cast of characters in the Laches. The
oldest pair, Nicias and Laches, were prominent generals, both of whom eventually died in battle. Lysimachus is
reputed (at Meno 94a) to have been given the best education his city could provide while Melesias is said to
have been trained as a top wrestler; but both men lament their failure to pass arete genetically to their sons.
’‘Jaeger (1939, p. 239, 275) sees dramatic evidence of this fact in the plays of Aeschylus and
Sophocles: "Aeschylus connects Pindar and Plato; his plays are an educational depiction of how a noble spirit
could be reborn in the new spirit of freedom... Sophocles taught through his plays by painting a cultural (as
opposed to aristocratic) ideal in his characters. TTiis reflected the attempt to deliberately form human
character."
” See Marrou (1956, p. 470): Political power turned out to be much greater than the physical strength
for which the athlete and warrior were esteemed and politics became "the noblest, the most highly prized
activity in the eyes of every Greek, the ultimate aim of his ambition." See also Protagoras 316b, 319a.
”See for example ( Euthydemus, 278b)
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tradition of sunousta. Plato straggled to shift the conception of arete away from
appearance. The whole culture of looking for arete externally is an aristocratic tradition
Plato lobbied hard to overturn.
1.1.5 The Sophistic Revolution
The sophists connected ^rete with techne [te^VTl, skill] and made a business of
teaching it for a price.^^ Since social, political, and financial success could be achieved
through practical skills like rhetoric, such skills were taken to yield arete. Given the
aristocratic and poetic connection between arete and reputation, the sophistic
interpretation was a natural development. Plato viewed the connection between
appearance and techne as a mistake, however, and felt that these traditions erroneously
confused social success and skillfulness with arete. Socrates harshly criticizes
sophistical skills as education in the Euthydemus:
These things are the frivolous part of study (which is why I also tell you that the
men are jesting); and I call these things "frivolity" because even if a man were to
learn many or even all such things, he would be none the wiser as to how matters
stand but would only be able to make fun of people, tripping them up and
overturning them by means of the distinctions in words, just like the people who
pull the chair out from under a man who is going to sit down and then laugh
gleefully when they see him sprawling on his back. ( Euthydemus 278b)^*
The center of a sophistic education was training in oratory. Almost directly as a
result of Ephialtes reforms in 461 b.c. which empowered the assembly to settle all major
matters of public policy by decree, rhetorical skill became invaluable. While all citizens
had the right to speak, few possessed the skills and confidence to exercise this power the
^’Sce, for example, Protagoras 249a.
^“Frederick. Beck, (1964, p.296) explains that rhetoric was the favored subject of Plato’s chief
educational rival: Isocrates. "Throughout his whole career Isocrates never ceased to proclaim the pnmacy or
rhetoric to all other forms of intellectual training, conceding with increasing years a provisional value only to
philosophy, as a preparation for the study of rhetoric. Plato's view of the place of philosophy was equally
resolute, but he does appear to have become more tolerant to the teaching of rhetoric in the Academy toward
the latter part of his life, and this change was no doubt influenced by the obvious success of Isocrates' school.”
^‘All translations of Eut/iydowus are by Sprague (1992) unless otherwise noted.
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fullest. The sophists taught how to speak confidently and effectively. A good speaker
could (and still can) manipulate his audience and so greatly influence public policy. He
may even persuade the assembly or a jury away from the truth, as Euthyphro recognizes:
So he indicts you for making innovations in religious matters and hales you into
court to slander you, knowing full well how easily such things are misrepresented
to the multitude. ( Euthyphro 3bc)
The very fact that Socrates must defend his honest speech despite its weakness in court at
Apology 38de shows that Athenians simultaneously recognized the moral hollowness of
letting persuasion outdistance truth and the undeniable fact that great power could be
gained from this fact. Ultimately, persuasion was more powerful than truth.
Predictably, a skill more powerful than truth did not come cheaply. Marrou (1956,
p. 33, 49) notes that Protagoras charged ten thousand drachmas, one drachma being
equivalent to a fair daily wage, for a three to four year course. Although the opinion of
the aristocrats had been that the man who made a business out of teaching should be
despised, the cost of a sophistic education indirectly validated their idea that knowledge
should be reserved for the elite few. Plato rarely misses a chance to contrast Socrates'
poverty and refusal to accept payment with the sophists' greed. Socrates goes so far as to
speculate that his indictment is partly based on his refusal to be selective about his
pupils:
But I fear my own generosity is such that they think I am willing to pour myself
out in speech to any man — not only without pay, but glad to pay myself if only
someone will listen. ( Euthyphro 3d)
Although competition eventually brought prices down, free market pressures
continued to compromise the sophists' educational goals. A sophist's success depended
heavily on his ability to persuade people to pay for his course. Sophists did their own
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advertising; they would go out and offer sample lectures that displayed their skill and sold
their services. As Marrou (1956, p. 49 - 50) points out, a sophist was not beyond claiming
omniscience, infallibility, or "pronouncing his decisions from a throne high up in the
air." Truth doesn't matter much when the ultimate goal is getting paid. Lysimachus no
doubt has sophists in mind when he says:
There are, you see, some people who scoff at men like yourselves, and if someone
asks for advice, they won't say what they really believe. They aim at what they
think the person consulting them wants to hear, and offer him something quite
different from their real opinion. {l3cJies 178ab)
It was not so much the sheer pragmatism of the sophistic education that irked Plato.
Rather he was worried about the relativism engendered by the "might is right " attitude."^
The sophists insisted on the moral neutrality of their tuition, yet moral guidance is
precisely the objective of education for arete. The fading of Homeric and aristocratic
ideals made the need for moral guidance urgent, but the sophists contributed to the
growing relativism. Plato recognized that he lived in a world where good rhetoricians
could, "like tyrants, put to death any man they will, and deprive of their fortunes and
banish whomsoever it seems best" ( Goigias 466c).'’^
Ironically, Plato's attempt to reshape the conception of arete and direct moral
pursuits would be based on something he shared with the sophists; intellectualism. Like
the sophists, Plato rejected the idea that it was impossible to acquire arete except by
aristocratic inheritance and agreed with what Jaeger (1939, p. 287) calls the central
claim of the sophistic movement: "that arete should be founded on knowledge and not
blood." In his attempt to awaken minds etherized by the rhythmic indoctrination of
^^See Hippias Minor 368bd, Corgias 447c, 448a., and Protagoras 315c.
^^Contrast Beck (1964, p. 199) who takes Plato to be as relativistic as the sophists.
^^Sce Crorgias 456d. where the teacher is not to blame for the misuse of the rhetoric he teaches.
Isocrates uses a similar argument at Antidosjs 252.
All translations of Gorgias are by Allen (1984) unless otherwise noted.
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mythopoetic education, Plato holds up the sophistic model of a techne or intellectual
skill that allows a person to judge particulars. Where Plato departs from the sophists is in
distinguishing moral from technical knowledge (i.e. of rhetoric) and acknowledging
both its greatness and our own ignorance of it. Once this deficiency is recognized, the
philosophical pursuit of arete, directed by an ideal conception of the good, can begin.
L2 Plato's Educational Objectives in the Rarliest Dialogues
There are three key components in Plato's project for educational reform: Awaken,
Acknowledge, and Aim. Since Plato sees arete as perfection of the soul which for each
individual is unique and therefore cannot be taught directly, his project will emphasize
self-determination. The first task is to awaken the mind from the rapture of poetry and
assumption of moral knowledge in order to engage it actively in inquiry and analysis.
Poetry and technical skills are not disdained in the early dialogues; Socrates frequently
quotes verse and praises craftsmen in his argument. He insists, however, that verse be
questioned and analyzed and that his interlocutors represent their own beliefs rather than
those borrowed from poets or anyone else. Second, Plato insists that arete be
acknowledged as a moral ideal connected to knowledge rather than reputation, and that
human beings acknowledge their ignorance with respect to that ideal. Once the greatness
of arete and the deficiency of human beings is acknowledged, education can do no more
than teach the student to aim for wisdom. The love and pursuit of wisdom — philosophy
in its literal sense -- is Plato's educational ideal.
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1.2.1 Awakening the Mind; The Release from Poetry
As I explained above, Plato had serious doubts about the use of poetry, an
artistically inspired creation aimed to enchant audiences, as moral education/^ What
bothered him most was how poetry taught morality, namely by mimesis - the imitation
of heroes. Unquestionably, this method effectively inspires behavior; the problem is that
it diminishes the agent’s ability to solve his own unique problems. To some degree, the
agent can t separate himself from his idol and must rely on analogy in making ethical
decisions. Even then he can’t evaluate a situation any better than the poet who created
the story, and Plato makes it clear that poetic inspiration is by nature mindless.^^ The
poets connection with the divine endows their verse with valuable meaning, but that
meaning must be approached through analysis and interpretation not acceptance.
When poetry does appear in the early dialogues, it is almost invariably accompanied
by Socrates asking the interlocutor to evaluate or interpret it.'*® Asking interlocutors to
question their beliefs in light of poetic conflicts is a proper use of poetry on Socrates’
scheme. It makes poetry an ally rather than an obstacle in investigation. The mnemonic
techniques used in traditional poetic education, in contrast, effectively paralyzed the
critical capacity of the mind. Socrates can’t resist the chance to contrast Ion and Hippias’
great mnemonic abilities to his own ’’forgetfulness” while in the process of revealing their
intellectual weakness.*® The rhythm and rhyme of poetry or musical lyrics is highly
conducive to retaining them; the problem is that we retain them uncritically and with
’‘Many commentators consider Plato's rejection of poetry hypocritical since he was a poet and
dramatist himself who clearly tried to present a moral message by poetic means. See for example, Marrou
(1956, p. 72).
’^See i^/7 534 ff. Plato had similar fears about tragedy, says Irwin (1992, p. 68): "He criticizes tragedy
as a form of rhetoric; it makes particular moral views appear attractive to the ignorant and irrational audience,
and it is written by writers who do not understamd the moral questions any better than their audiences do."
’’See Charmides Lysis 2 12de, 214b, and 216a.
”See Ion 368d, and Hippias Minor 539e - 540a.
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nearly no idea of what we are learning. Plato's push for rational inquiry entailed an
attack on poetry as uncritically accepted moral doctrine.^®
Greece’s attachment to its Homeric heroes was irrational, like a child’s attachment to
her secunty blanket. The ability to absorb poetic paradigms was invariably accompanied
by a great capacity for action in accordance with those paradigms, but the middleman of
individual reason was absent from the equation. Greeks often confused the poet with his
dramatic heroes, and his ideals with theirs. Ion thinks Homer has taught him to race a
chanot, cure the sick, and lead an army when it’s unlikely that Homer did any of those
things himself.^^ Other times Greeks used contradictory interpretations of verse to
construct an inconsistent moral belief system accepted on the authority of the poet.^^
To wean Greece from its poetic security blanket, Plato needed to distinguish
individuals from their poetic idols and force them to take responsibility for their moral
beliefs.” Interlocutors are asked to ”say what they believe" and discouraged from
defending their views by appeal to authority. Socrates sardonically compliments a
confused Ion at 530bc for his (non)ability to understand the poets rather than just mimic
them and insists that Hippias defend his beliefs rather than appeal to Homer’s authority:
Well, let's leave Homer out of this, since it's impossible to question him about his
poetic intentions in these lines; but you can answer for Homer as well as yourself,
since you’re obviously undertaking the responsibility of doing so, and you agree
with Homer's words as you see them. ( Hippias Minor 365cd)”
In his effort to distinguish an interlocutor's personal beliefs from the field of
information (including poetry and experience) from which he derives those beliefs, Plato
^“Havelock (1963, p. 199) explains that Poetry’s "acceptance and retention are made psychologically
possible by a mechanism of self-surrender to the poetic performance and of self-identification with the
situations and the stories related in performance. Only when the spell is fully effective can his mnemonic
powers be fully mobilized.”
^‘Sce Jaeger (1943, p. xiii)
”Scc, for example, Protagoras 339 - 347, and Mono 95 - 96.
think this is what Havelock (1963, p. 201) calls "separating the knower from the known."
^^All translations of Hippias Minor are by Waterfield (1987) unless otherwise noted.
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employed the tool of Socratic questioning ” Long lectures and speeches keep the flow of
ideas going in one direction and leave their audience little time to reflect upon an idea
before receiving it. But it would be bad form, not to mention fruitless, to break into a
speech or recitation of poetry and ask what a certain statement means, as Socrates laments
at HippiasMinor 364b. Once the conversation begins, however, Socrates questions
Hippias' own views rather than those expounded by Homer (365cd) or in Hippias’ own
prepared speeches (363bc). As I show in Chapter 3, Hippias’ interpretation of Homer
turns out to reveal his personal confusion about arete, but it is only through Socratic
questioning that this confusion emerges.
Ask any electoral strategist and you will find that people often base actions such as
voting or buying on poetic phrases like "Putting power back in the hands of the American
People’’ or "It’s the right one now" while being almost totally at a loss to explain what
those phrases mean. Of course they think they know wLat the phrases mean, but like
Laches at 190c, they are at a loss to explain them. The Socratic question asks
interlocutors to explain the principles on which they base action. When principles are
swallowed whole with the sweetener of some poetic turn of phrase, the answerer often
can’t explain them. Appeal to poetic or even political authority is not an acceptable
escape. The Socratic question destroys the illusion of knowledge fostered by poetic
rapture; illusions of knowledge being perhaps the greatest obstacle to inquiry.
1,2.2 Establishing Arete as Moral
In some ways, Plato’s project for educational reform was part of a larger wave of
intellectualism that swept through Athens during his lifetime. Socrates, Plato, and their
erstwhile enemies the sophists all shared the mantle of intellectualism with Xenophanes
“For a similar observation see Havelock (1963, p. 234 - 235).
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of Colophon, who W'as perhaps the first to challenge the traditional militaiy and athletic
with a new based on the intellect.^ Although they agreed that arete was of
the mind, they disagreed sharply over how it should be achieved. Plato hoped to replace
the emotional pleasures of poetic education with intellectual ones, but he found that
Greek minds, once denied the security blanket of poetic rapture, groped for the
intellectual security of false conceit and hid behind that in their resistance to inquity.
Whereas Socrates seems to draw immense pleasure from his search for the truth, his
interlocutors often need to be goaded. Euthyphro's "wealth of wisdom" (12a) makes him
lazy and soft in discussion (lie) while Laches fails to show courage and endurance in
inquiry once he realizes that his expertise in this area is being challenged (193e). Inquiry
is pleasurable for Socrates because he has no false conceit of wisdom. For the others it is
wearing, because they are reluctant to give up the security of thinking themselves wise or,
worse, their reputations for wisdom. Socrates lays out strict criteria for wisdom in Ion,
however, insisting that it enable a person to make reliable judgments in particular
instances the way a craftsman can reliably judge instances of his craft.
This intellectual and technical conception of arete was favored by the sophists who
connected arete with achievement in practical skills like oratory and shoemaking. Plato
needed to show, however, that the formal similarity between arete and techne does
not extend to equivalence, as the sophists would have it. For Plato, arete is a moral
achievement distinct from social and professional success. Hippias, however, confounds
the practical knowledge implied in a techne with the moral knowledge needed for arete
and so finds himself with the paradoxical conclusion that a good criminal is a good
person. In the Hippias Minor Plato must establish a separate moral category.
^‘Scc Marrou (1956, pp. 46 - 47).
”Sce section 3.1., below.
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If Hippias’ confusion between being good morally ( arete ) and being good at a craft
( techne ) seems naive, consider the sophistic approach to education. A good man, for
the sophists, was one who succeeded in the new democracy, and this success depended
on specific skills ( technai ) such as the ability to speak and argue persuasively. Indeed
the sophists liked to point up their goodness by showing how many different technai
they had acquired.^® The sophists were intellectualist because their society rewarded
mental skill rather than battlefield prowess or aristocratic hentage, but they still equated
arete with the appearance of or reputation for it. Democracy encouraged this error by
seeking truth in the opinion of the many.®^ Since skill in oratory could bring wealth,
popular esteem, and political power, skill in oratory could make you a good man.
The Charmides and Laches, as I show in Chapter 4, criticize the sophistic and
aristocratic emphases on appearance and in the process reveal arete in a new dimension.
By pointing out that, for example, the techne a doctor uses to cure his patients does not
enable him to decide whether its better for them to live or die, Plato distinguishes
technical knowledge from the kind of knowledge required for arete. When the
exploration of the intellectual basis for two parts of arete leads to the same "knowledge
of good and evil," arete looks to be something unified.®^ Finally, when it is asked what
sort of knowledge this could be, arete emerges as some new kind of ideal and demands a
reevaluation of the very concept of teaching.
1.2.3 Eliminating False Conceit
Like alcoholics who must admit their dependence before they can even begin to
eradicate it, Greeks needed to admit their ignorance with respect to arete in its moral
^®Sce, for example, Hippias Minor 368b, ff.
” Something specifically resisted by Socrates, for example at Laches 184de.
“See Laches 195cd.
‘'See Laches 195 ff., Charmides 174c, and Mena 87d.
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dimension before they could begin to pursue or even understand it. Plato explains the
need for denchus in education at Sophist 229c, where the Eleatic Stranger complains :
I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of ignorance which is quite
separate, and may be weighed in the scale against all other sorts of ignorance put
together.
. . . When a person supposes that he knows, and does not know; this
appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect.^^
Such false conceit abounds in the dialogues. Interlocutors frequently justify their actions
with epical precedent, the authority of poets or prophets or scholars, or their own
authority based on their beauty, bloodlines, or social success.
Socrates combats his interlocutors' complacency with questions, asking them to
judge or defend the statements as if they were their own.^^ This was not an easy task since
the poetic statement by nature invites one to emotionally identify with it and then to
repeat it. The interlocutor has memorized it and can parrot it, but has never really
reflected on its meaning. Wisdom acquired by aristocratic inheritance, victories in eristic
contests, or the approval of the many, was equally unsecured by reflection. When
Socrates asks interlocutors to say what they mean, he abruptly disturbs the
self-satisfaction of having memorized a story or achieved the reputation for wisdom.^^
Hippias, for example, quotes a passage from Homer as evidence for the difference
between honesty and deceit. "It would be monstrous" not to agree with the poet, he
concludes. Here Socrates forces Hippias to separate himself from Homer or else to
undergo questioning in Homer's name. Similarly, Critias reveals at Charmides 163b that
his distinction between making, doing, and working is based on the writings of Hesiod
and he expects every knowledgeable person to agree with Hesiod as well. His appeal to
^^All translations of Sophist are by Comford (1935) unless otherwise noted.
“Sec, for example, Lysis 212de, 214b, 216a; Euthyphro 5e - 6b.
“Havelock (1963, p. 208 - 209) makes a similar point.
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poetic authority does not free him from elenctic questioning, however. One way or
another, all principles must be questioned and evaluated.
Showing the knowledge that corresponds to arete to be moral and capable of
producing judgment would have no educational effect unless Plato could also convince
people that they hadn’t achieved it. Hence Plato’s insistence that the many couldn’t
determine a person's arete evolved into a crusade against doxa [56^a, opinion] in favor
of a stncter kind of knowledge.^^ Because doxa is only as stable as the whims of the
multitude, it could be changed by the performance of a brilliant orator. Worse, if
judgments about knowledge could be made by the multitude or even the knower herself,
the number of people believing that they had knowledge (and therefore no need for
inquiry) would be astronomical. For Plato, the truth about justice had to be fixed,
eternal, and abstract enough to apply across time and space.
1.2.4 Directing the Pursuit of Arete
As I explained in section 1.1, Plato faced a world where the moral compass was
beginning to spin out of control. The discovery of other cultures was rendering old
paradigms obsolete and fostering relativism - a doctrine espoused especially by sophists
who were often foreigners themselves. Hippias, for example, claimed to "know the
nature of things" through wide and many-sided leaming.^^ He felt that a concept like
justice could be based on the observation of the customs of many people.^^ This theory
surely did its part to undermine poetic paradigms, but what it offered in return was too
“Plato’s crusade against doxa also reflects his concerns about poetr>'. Sec Havelock (1963, p. 250
-
251): "Both the noun and the verb doko are truly baffling to modern logic in their coverage of both the
subjective and objective relationship. [ Do.\a \ would appear therefore to be the ideal term to describe that
fusion or confusion of the subject with the object that occurred in the poetized performance and in the state of
mind created by this performance. It is the 'seeming show of things,’ whether this panorama is thought of as
within me or outside of me."
“Sec, for example, Hipp/as Minor 368b, ff.
“See Protagoras 337d; also Beck (1964, pp. 183 - 186)
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unstable for Plato. The idea that justice was just the sum of its many worldly
manifestations did more to encourage the rejection of any ideals than to foster better ones.
Like those who criticize modem multiculturalists for holding that no one ideology is
better than any other, Plato pushed for some ideal that would transcend worldly examples
but not be divorced from them. He was looking for an ethical North Star.
The analysis of arete in Laches established that moral knowledge must be eternal
(199bc) and universal (195a). This belief conflicted with poetic and technical knowledge
which are shown in Ion and Laches to be applicable only to particular problems in
particular situations. A higher ideal of knowledge was equally discouraged by
materialism. Whether the extreme view that nothing at all exists except what can be
touched, or weaker view that anything else has only a derivative and dependent existence,
materialism challenged the push for ideals by eliminating all but temporal objects.
Plato s hopes for ideal knowledge were similarly diminished by the prevalence of
Protagorean relativism.^® Protagoras' educational doctrines included "man the measure"
or metron anthropos which held that reality depends on man's measure of it;®® "the better
argument" or kreitton Jogos, which taught that man, mastering multiple propositions,
chooses the more advantageous as knowledge;’’® and the "twofold argument" or dissoi
Jogoi, a relativistic doctrine. Plato also saw skepticism inherent in the conniving
rhetorical tricks and unscrupulous use of oratory. Eristic, for example, was a means for
finding truth to Plato but nothing more than a competitive game to the sophists.
Although they rallied with Plato against the memorization of Homer for education,
the sophists were not above integrating mnemonics into their own pedagogical scheme.
Aristotle's De Sophisticis EJenchis shows evidence that some sophists had their students
‘*Beck(1964, p. 152- 155)
“cf. TJieaetetus 160a.
^“cf. Theaetetus 167a.
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memonze particular arguments for and against particular theses. Hippias boasts that he
can answer any question - on which he has a lecture prepared (363d). His mnemonic
skill (alluded to at 368d) suggests that he had a good many such lectures ready. Socrates,
in contrast, disdains speeches and insists on discussing the actual beliefs of his
interlocutors. Knowledge is not something to be memorized, or defended or w'on in
argument; it is something to be loved, pursued, and recognized as ideal.
Just as he used dialogue to transcend the medium of the written word and
communicate with his audience interactively, Plato needed to transcend the use of
ordinary language to communicate the nature of the ideal. Whereas poets and rhapsodes
used language to enchant and indoctrinate youth, sophists and rhetoricians used it to sell
services and sway audiences. By contrast, Socrates' insistence on explanation and
definition shows language to be incapable of directly communicating the ideal. The
failure of Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides, reputed possessors of arete, to articulate
their "knowledge" throws doubt not only on their actually having it, but also on the
conventional idea of what sort of thing arete is.
The failed push for definitions and standards, as I show in Chapter 5, ultimately
suggests that arete is incapable of being possessed, articulated or taught by conventional
means. Even Socrates, whom Plato sees as a mortal embodiment of arete (and
knowledge) if there ever was one, can neither say what it is nor teach it to others. It is his
ideal conception of arete that leads Plato to reject the transmission theory of education
w’hether the teacher - transmitter be Homer, Solon,^^ or even Socrates.^^ The new ideal of
^‘Despland (1985, p. 23) says the abuse of words had "become a social crisis and a moral problem."
” Solon filled his Elegies with moral injunctions designed to educate his fellow citizens by providing
them with an ethical authority. "It seems clear,” says Marrou [1956, p.42], "that he was looked upon as the
national spokesman — consider, for instance, the way he was quoted in the law courts and the Assembly by any
orator in need of authority, even by Clcophon and Demosthenes."
”Beck (1964, p. 197),says This rejection of the transmission theory, "represents an educational
revolution of the first magnitude."
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arete demands a new ideal of education; one where knowledge is loved, pursued, and
perhaps incrementally approached, if never actually achieved. Men can use language to
wage battles against each other or they can use words, in dialogical communication with
one another, to pursue the ideal. Socrates clearly had the latter intention.
Ultimately, Plato's purpose in reforming education with philosophy is not to turn
everyone into a Socrates, or even into a philosopher in the academic sense. Plato regards
philosophy in its most literal sense as the love and pursuit of wisdom. Plato's purpose is
to use philosophy to mobilize the minds of Athens which had been etherized from
thinking by the hypnotic rhythms of the Homeric rhapsode and sold by sophistry on the
idea that quality of a man's character is determined by his performance in the assembly.
Once mobilized, these minds could recognize arete as a unified intellectual ideal and so
the needles of their moral compasses would be set. By asking questions, both of
themselves and of their rivals,^'* these minds might ascend the path towards the ideal and
through their progress achieve practical arete. The initial steps in this ascent toward
arete form the educational theme of Plato's earliest dialogues.
1.2,5 Approaching a Popular Audience
For his educational project to have practical effect, Plato needed to reach a large
audience in a climate hostile to philosophy. He did this primarily by writing the
Apology, Crito, Ion. Hippias Minor, Charmides. Laches, Euthyphro, and Lysis. The
thing that most distinguishes this group of works is their accessibility to the untrained.
Their subjects and characters are popular and recognizable, their style is colloquial,
humorous, and entertaining, and their structure dispels false complacency while
^'Nettlcship (1935, p. 137) says 'This capacity which the mind possesses of rising above itself, asking
itself questions, feeling dissatisfaction with its own results [is] the real condition and source of progress,
intellectual and moral.”
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motivating and encouraging further inquiry. Whether performed, recited, or read, these
dialogues better than any others attract an unsophisticated audience to philosophy the
way Socrates lured a crowd to his conversations in the Agora.
My contention is that the earliest Socratic dialogues were written for a popular
audience and with a consciously pedagogical motivation. A more colorful theory about
the intended audience of Plato's dialogues, rather dramatically espoused by Ryle^^ but not
ruled out by others, is that they were performed at dramatic festivals and competitions, or
otherwise recited to the general public. Ryle (1966, p. 24) also describes the dialogues
using Aristotle's term 'exoteric', which distinguishes popular discourses from academic
ones. The part of Ryle's performance theory that jibes so well with the textual evidence is
the implication that the dialogues were written for a popular audience. Their dramatic
nature and short length would make them accessible to the average Athenian citizen,
who, though probably literate, was unlikely to own or read booksJ^ Whether or not the
dialogues were meant to be performed, they have survived and prospered as reading
material for a variety of classes and cultures.
The relative simplicity of these early dialogues is explained not by Plato's inability to
write more complex works, but rather by the fact that his intended audience needed to be
reached at a simpler level. None of Socrates' respondents in the early dialogues is a
philosopher and philosophical jargon is largely avoided. The interlocutors of these
dialogues are familiar characters representing familiar views in contrast to Socrates, who
represents the rival view of philosophy. These earliest dialogues can be seen as a kind of
bait for philosophical thought intended to attract the less than philosophically inclined.^^
’^Ryle (1966) Ryle’s theory that the dialogues were performed includes the dubious proposition that
Plato himself took the role of Socrates, and eliminated the character when he became to old to play it.
‘'‘See Havelock (1963, p. 38).
”See Kahn [1981, p. 39] who says Plato was "writing to prepare the minds of his audience - both inside
and outside the school - for the reception of this mature philosophy;" and Scintas (1979, p. 67) who calls the
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Accordingly, they were probably used as textbooks in Plato’s own Academy and in other
Greek schools/® The task of selling philosophy to the non philosopher, whether a student
or layman, was predictably a crucial element in Plato’s educational project.
Further evidence that the earliest dialogues were intended to influence popular ideas
about education can be found in the methods and issues of the dialogues themselves.
The issues of sopA/is [crotpia, wisdom], and technosune [xej^voa'bvr), expertise]
were of educational and hence popular interest, but were not specifically items for
philosophical debate. The later dialogues, in contrast, were probably written for an
academic audience since they take on more technical and specialized issues. The earliest
dialogues represent a non-dogmatic way to teach both students and the general public
about philosophy. They provided an enlightening contrast to the agonistic use of
argument and dialogue found in the popular practice of eristic moots contests. At the
same time they presented an example of the right way to approach problems and think
about issues. Plato hoped that his audience would embrace this method and he made
sure that his students did, asking them to write dialogues of their own. Some of Aristotle’s
dialogical homework can be seen in the Fragments.
1.3 How Would the Earliest Dialogues Achieve Plato’s Agenda?
Once the objectives and motivation for Plato’s educational project are understood,
the idiosyncrasies of his literary style begin to fall into place. The use of dialogue
combines Socratic orality with the permanence of the written word while avoiding the
didacticism of poetry. The use of character, setting, and other dramatic techniques allows
early dialogues "dramatic introductions to philosophic subjects and philosophic techniques."
Lodge (1947, p. 169) claims they were memorized and acted out for educative purposes. See also:
Kahn (1981, p. 44), Robb (1994, p. 238 - 239) and Laws (811 de).
”See Field (1930, p. 189), who agrees that the earliest dialogues were directed to the ordinary educated
public of Athens and aimed at stimulating them to think clearly and examine their assumptions. Even the
philosophical issues that arise in the early dialogues "would probably be familiar to every educated man" (p.59).
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Plato to enhance his philosophical message while keeping the works palatable to a
popular audience. The Socratic method of eJenchus [^xoc;, examination] and its
product 3pori3 [dtropia perplexity] are included in the text in such a way that they are
virtually performed on the audience while irony and paradox force reflection. Above all,
the character of Socrates emerges from these dialogues as larger than life - an Odysseus
who navigates the soul, a philosopher-hero.
Ii3fl Plato's Use of the Dialogue Form
P is the same with written words; they seem to talk to you as though they were
intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say, from a desire to be
instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing forever. {Phaedrus 275e)
Plato is distinguished from his mentor Socrates in that he wrote while Socrates only
spoke. Plato is distinguished in the history of western philosophy in that he wrote in
dialogue form. While Plato invented neither philosophy nor dialogue, he fused them
unforgettably in an effort to keep philosophy afloat in the rising tide of literacy. For all
his worries about the educational legacy of oralism, Plato was equally worried about
writing, as attested by his comments at Protagoras 329a, Phaedrus 275e, and the
Seventh Letter 341d where he says: "I certainly have composed no work in regard to
[philosophical topics], nor shall I ever do so in future, for there is no way of putting it in
words like other studies." Plato's use of dialogue is best seen as an effort to adapt the
essentially oral character of philosophical discussion to the medium of literature without,
so to speak, writing doctrine in stone.
®“As much as Plato's use of dialogue stands out for us, in its own day it may not have been so unique.
Irwin (1992, p.74) and Vlastos (1991, p.51) note that dialogue was a traditional medium for ethical discussion,
citing precedent in the histones Herodotus and Thucydides as well as Aristophanes' comedy and the tragic
drama of Eunpides and Sophocles.
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Plato's cnticism of writing may be surprising since he rebelled from Socrates' policy
and wrote extensively. He seems to have compromised his worries about writing with his
need to wnte by adopting and perfecting the dialogue form.®^ Homer's work lost its
ethical and educational force when it became frozen, first in rhythm of verse and later in
writing. As literacy increased, ideas were being trapped in the tar pit of the written word,
waiting to be passed up by time. Plato's dialogues were a way to transcend the stagnancy
of writing without abandoning literature. The dialogues would try to awaken and engage
minds the way Socratic discussions had. They would offer a way to read that
discouraged the passive acceptance of ideas and encouraged the active investigation of
them.®^
Plato's use of dialogue reflects more than the suspicion about writing he inherited
from Socrates; it also expresses his belief in the importance of multiple voices for
philosophy. I say "voices" because Plato makes it clear that separate minds are not
required. At Sophist 263e he defines thinking as "the inward dialogue carried on by the
mind with itself without spoken sound. Socrates converses with himself when an
interlocutor isn't available, won't cooperate, or refuses to answer. He's not beyond
personifying an entity like the Laws of Athens in his dialogical effort to understand an
issue.®'’ Plato writes in dialogue form in an attempt to teach his audience to think
philosophically, that is, to hold a dialogue — even with oneself.
Part of Plato's educational purpose in the early dialogues is to distinguish
philosophical dialogue from the eristic games espoused by his rivals the sophists. While
®‘For a similar view sec Griswold (1985, p. 161).
Kraut’s (1992, p. 27) rhetorical question: "What better way to give expression to this warning
against the misuse of books than to make each of one’s works a dialogue?”
”AI1 translations of Sophist are by Comford in Hamilton and Cairns (1961).
“'Jaeger (1939, p. 12) says that such internal dialogue begins with Archilochus’ monologue in the
Odyssey. ’’ See also Dewey (1993, p. 43), Ncttleship (1935, p.l 15), and Santas (1979, p. 59).
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both techniques represented a challenge to the poetic tradition. Plato worried about
eristic’s methods and goals.»> In the game of eristic, one person acts as questioner and the
other as answ-erer. The answerer’s objective is to defend some conceptual thesis; he is
limited to answers of yes and no. The questioner tnes to extract inconsistent theses from
the answerer by a carefully constructed series of questions. There is a winner, a loser, and
recognized fouls in this game.“ One way that eristic failed to depart from the poetic
tradition was its emphasis on rote memorization. Students w-ere apparently required to
memorize specific arguments for and against popular theses. In this way. they could
an enstic competition no matter which side their opponents took up. A list of such
win
arguments survives in the DissoiLogoi.
Plato needed to distinguish philosophic dialogue from this competitive game which
rewarded deception and logical tricks rather than truth. Although Ryle insisted (1966,
p.l04 - 105) that Plato s dialectic is actually based on the game of eristic, a close look at
Socrates' behavior in such works as Hippias Minor and Euthydemus reveals that Plato
rejects and often mocks eristic tactics.*^ Most telling is Socrates' requirement that
interlocutors resolve conflicts only in light of what they truly believe; this rule is clearly at
odds with the methods and goals of eristic.®® Plato's intended audience would have
noticed the similarities between Socratic dialogue and eristic, but more important they
would have noticed the differences. In a subliminal way, Plato battles eristic by wielding
Socratic dialogue as a counterexample.
See Asmis( 1992, p. 340).
'‘For more on enstic, see Aristotle’s Topics.
'^On Hippias Minor see sec. 3.2. Ryle (1966, p. 203) later admits that Euthydemus has, "double
didactic purpose of explaining to Athens the unobvious distinction between prize-fighting eristic and tutorial
dialectic; and of interesting the young students and would-be students of dialectic in the tasks of detecting and
rebutting fallacies that were already extant and already giving trouble. What Aristotle tnes to do scientifically in
his De Sophisticis E/enchis Plato tries to do dramatically in his EutJiydemus. " WTiilc I don’t agree with
Ryle’s whole characterization of how eristic was used, he may be right here.
"See chapter 4 and Irwin (1995, p. 20)
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The dialogue form may also be an effort to preserve su„ous,s> In a new form. Part of
the reason for having another "voice" when doing philosophy stems from the tradition of
mentoring, of having someone to ask questions. While sunous/a was controversial
because of its association with pederasty, Plato approved of the convemational and
motivational aspects of the tradition,” Plato's nostalgia for sunousia was no doubt
heightened by the fact that the democratization of education and the rise of literacy were
making it necessary that students be taught in large groups rather than enjoy one on one
exchange between student and master.* The fact that Plato's readers often feel as though
they are having a conversation with Socrates shows how successful his adaptation of
sunousia to literature was.
L3.2 Plato's Use of Dramatic Technique.^
In addition to dialogue, Plato employs such dramatic elements as setting and
characters to increase the popular appeal of his works and to enhance their educational
message. Whether the dialogues were performed or read, their characters and setting give
them an entertaining aura which attracts traditional students as well as adults, who might
be more reluctant to be "taught" a new attitude about virtue.^^ Furthermore, by putting
his educational message in dramatic form, Plato managed to infiltrate an intellectual
climate that was hostile to philosophy.^^ It's not coincidental that the early dialogues
resemble a dramatized battle between philosophy and its educational rivals. Plato's
dramatic style is seductive but not superficial; it opens the reader up to philosophy
without forcing it down his or her throat. Since Plato's audience for the earliest dialogues
®’Netfle.ship (1935, p. 5) says the essence of education for Plato can be expressed in the word "nurture."
’“See Beck (1964, p. 197).
’‘As Seeskin (1987, p. 10) notes "If the reader came to approach the text as a student approaches a
teacher, then from Plato’s perspective, the text would fail.” For Plato's belief in lifelong education, see sec. 4.1.
’“See Jaeger (1943).
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was neither philosophical nor academic, Plato needed to cast philosophy in a positive
light dramatically before he could argue for it directly.
The educational theme of the dialogues is frequently reflected in their dramatic
settings. Socrates always questions people in Athens and in public.” Education,
accordingly, is a public enterprise. In addition to being public, the settings of the earliest
dialogues are frequently places of persuasion and education. Socrates meets Ion and
Hippias at the agora and at an Olympic oratory festival, their respective places of
performance. Euthyphro is met on the porch of the King Archon's court, where juries are
persuaded. The Inches takes place overlooking a military exercise which is being
considered for its educational value. At the opening of the Lysis, Socrates is making his
way from the Academy, the future site of Plato’s school, to the Lyceum, the eventual site
of Aristotle's school; both sites were gymnasia at the dramatic time.
The main action of both the Charmides and Lysis takes place in wrestling schools
where, according to Hippothales, "We spend most of our time . . . having discussions."
(^Lysis 204a). Several commentators have noted the significance of the gymnasium
setting, which Plato uses in several other dialogues, including Euthydemus. ” It seems
appropriate that the intellectual gymnastics Plato hoped would gain new prominence in
Athenian education should be exercised in buildings designed for physical education.
The nonacademic settings may also reveal Plato's hope to extend education and
philosophy beyond the boundaries of schools and youth and into the realm of every man
in everyday life.
”This is noted by Santas (1979, p. 67)
’Tor example: Marrou (1956, p. 45) claims that Socrates goes to the gymnasium to "drag [students]
away from it and to submit them to the hard discipline of mathematics and dialectics.” Jaieger (1943, p. 35)
says that the mind-to-mind contact at gymnasia "generated an intellectual heat which made them the most
receptive soil for any new thought or enthusiasm." Friedlander (1958, v. I, 159) adds that when Plato moves the
setting from the wrestling floor to the dressing room in Lysis, he was trying to create "a concrete image of the
intellectual undressing with which he liked to play.”
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An important component in the dialogues, part setting and part character, is the
group that surrounds Socrates and listens to the convemation. Dramatically, this group of
conventional men or boys representing conventional values is an extension of the
audience Plato wants to influence. Like the reader, they sit on the sidelines in judgment
while silently participating in the conversation. Their presence reminds us that observing
a Socratic dialogue can be as educational as participating in one.'' The distance may
even heighten the educational experience. Because observers are less emotionally
involved than interlocutors, they are more likely to see his errors. They can then correct
similar contradictions in their own belief sets from the safety of anonymity and in cold
blood. While Socrates and his interlocutors often go away unchanged, this silent third
group may reap the greatest educational value from the exchange.
The most striking thing about Plato’s second group of characters, Socrates'
interlocutors, is the fact that many of them were historical figures familiar to the audience.
Nicias and Laches, for example, were famous generals. Charmides and Cntias, in contrast,
were infamous members of the Thirty Tyrants. The prestige of the interlocutors along with
the knowledge of their later careers no doubt heightens the audience's interest in the
conversation. One the one hand, since Plato is portraying even his historical interlocutors
with the educational aim of getting his audience to identify with them, it is unlikely that
he intended their conversations and personalities to be historically accurate.'^ Rather, the
interlocutors represent typical viewpoints that Plato wants to refute, because they reflect
the opinions either of his educational rivals or simply those of the multitude.
’^Sec Lodge (1947, p. 4) for a similar view.
’‘See Field (1930, p.l90), Marrou (1956, p.48), and Griswold (1985, p. 153).
36
The dramatization, then, of a Socratic elenchua performed on Charmides and Crit.as
before they became corrupt shows not that Socrates contributed to the.r delinquency, but
rather that he saw it coming and feared for their future:
I m not annoyed so much for myself as for you, Charmides,' I said, 'because youwho have such good looks and are in addition very self-controlled of soul, will notp ofit from that self-control, and because despite its presence in you, it won't bringyou any presence at all in life! ( Charmides 1 75de)
y • n n t
Charmides, Critias, and Alcibiades can be seen following sophists around at Protagoras
315 - 316. Plato's educational aim is not to posthumously reform his famous interlocutors
but to reveal the inconsistencies that eventually misguided them.’' When members of the
audience see similar faults in themselves, they might try to rectify them lest they end up
like the historical failures.^®
Put simply, Socrates' interlocutors in the early dialogues represent apparent
exemplars of virtue and education who fail to live up to the definition.^^ Charmides is an
example of temperance who ends up a loose canon, Nicias is a military hero who can't
explain courage; Ion and Hippias are wise men who don't know what they're talking
about, and Euthyphro is a self-proclaimed pinnacle of piety who isn't sure what piety is.
These characters represent people or doctrines that the Athenian audience and many
audiences since W'ould put forward as examples of their idea of particular virtues.
The intended effect of all this character assassination is to challenge the audience.
In revealing the aims and ideals of popular personalities and doctrines as flawed, Plato
This process works both ways. For example, Plato has Socrates examine Theaetetus, who went on to
be a great geometer, as a young man. Here it is hoped that the audience will identify with the benefits of
elenctic^struggle. From the aporia produced by his talk with Socrates, Theaetetus goes on to do great things.
’'This audience - character connection is echoed by Robb (1994, p. 171 - 172) who claims that Plato’s
characters get the very- Socratic chastisement most Athenian intellectuals were in need of. Stokes (1986, p. 17)
says, A proposition may look false, or true, as the case may be, to one particular kind of interlocutor, or indeed
to one particular kind of reader.”
’’Desjardins (1988, p. 122) makes a similar point.
"“See Stokes (1986, p. 30)
"'Contrast Robinson (1953, p. 14): "If the ulterior end of the elenchus is to be attained, it is essential
that the answerer himself be convinced, and quite indifferent whether anyone else is. " One strange aspect of
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awakens the audience from dogmatic complacency. Members of the audience realize
suddenly that what they thought worked doesn’t work at all and the need for change
becomes clear to them. Plato thought that many readers would begin the dialogue
agreeing with the interlocutor and end it in a sympathetic state of apona or at least with
a personal mandate to reexamine his or her own beliefs. The nature of the topic
precludes the option of simply distancing oneself from the discussion; a choice must be
made.
1.3.3 Elenchus and Apnria
In section 1.2.3, 1 explained Plato's need to eliminate the false conceit of knowledge.
Plato achieves that objective in the dialogues by extending Socrates' elenchus of his
interlocutors and the resulting aporia to the audience. Plato explains the hoped-for
result of the elenchus in the Sophist :
They cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is saying
something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of
inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the dialectic
process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one
another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same
respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, and grows gentle toward others, and
thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which
is most amusing to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the
person who is the subject of the operation. (230bc)
Plato hoped that by portraying a Socratic elenchus being performed on well-known or
stereotypical characters who represented commonly held beliefs, the release from
complacency would extend to the wider audience even when it doesn't take place for the
particular interlocutor.
this interpretations is that dialogues where the interlocutor is not convinced, such as the Euthyphro, would
seem to be failures. Plato could have ended the dialogue with Euthyphro convinced of his ignorance, but he
chose not to.
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The objection that Socratic denchus can eliminate complacency only in particular
individuals with particular belief-sets is mitigated by Plato's use of typical characters and
popular ideals. In this, as in his decision to write, Plato departs from the historical
Socrates who philosophized only orally so he could tailor his examination to particular
individuals. Since Plato is targeting a much wider audience, he must reach them by
making the views of his interlocutors represent unquestioned yet commonly-held
values.^°^ In the early dialogues where Plato’s audience is the multitude, his characters
represent the ideals of the multitude. Even Vlastos, who contends (1994, p. 15 -160) that
Socrates argued from the particular beliefs of interlocutors as opposed to the common
beliefs of men, admits (1991, p. 59) that the responses of interlocutors like Euthyphro or
Laches are "a fair sample of the ones Socrates would have elicited from anyone on the
street picked at random."
So the denchus of the early dialogues does more than "amuse the hearer" as the
Sophist passage suggests. By sticking to widespread views it performs a kind of indirect
denchus on the hearers or readers and compels them to question their own unexamined
beliefs. In this way Plato can prescribe Socrates' medicine to a vast audience by
performing an indirect elenchus on them while "amusing " them with the direct one.
The educational effectiveness of elenchus as a social project depends on its ability to
refute typical viewpoints in a methodical way. While Plato could still have produced
interesting and entertaining dialogues in which Socrates refutes the oddball view's of some
little-known eccentric, it would not have been as educationally effective.
In most of Plato's early dialogues, the Socratic elenchus ends in a state or
puzzlement or aporia. Like the denchus itself, Plato intends this aporia to have an
'“^Beck (1964, p. 195) makes a similar point.
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educational effect on his audience. When an expert is reduced to aporia. the layman is
encouraged to get on wth his own philosophical search. When the reader herself is pul
into a state of puzzlement, she is motivated to search for the answer. Furthermore, since
the state of puzzlement concerns how one ought to live, the search for a better answer is
immediately important. The educational intention of aporia is to encourage inquiry. It
seems to work for Socrates who is always in a state of aporia and always inquiring.
Now ^ocx^Xic aporia may very well have the demoralizing effect of an eristic
refutation. Euthyphro doesn’t seem motivated to pursue further inquiry, and history
indicates that Charmides and Critias probably didn't. Their problem, and Plato wants his
audience to notice this, is that they don't see the benefit of inquiry. Critias is so
concerned with appearances that he tries to conceal his aporia rather than to eradicate it:
When Critias heard this, and saw that I was in difficulties [6t7Copo\)VTCX], he
seemed to be forced by my being in difficulties [ocTCOpoiivxoq] to fall into
difficulties [(XTCopiotq] himself, in the way people who see others yawning in their
faces are affected similarly. Well, conscious that he had a reputation to keep up,
he felt ashamed in front of the others and was unwilling to admit to me that he
was unable to determine the points on which I was challenging him. He said
nothing clear, in an attempt to conceal his difficulties [ocTCoplavl.
( Charmides 169cd)^'’^
Nicias, likewise, is afraid to admit his perplexity. The first step toward eliminating
aporia is admitting it.
So it looks to me as though Nicias is not prepared to be a gentleman and admit
when he's talking nonsense: he's twisting and turning to hide the fact that he's
baffled [otjcoplotv]. You and I could have twisted in the same way just now if
we'd wanted not to look as though we were contradicting ourselves. If we were
arguing in court, there'd be some excuse for such behavior, but when we're having
a friendly conversation like this, why would anyone waste time dressing himself
up with such frippery? 196ab)
All translations of Charmides in this chapter arc by Watt (1987) unless otherwise noted.
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For these and several other of Socrates’ interlocutors it seems to be much more important
to look as if you know than to actually know at all. If a spark of philosophical curiosity
exists, however, Plato’s early dialogues usually provide the fuel to ignite the flame of
inquiry.
Those who are motivated by Socratic aporia see two key things; their own
Ignorance and the possibility that an answer can be found. A person brought into
Socratic aporia does not find herself lost at sea; rather, she finds a point on the horizon
to be used in guiding her ship across the ocean of inquiry.^°^ Socrates’ conviction in the
divine nature of the soul and in arete as the moral perfection of the soul motivates and
guides his pursuit of wisdom. Socratic aporia represents a state in which the nature of
moral knowledge is acknowledged simultaneously as something of greatest value and not
yet achieved. The fact that Euthyphro, Critias, Channides and others choose to return
to the false security of popular approval rather than face their ignorance and join the
effort to eradicate it does not imply that Plato is suggesting that route to his audience.
Their failure to admit ignorance serves as a negative example to the audience; one
reinforced in Critias and Charmides’ case by the knowledge of their subsequent
downfall.
The aporetic conclusions of Euthyphro and HippiasMinor are not diminished by
their protagonists’ refusal to admit ignorance, since the obvious refutation of these
renowned experts encourages the lay-searcher by discrediting the experts. Believing that
some expert has knowledge, even while you don’t, is nevertheless an impediment to
inquiry. Part of Plato’s worry about traditional education is that students are encouraged
'"^Says Friedlander (1958, v. I, p.l70): 'The final truth, is brought into view SiS from a distance."
'“^Says Robinson (1953, p. 17): "The cicnchus docs not directly give a man amy positive knowledge; but
it gives him for the first time the idea of real knowledge."
‘“‘For a poignant explanation of the effects of avoiding Socratic apona see Symposium 215a - 222b.
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to accept answers to puzzling (properly philosophical) questions on the basis of the
authority of the person who gives them. The authority may be a parent, a poet, a
politician, even Plato. Unless one understands why one holds the opinions one does,
there isn’t much reason to act on those opinions. The Socratic approach is to question
beliefs and opinions constantly, no matter from where or from whom they come.
A reluctance to test one's opinions against those of experts reveals a dangerous
complacency. In his speech at 183-184, Laches expresses his suspicion of military trainers
who avoid Sparta, the Mecca of military training. His criticism amounts to suspicion of
those who avoid the experts. Socrates, by contrast, goes right to the experts in his
inquiries. By showing that even the experts haven’t got their own beliefs tied down, Plato
opens up the question to the masses. Euthyphro, a self-proclaimed expert on piety, is
revealed to have no better idea of what it is than Socrates, a man about to be convicted of
impiety. It is by asking for explanations rather than advice that one can learn about
virtue. Socratic method opens the realm moral inquiry to the common man.*®^
Socratic sporia is ideally the state of a person motivated to do philosophic inquiry.
Admissions of aporia in Lysis result in a pledge of friendship and a commitment to
continue the inquiry. After having been reduced to aporia in Laches, Nicias and
Laches agree that Socrates would be the best teacher. Socrates then reminds them that no
one of them is better than any other now, since they are all in a state of perplexity. He
suggests that they spare neither effort nor expense in their continued inquiry. What he
doesn’t advise is that they remain satisfied with their perplexity. Motivating young and
old to pursue philosophic inquiry is Plato’s goal in these early aporetic dialogues. The
admission of ignorance is a necessary first step to philosophic inquiry.^®*
'“^For a similar observation see Vlastos (1971b, p. 20).
‘““Says Ryle (1966, p. 206): "An elenctic debate terminates in aporia. Philosophy starts from aporiai.
"
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The educational purpose of the aporetic endings of Socratic dialogues, then, is to
stimulate the reader to want to break the aporis, ideally by engaging in dialectic.^®’
Lodge (1947, p. 7) agrees, calling refutation an educational rather than a metaphysical
tool whose function is to stimulate people, rather than to solve problems. One reason the
early dialogues are so effective in stimulating readers is that their subject matter is moral.
The perplexity is not over some disembodied proposition; it concerns the universally -
pertinent question of how one ought to live one's life.“®
Rather than replacing one opinion with another, eJenchus and aporia induce a
state of mind conducive to the search for truth. The realization of one's ignorance is the
first step toward wisdom. Aporia is sometimes translated as being "at a loss" but
Socratic aporia is closer to the wonder that Robinson (1953, p. 11) describes as the
beginning of philosophy. Keeping in mind that Plato is tiying to inspire the common man
to take up philosophy as a way of attaining virtue, we should see elenchus and aporia
as ingenious educational tools.‘^‘
1.3.4 Puzzles and Irony
In the Apology, Socrates calls the oracle's statement an ainigma [aiviypa] which
is cognate to our 'enigma' and is usually translated as some kind of riddling puzzle.
Forms of the word appear elsewhere in the dialogues in reference to the words of the gods,
the poets, or even Socrates himself. At Chaimides 161c, Socrates describes the statement
that sophrosune is doing one's own job as "cryptic", literally ainigmari [aiviypaxi]
See Teloh( 1986, p.5)
"“Sec Brickhousc and Smith (1994, p. 17): "But the aporia that results from Socratic questioning gives
the interlocutor an important reason to pursue the examined life: the recognition that one is seriously confused
about how best to live."
As Jaeger (1943, p. 90) secs it, they au^c toots that work: "When we observe in reading them that not
one of the little [early Socratic] dialogues concludes with the expected result, but all turn into a question-mark
at the end, we feel a philosophical excitement which has a profound educational influence."
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which IS the adjective from the verb ainissomai [aiviaaouai]. The imperfect, einitteto
[fiviTTeto] appears again in reference to the saying at 162a. The noun ainigma
[aiviyjLia] then appears at 162b:
Well, as far as I can see, he propounded this as a deliberate puzzle faiviyual for
us for no other reason than that he thought it would be difficult for us to find out
what on earth doing one’s own job is. ( Charmides 162b)
Clearly, Plato is drawing our attention to the nddle in the statement."-’ His motivation for
doing so is no doubt parallel to the motivation Socrates accuses the writer of the riddle of
having in the Charmides: he wants us to investigate the issue for ourselves because it
can be understood only through personal discovery."^ A paradox may be recited or
repeated, but the mind will never swallow it whole. "What could that mean?" says the
internal Socratic voice, and here inquiry begins.
What paradox does for Plato in the early dialogues is to reveal the issue of arete as
philosophical and personal. As I argued earlier, Plato is not so much arguing for a
particular account of arete as he is pushing for a particular approach to it."^ By relying
on riddles rather than doctrinal statements, Plato identifies the existence of an answer,
hidden in the riddle and as yet unknowm, while simultaneously encouraging the
investigation of the riddle. Perhaps he thought his strategy similar to that of the gods,
who offer their wisdom in the form of riddles. Plato discovered thorough Socrates and the
cryptic tradition that nothing encourages philosophical thought better than paradox.
"^Notes Watt (1987, p. 186): 'The statement, "doing one's own job" is offered as a definition of justice
at Repub/ic 433a, but there interpreted differently."
"^Desjardins (1988, p. 1 13): "The meaning of such statement often proves to be multileveled, yielding
layers of interpretation normally requiring that one be Jed from one level of understanding to another. In other
words, to be able - even correctly - to report beliefs or recite doctnnes is not sufficient for understanding."
‘"Secskin (1987, p. 43) says Plato’s dialectic is "a pathway to a philosophical stance rather than a way
of certifying the truth of vanous propositions." .Mittelstrass (1988, p.l39) adds that Plato "seeks to transport
not objective knowledge but philosophical attitudes."
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Another benefit of the pedagogical use of irony and paradox is their ability to
encourage independent inquiry. The conversation at Lj^'/s 207d - 209d on the issue of
being a master is a kind of instructive irony. It's obvious, on one level, why Lysis isn't
allowed to dnve the chariot or the mule team or to play with his mother's loom. Still,
these questions of why others should rule a child are vety important to the youthful
audience, so Socrates tries to exhort them into philosophical thought by laying the
problem out to be examined logically rather than emotionally. Platonic irony and
paradox encourage self-determination by challenging the reader to solve the problem
within his owm mind. The texts don't teach philosophy so much as challenge the reader
to think philosophically. That the reader become a lover of wisdom on his own is
essential to Plato s project for educational reform. Rather than impart a particular
philosophy, Plato wanted to engender a philosophical approach that could be applied to
personalized problems. As I will show in chapter 5, the pursuit of is different for
each unique soul and so it must be undertaken on an individual level.
Irony and paradox also point toward the existence of solutions without entrapping
them in a formula. Plato seems to think that absolute moral paradigms exist but cannot
be expressed completely in words, which are frozen in time. Paradox manages to indicate
the existence of such absolutes without killing them by reducing them to formulas.^^^
Socrates' ironic self description for Hippias is an example:
Do you see that Fm telling the truth, Hippias, when I say that I'm persistent in
questioning clever people? This is probably [iciv5'Uve\)C0] my only good point: in
other respects I'm pretty useless. I mean, Fm ignorant about the way things are,
which just baffles me. I can easily prove this: whenever I meet anyone like you
whose wisdom is famous and vouched for by all the Greeks, my ignorance
becomes evident, because w'e disagree on almost everything. What greater proof
of ignorance can there be than disagreement with experts? ( Hippias
Minor. 372be)
Desjardins (1988, p. 122 - 123) says historically accurate thoughts are insufficient. What is needed is
"one rich enough and flexible enough to provide insight into problems current in his own time."
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Socrates’ riddles and irony help Plato to accomplish two central challenges in his project
for educational reform. First, they insist on the engagement of the mind and therefore
discourage the uncritical acceptance of doctrine as doled out in traditional myth and
poetiy. Secondly, they indicate the presence of a truth or absolute standard, a solution to
the riddle that can be discovered if not articulated, and so they avoid the dangerous
relativism that occurs when stated principles gets stuck in time.“^ Socrates'
quintessential irony turns out not to be an unfortunate quirk of his personality or an
entertaining dramatic subplot, but rather a key to his uncanny success as an educator.
1.3.5 Socrates as Hero
By far Plato's greatest weapon in his educational project in the early dialogues is the
character of Socrates. I have already argued that Plato's educational project is, to some
extent, an adaptation of Socrates' educational method. Whether Plato offers a historically
accurate account of his former teacher or simply uses the character as a mouthpiece for his
own views, the educational effect of his role remains the same. Socrates functions in
the early dialogues as a hero and martyr for philosophy who asks his audience to reflect as
much as he asks his interlocutors to. The relationship between Plato, the character of
Socrates, and the historical Socrates forms a complex triangle with education at its center.
The most popular solution to the question of the character Socrates' authenticity is
to attribute full historical accuracy to the Socrates of the Apology, then less and less in
each successive dialogue until the character becomes a complete mouthpiece for Plato in
later works. Predictably there is a lot of dissension about just where the transition takes
place and which doctrines can be attributed to w'hom at what time. Tfie division between
‘“Desjardins (1988, p. 123) makes a similar observation.
Ryle (1966) takes the identification to an extreme, suggesting that Plato insisted on playing the role of
Socrates in performed versions of the dialogues and insisting that the Apo/ogy is a defense not of Socrates,
but of attacks made on Plato well on in the 370’s (p. 152). For a less radical view see Kraut (1992, p. 25).
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the early and middle Socrates, however, is widely agreed upon.^^« It is doubtful that Plato
is ever merely an objective reporter. Even if he is carrying on Socrates’ mission in the early
dialogues or reconstructing actual conversations he overheard, Plato does this with
particular goals in mind. Whether these goals were bought, borrowed, or stolen from
someone else, Plato at least shares them. At minimum he is testing them against more
widely held views; but it’s no secret which side he wants to win."’
The idea that Plato is testing his inherited Socratic beliefs against others that he
finds at least viable is certainly consistent with his educational project. Plato is a great
advocate of settling difficult issues through honest debate; whether the debate is external,
internal, or imagined. In Crito, the reader experiences a debate between the characters of
Socrates and Crito while Socrates describes a parallel debate he imagined w'ith the
personified laws of Athens. Given his enthusiasm for dialectical discussion and his
acceptance of multi-layered debates, Plato may very well be dramatizing imagined
debates of his own in the early dialogues. Just as Socrates is sympathetic to both sides
of the imagined dialectic with the personified laws, Plato himself may be sympathetic not
only to the character of Socrates, but also to his dialogical opponents. Accordingly,
Plato’s educational project is concerned with moral dilemmas where the agent identifies
with both sides of the issue.
It may be more instructive to ask not which side of the argument Plato endorses but
rather what effect he hopes the argument as a whole will have on his audience. Although
Socrates' interlocutors were drawn to represent popular or widely-recognized views, the
“®Vlastos ( 1991, p. 48 - 49) offers a list of ten theses distinguishing the early Socrates from the middle
Socrates. Irwin (1995, p. 5) looks to Aristotle for advice on the issue, noting that he "regularly treats the
dialogues as evidence for Plato’s views, and regularly attributes some of the views of the Platonic Socrates to
Plato, without seeing any need to explain or defend the attribution."
"’Vlastos (1991, p. 50) says that since Plato shared Socrates' bcisic philosophical convictions, he sets
out in the early dialogues to test them, "by pitting them in elenctic encounter against the views voiced by a
vancty of interlocutors. In doing this Plato is producing, not reproducing, Socratic philosophizing."
’^“Friedlander (1958, p.l68): 'The struggles and victones [Plato] made public were won within himself."
47
conversation between characters in a dialogue is different from the silent conversation
between Plato and his audience.^^^ In this second conversation, the more important one
for the educational project, Plato tries to simulate the Socratic experience for his
readers.^“ To the extent that an audience member identifies with the interlocutor, he or
she will examine the beliefs Socrates questions. To the extent a person identifies with
Socrates he or she will better appreciate the challenge of opposing views and be
encouraged to go on acknowledging ignorance.
Plato was motivated to recreate Socrates in the form of literature by more than a
desire to memorialize his old teacher. Socrates' fate discouraged Plato from pursuing a
political career while at the same time underlining Athens' desperate need for Socratic
reform.^^^ In the Apology, Socrates repeatedly laments the lack of time he has to
convince the jury. The suggestion is that Socrates died because he wasn't able to talk
to enough people for a long enough time. By using the rising technology of literature
Plato found a way to carry on Socrates' project on a much grander scale in a more hostile
environment. Socrates' goal was not to impart information to his students but to
encourage internal deliberation and reasoned action.^^^ Plato wrote the earliest dialogues
w'ith the specific aim to reduce complacency and encourage inquiry on a grand scale.
One of Plato's biggest assets in his project was no doubt the memory of the historical
Socrates. The closeness of the vote at Socrates' trial (see Apology' 36a) suggests that his
execution was at least controversial, if not a source of civic embarrassment in Athens.
For a similar view sec Bowen ( 1 988, p. 58).
‘“Jaeger (1943, p. 17-18) says the dialogue and biographical memoir were new literary forms invented
by the Socratic circle to "to re-create the incomparable personality of the master who had transformed their
lives." Says Irwin (1995, p. 7), "Since Plato takes Socratic philosophy seriously, he writes Socratic dialogues."
‘“a fact suggested by the dialogues and confirmed in the Seventh Letter.
‘“At Apology 19a, Socrates laments that he has so little time to remove a prejudice that the juiy has
spent nearly a lifetime acquiring. At 24a, he says he would be surprised if he were able to remove the prejudice
against him in so short a time. At 37a, he concludes that if Athens didn't insist on deciding death penalty cases
in a single day, he believes the jury could be persuaded.
“^See de Nicolas (1989, p. 440.)
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Plato use. the memoty of Socrates aad h.s fate to enhance his plea for reform, a project
which includes dispelling a myriad of myths. Aristophanes’ Clouds contains a
sophistical portrayal of Socrates so compelling that some have wondered whether it might
be more histoncally accurate than Plato's.*-’* The Socrates of the Clouds teaches how
rhetonc can turn wrong into right and accepts payment for teaching this skill - things the
Platonic Socrates specifically denounces. Aristophanes' portrayal of Socrates lumped all
scientists, sophists and philosophers together in a single caricature that, while inconsistent
With Plato and Xenophon's accounts, W’as accurately reflective of the general
characteristics of contemporary' intellectuals.^^^ By naming this caricature 'Socrates',
however, Aristophanes was making a grave mistake in Plato's eyes.
The trial made Plato acutely aw'are of the danger of this resemblance between
Socrates and the sophists, so he makes it a pet project in the early dialogues to show the
difference. True to form, the distinction is ironic. Plato challenges the reader to see the
difference between Socrates and the sophists rather than pointing at it plainly. For
example, at Apology 19e - 20c Socrates ironically says it w^ould be a "fine thing to be
able to educate men" as Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias do; that is, it would be great to do
what these men clsiin to do. Similarly at Lschss 186 - 187, Socrates says (ironically)
that he would have liked to study with the sophists but couldn't afford it. Nicias and
Laches, on the other hand, had the money to pay for instruction and so should have a
better idea of how best to care for souls than he does.
‘^‘Even modem scholars who depend almost entirely on Plato for their conception of Socrates mistake
him for a sophist. Beck (1964, p.l64), for example, alleges that in Socratic elenchus, "Despite the pretense of
ignorance the questioner usually knows the end result and there is no genuine participation on the learner's
part," adding that "the sophists, too, recognized the value of indoctrination in education."
‘”See Dover (1971, p. 54 - 65): "If it was Aristophanes' purpose to caricature the genus 'intellectual'
[sophists and philosophers] as a whole, the evidence suggests that it is a fair caricature in essentials."
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In addition to inheriting the bulk of his early philosophical ideals from Socrates.
Plato used his master's memory to add dimension and weight to the message in his
dialogues. He tries to reveal the subtle, but crucial distinctions between Socrates and the
sophists. He reinterprets Socrates' historic failure as a teacher of men like Charmides,
Critias, and Alcibiades in an educational way. In some ways Plato is defending the
Socrates he knew from the cancature drawn by Aristophanes and perpetuated in popular
myth. In defending Socrates, however, Plato is defending philosophy and specifically
philosophy as education.*^®
The Socrates of the Plato's early dialogues emerges above all else as an example of
what moral education should achieve. Since Plato makes arete so difficult for humans
to attain, it's important to have an example showing that the method works. Socrates is
that example. What Socrates does for Plato's educational project is to add a concrete
image to the ethereal ideals of arete being pursued. When he walks into the gymnasium
at Charmides 153-154, he tells the young men that he has just returned from battle.
That battle would be recognized by some of Plato's audience as a battle in which Socrates
saved Alcibiades life.*^° The young men want to talk about the battle, about deeds.
Socrates wants to talk about philosophy and arete. That he has just proven his own
virtue can t help but add clout to his words. Elsew'here in the Charmides a definition
of self-control is proposed:
Being self-controlled, or self-control, wouldn't be knowing what one knows and
one doesn't know, but only, it would appear, that one knows and that one doesn't
know. (170d; see also 170a, 167a)
'^®For more on Plato’s need to defend philosophy see: Griswold (1985, p. 152).
Santas (1979, p. 7) says "[Plato] saw Socrates as the star example of the virtues of wisdom,
moderation, courage, and justice, the nearest possible approximation on earth of the perfection of the Platonic
forms." Friedlander (1958, p. 15 - 16) adds that "Socrates w’as the only one who not only tried to clarify the
meaning of the word [virtue]. . . but who bore witness, though his life and death, to the existence of virtue."
™Watt(1987, p.l77n.l)
‘^‘Similarly at Ladies 189b, Laches bases his willingness to be taught by Socrates on their having
been though a "dangerous experience" together and Socrates having "proved his mettle."
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This IS just how Socrates describes himself at Apo/qg.,- 21d. Here Socrates exemplifies
clearly the virtue they are talking about. Just when seems like an unfathomable
concept, it's sitting cross-legged on the ground in front of us, asking questions
Plato recognized that his criticism of ordinaiy moral judgments and standards might,
like the sophists' relativism, breed doubt about the reality of all moral standards. The
educational motivation for creating such an ideal Socrates as the central character in the
dialogues can be seen to stem from an effort to quell such doubts. Just as Plato uses the
literary tool of setting the Charmides discussion on the heels of Socrates' historic
performance in battle, so he uses the fact of Socrates' exemplary- existence to reinforce his
conceptual discussion of virtue. Socrates adds an existential dimension to the ideal
that transcends definition. Plato gives Socrates the role in his dialogues that he no doubt
played in the writer's young life.
So Socrates' role in the earliest dialogues is essentially that of the classic hero; but he
is a philosophical, and not an epical hero, and as such he is filled with irony. Though
regarded by nearly everyone including the oracle as wisest among men, Socrates
constantly claims his ignorance. Similarly, while Socrates leads Plato's campaign for
moral education, he claims that virtue cannot be taught. Despite his exemplary holiness,
courage, and self-control, Socrates claims to have no idea what these things are. It is not
by coincidence or Plato's creative whimsy that Socrates is ironic and paradoxical; it is
essential to his role as the embodiment of an ideal. Like the virtues he explores, he
cannot be defined by words and yet his presence cannot be denied. It is a great
achievement that Plato was able to transmit this quality through the medium of words.
‘^^For a similar view see Field (1930, p. 8 - 9).
‘“Similarly, Vlastos (1991, p. 29) sees Socrates' irony as central to his philosophy: "[Socrates] changes
the word
[ aronaa ] not by theorizing about it but by creating something new for it to mean: a new form of life
realized in himself which was the ver>' incarnation of eironcia. .
.
"
‘“See Lodge (1947, p.l68). For more on Socrates' irony, see section 2.3.
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In this chapter I have explained the motivation, objectives, and finally methods of
Plato's educational project. In aiming at his goal to awaken, acknowledge, and aim the
pursuit of I have shown Plato to have various and unexpected arrows in his quiver,
Plato's use of literary techniques, including his choices of settings, characters, and the
dialogue form, all contribute to his educational goals. Socrates is revealed as the
centerpiece of Plato's project, a character whose historical legacy combines with his
unique character to inspire the philosophical pursuit of srete while confirming its
existence. The remaining chapters will examine the specific ways in which Plato wields
these tools and techniques to further his educational goals in the Apology^ Crito. Ion,
Hippias Minor, Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro, and Lysis.
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CHAPTER 2
A PUSH FOR CHANGE IN THE APOLOGY AND CRITO
The Apology and Onto are widely considered to be the earliest and most
historically accurate of Plato’s writings. But whether Plato acted as an unbiased reponer
or sly social reformer in producing these works, key aspects of his educational project
emerge from them.* Both works criticize popular morality while depicting Socrates as a
counterexample and prescribing philosophy as an antidote. In the Apo/ogy. Socrates is
not so much on tnal as Athens and her educational and moral structures are. The Defense
is less an ^po/ogj^ for Socrates than a defense of philosophy as education and as a moral
guide. The Crito reinforces the lessons of the Apology by showcasing the practical use
of intellectual virtue in the real-life good deeds of a philosopher in action. These
dialogues contrast standard Athenian justice, which condemns Socrates as a criminal,
with a new philosophic ideal of justice, which exalts Socrates as a hero and a martyr.
With the Apology and Crito Socrates' stoiy begins at the end.
2il Spcrates* Challenge to the Educationa l Establishment in Apology
If you kill me, you will not easily find such another man as I, a man who ~ if I
may put it a bit absurdly — has been fastened as it were to the city by the God as,
so to speak, to a large and well-bred horse, a horse grown sluggish because of its
size and in need of being roused by a kind of gadfly. Just so, I think, the God has
fastened me to the City. I rouse you. I persuade you. I upbraid you. I never stop
lighting on each one of you, everywhere, all day long. Such another will not easily
come to you again. Gentlemen, and if you are persuaded by me, you will spare me.
But perhaps you are angry, as men roused from sleep are angry, and perhaps you
will swat me, persuaded by Meletus that you may lightly kill. Then will you
‘Although vanous parts of the Apology are corroborated by independent historical accounts, there is
no shortage of controversy over its historical accuracy. While scholars such as Grote (1875), Kostman (1984),
and Brickhouse and Smith (1989) defend the dialogue's accuracy, others including Stokes (1992) believe that
Plato exploits the historical gravity of the event to promote his own causes. Brickhouse and Smith (1989, p. 5)
contend that the ApoJcg}' couldn't have strayed far from the facts because its audience would be aware of the
actual events. The accuracy issue need not affect my argument for Plato's educational project because Plato
could coherently be pushing his educational agenda while writing the most accurate portrayal possible. Allen
( 1984, p. 3) and Teloh (1986) agree that Apo/ogv and Crito might have been simultaneously apologetic and
educational.
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3or-r/''“'
When Socrates warns the "Gentlemen of Athens"^ who make up his jury that it is
they and not he who will suffer from a guilty verdict, it seems as if he fails to grasp the
gravity of his tnal. For a man whose very life rests on the judgment of his peers, he
remains cunously cavalier in his treatment of them. He rouses them and upbraids them
and indeed they swat him. The guilty verdict is no surprise, not even to Socrates himself.
The defendant's almost complete refusal to mount a traditional defense, however, is a
surprise — at first. The Apology is different in form from the other early Socratic
dialogues; in substance, however, it differs little. Socrates treats his jury much as he treats
his interlocutors in the other dialogues. This is appropriate because the jury exhibits the
dogmatism, complacency, and failure to appreciate virtue characteristic of a typical
Socratic interlocutor. Socrates' defense turns out to be an accusation of Athens, an
attempt by Socrates to perform his elenchus on the whole city at once. Whether he fails
or succeeds is not nearly as obvious as it may first seem.
2 .1 .1 First Offense: A Failure to Pursue Truth and Justice
To what degree, Gentlemen of Athens, you have been affected by my accusers, I
do not know. I at any rate, was almost led to forget who I am — so convincingly
did they speak. Yet hardly anything they have said is true. (17a)
Socrates opens the dialogue with the suggestion that by entering court, he has
entered a den of deception. His accusers have been so deceptive as to make him nearly
forget who he is. Here Socrates offers sympathy to the Gentlemen of Athens he is about
to attack; he can understand how they were deceived into indicting him. But into this
^All Apology translations are by Allen (1984) unless otherwise indicated.
^Socrates uses this general term to addresses his jury and audience at the tnal. I adopt his term since I
believe it describes the target of both Socrates' accusations and Plato's educational reforms.
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den of deception Socrates will bring the shining ideal of truth. He challenges the jury to
recognize it - for their own good and not only for his. The greatest of his accusers'
falsehoods, Socrates goes on. was to insinuate that Socrates might be a clever speaker and
SO a deceiver;
Amorig their many falsehoods, I was especially surprised by one: they said you
m^ust be on guard lest I deceive you, since I am a clever speaker. To have no
shame at being directly refuted by facts when I show myself in no way clever with
words - that, I think, is the very height of shamelessness. Unless, of course, they
call a man a clever speaker if he speaks the truth. If that is what they mean, why, I
would even admit to being an orator - though not after their fashion. (17ab)
In just these few opening lines, Socrates has indicted the rhetoricians for being
fundamentally deceptive and indirectly accused the jury of being fools for their art.
Socrates denies that he is a clever speaker precisely on the grounds that he aims at truth
rather than deception. If a clever speaker were merely a truthful one, then he would even
call himself an orator. But orators arrange their words in the service of persuasion not
truth and so - Socrates seems to suggest - the jury that allows itself to be deceived by
them is either a passive slave to the orator's whims, or shares their priority of persuasion
over truth. In contrasting his own straightforward speech with the floweiy' manipulations
of orators, Socrates reminds the jury that theirs is a question of justice. Is justice to be
determined by the quality of performance, as in a drama festival? Or is justice to be
determined by truth?
These men, I claim, have said little or nothing true. But from me. Gentlemen, you
will hear the whole truth. To be sure, it will not be prettily tricked out in elegant
speeches like theirs, words and phrases all nicely arranged. On the contrary, you
will hear me speak naturally in the words which happened to occur to me. For I
believe what I say to be just, and let no one of you expect otherwise. (17bc)
Socrates asks the jury to make allowances for his lack of skill in speaking and his
lack of savvy in the ways of the court, just as they would for a foreigner unfamiliar with
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their dialect and justice system. But Socrates is less unskilled in rhetoric and unfamiliar
with the ways of the court than he is unwilling to conform to them in their traditional
sense. He implores the juiy to look beyond their traditional concerns and to aim their
pursuit of Justice at the higher ideal of truth - the truth to which Socrates has committed
himself;
In just the same way, I specifically ask you now, and justly so, I think, to pay no
attention to my manner of speech - it may perhaps be poor, but perhaps an
mprovement - and look strictly to this one thing, whether or not I speak justly.
For that is the virtue of a judge, and the virtue of an orator is to speak the truth
(18a)
The difference between Socrates' speech and a traditional orator's is, in the end, its goal of
truth.
Despite his disclaimers, Socrates' defense is a prime example of rhetorical art that
would be recognized by his audience as based on Gorgias' famous Apologyof
P3lamedes. The irony of this antirhetorical use of rhetorical convention^ should not
discount the sincerity of the content of Socrates' speech; his commitment to truth is real.^
Rather, this repudiation of rhetoric is a counter-indictment of a system of justice that
breeds and nurtures misunderstanding while offering little possibility to correct it.^
Socrates task turns out to be less an effort to get himself acquitted, than an attempt to
show the faults of the system of justice and of juries who so often reach for flattery and
'On the Apology'?, irony, see Allen (1984, p. 61); on the connection to Gorgias. Seeskin (1987, ch. 3).
^Teloh (1986, p. 107) calls Socrates speech "an antirhetorical parody of rhetoric." Allen (1984, p. 68 -
69) coins the term ’philosophical rhetoric' to describe it, and distinguishes it from the 'base rhetonc' of the
sophists on the grounds that it is aimed at truth and indifferent to gratification and pleasure.
‘Truth is the critenon that separates Socrates' defense from Palamedes' and also the crucial difference
between Socrates and the Sophists. See Seeskin (1987, p. 62): "Though Gorgias' Palmedes made essentially
the same claim, we have seen that he was concerned less with truth than with probability. For if Plato had
imitated Gorgias to the letter, he would have written a defense of Socrates which made ample use of the
argument from probability.
"
^Socrates complains repeatedly about the lack of time he has for his defense and pessimistically
prophecies his conviction. Brickhouse and Smith (1989, p. 41) observe, ". . .if the jury should take literally an
ironic remark, their mistake could not emerge in subsequent conversation for Socrates to correct." Reeve
(1989, p. 20) points out that Socrates must appeal to the jury itself cis witness to the truth of what he says: "He
asks them to confront their prejudicial beliefs about advanced thinkers with their actual knowledge of him."
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emotional appeals rather than truth. Socrates knows what the jury is expecting, but he
insists on force-feeding them truth. He refuses to play the game:
Hear me then. Perhaps some of you will think [Vm playing
well assured that I shall tell you the whole truth. (20d)
a game (ttai^eiv)];® be
2ul ,2 Second Offensg; PoRmatic Acceptance of the. Fir<.t
Socrates is quick to point out that courtroom rhetoricians are not alone in their
efforts to deceive the jury:
For the fact is that many accusers have risen before you against me; at this point
they have been making accusations for many years, and yet they have told no
truth. Yet I fear them more than I fear Anytus and those around him - though
they too are clever [beivoxx;]. Still, the [first accusers] are more dangerous
[Seivoxepoi]. (I8bc)
Now deinos [5eiv6q, terrible, able, skillful] is an ambiguous word that denotes both skill
and danger. While Anytus and Meletus seem to pose a danger to Socrates, the first
accusers are more directly dangerous to the jury, the Gentlemen of Athens, for they
corrupted them as youths:
They took hold of most of you in childhood, persuading you of the truth of
accusations which were in fact quite false: "There is a certain Socrates
. . . wise
[ao(p6q] man. . . thinker on things in the Heavens.
. . inquirer into things beneath
Earth
. . . making the weaker argument stronger." Those men. Gentlemen of
Athens, the ones who spread that report are my dangerous [5eivoi] accusers; for
their hearers believe that those who inquire into such things acknowledge no gods
(18bc)
This passage must be interpreted very carefully. Anytus and Meletus present the
accusation cited, but this fallacious accusation is dangerous to Socrates only because the
first accusers laid the groundwork for its acceptance. The first accusers got hold of
® Allen translates pajzo as "I joke,"; I have departed from his translation for my own emphasis.
According to Liddell and Scott, the pnmary meaning of pajzo is to play ~ like a child or at a game or sport.
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Socrates’ judges as youths and indoctrinated them with the dangerous idea that inquiry
equals impiety.
Who are the first accusers? Socrates indirectly identifies Aristophanes at 18d, but
says that the others cannot be named or even known. All we know is that they begin
working on citizens when they are youths and continue indoctrinating them over a veiy
long time, leaving Socrates with the nearly impossible task of removing "in this short time
that prejudice which you have been so long in acquiring" (19a). Their anonymity and
pervasiveness can make these corrupters of youth none other than the "everyone" Meletus
identifies as the improvers of youth at 25a. It is the educational system and its practice
of feeding unquestioned social values to the youth of Athens that lays the groundwork for
Socrates ultimate conviction. This is just as he predicts;
Gentlemen of Athens, I do not think further defense is needed to show that, by the
very terms of Meletus' indictment, I am not guilty; this, surely is sufficient. But as I
said before, a great deal of enmity has risen against me from among many people,
and you may rest assured that this is true. And that is what will convict me, if I am
convicted -- not Meletus, not Anytus, but the grudging slander of the multitude. It
has convicted many another good and decent man; I think it will convict me; nor
is there any reason to fear that with me it will come to a stand. (28ab)
It is not so much Aristophanes' particular portrayal of Socrates as a corrupting educator in
the Clouds that sends Socrates to his death; after all, Socrates makes clear that the first
accusers have convicted and will convict many other men as well. Rather, it is the
multitude's unquestioned standards of goodness and piety that preclude any alternative
conception of these ideals, and the constricted setting of court which fails to provide the
opportunity to rid the juty of these prejudiced standards.
To be sure, Socrates attributes part of his indictment to confusion caused by
Aristophanes' poetry and plays, to books by other philosophers such as Anaxagoras
w'hich are bought cheaply in the agora and then mistakenly attributed to Socrates (as
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Meletiis dees at 26de), and to orators who by veiy definition set out to slander their target
Socrates' complaint about these things is not so much that they misrepresent him, or even
what they misrepresent him as, but rather that their ideas now in a single direction. There
IS no opportunity to ask questions of a book or to challenge the ideas of a play. As a
result, there is little motivation for their impressionable audiences to doubt what they sayi
^am, there have teen many such accusers, and they have now been at work for a
f
® ® especially credulous - someof you children, some only a little older- and they lodged their accusations quiteby default, no one appeanng in defense. (18cd)
Now Socrates must defend himself against these disembodied accusers. He is
fighting not only against a misconception of his character, but also against a narrow and
dogmatic idea of piety that disallows inquiry. He must fight against his jury's faulty
education:
But those who use malicious slander to persuade you, and those who, themselves
persuaded, persuade others - all these are most difficult to deal with. For it is
impossible to bring any one of them forward as a witness and cross-examine him. I
must rather, as it were, fight with shadows in making my defense, and question
where no one answers. (18d)
Unfortunately this education has yielded a jury that values persuasion over truth. So
when at 19bc, Socrates recounts Aristophanes' cancature of him and asks those in the jury
who have interacted with him personally to tell the others that their experience doesn't
square with the play, their counterexamples have no effect. Somehow the play's message
has become more pervasive than the testimony of Socrates' real acquaintances.
2.1,3 Third Offense: Failure to Acknowledge Ignorance
I have been arguing that the real harm done by the "first accusers" was to instill in
the jury from their youth a conception of piety so dogmatic that inquiry into the truth or
59
reality of things could be interpreted as impiety. In assuming that they know what piety
IS, the juty displays the kind of assumption of wisdom so characteristic of Socrates'
interlocutors. Indeed their assumption of knowledge is so strong that they interpret
inquiry itself as heresy. Socrates is a threat because he questions things the jury members
assume they know and so challenges their complacency. This complacency is evident m
the charges:
Socrates is guilty of needless curiosity and meddling interference, inquiring intothmp beneath the Earth and Sky, making the weaker argument stronger and
teaching Others to do the same. (19c)
The very idea that curiosity is "needless” and that asking questions is "meddling
interference" reveals a profound resistance to inquiry. Inquiry is considered criminal.
The charges that Socrates inquires after things beyond earth and sky and makes
the weaker argument stronger are inconsistent with the Socrates we know from Plato and
Xenophon; and Socrates immediately attributes them to Aristophanes' caricature.
Though he denies the accuracy of this caricature, he takes pains to point out that he
would not be ashamed were the charges correct:
Mark you, I do not mean to disparage such knowledge, if anyone in fact has it -
let me not be brought to trial by Meletus on such a charge as that! But
Gentlemen, I have no share in it. (19c)
Socrates sees crucial differences among himself, the natural philosophers who inquire
after the earth and sky (see 26d), and the Sophists who make weaker arguments stronger
and teach for a fee. He does not consider their activities impious or worthy of
prosecution, however. He asks the jury again to compare their experience of him with the
charges and note the discrepancy: "From that you will recognize the nature of the other
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things the multitude says about me," he says (19d). This is not so much a defense as a
reminder to the juiy of the hollowness of their own assumptions.
Having presented a diatribe against sophistic orators who make weak aiguments
stronger and having shown himself committed instead to truth, Socrates goes on to
distinguish himself from sophistic educators. Again, he doesn't disparage education
directly but rather criticizes accepted practices in the process of avowing his innocence:
And if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to educate men and make
money from doing it, that is false, too. Once again, I think it would be a fine thing
o be able to educate men, as Goigias of Leontini does, or Prodicus of Ceos, or
Hippias of Elis. For each of them. Gentlemen, can enter any given city and
convince the youth - who might freely associate with any of their fellow citizens
they please — to drop those associates and associate rather with them, to pay
money for it, and give thanks in the bargain. (19d - 20a)
This statement is practically dripping with irony. It would be a "fine thing" to educate
men as these sophists cJaim to do; that is it would be great if one could in fact teach
virtue. But Socrates knows he lacks the relevant knowledge, and he suspects that these
men do as well. Noting that they are paid handsomely for their tuition, Socrates at once
reveals their motivation for deception and declares himself devoid of such capitalism.’
The anger directed at Socrates and his "teaching" cannot be based on what he
teaches, since he teaches nothing, nor on his fees, since he charges nothing. Rather, he
explains, it is based on people upset with the suggestion and appearance of their own
ignorance:
As a result, those whom [my followers] test become angry at me, not at themselves,
and say that "this fellow Socrates is utterly polluted, and corrupts the youth."
’Socrates' most tangible defense was his poverty. Since he didn't take a fee for his associations with
young men, despite their wealth, and since he devoted all his time to talking with them, he had no resources to
speak of. Part of his refusal to accept payment no doubt has to do with his claim that he had nothing to teach.
Another reason may be that Socrates' goal is truth, not profit, and going after money might cause him to stray
from the path. A student is bound to fork over more for flattery than for the insulting aporia Socrates was
wont to produce. On the other hand, Socrates refusal of payment left him free to pursue truth. The ultimate
reason Socrates refuses a fee, however, is that his activity is of a religious and not a business nature. See also
Teloh(1986, p.l09).
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And when someone asks them what it is this Socrates does, what it is he teaches
they cannot say because they do not know; but so as not to seem at a loss, thev
’
mutter the kind of things that lie ready to hand against anyone who pursues
wisdom: "Things in the Heavens and beneath the Earth." or "not acknowledging
gods, or making the weaker argument stronger." (23d)
That Socrates has personally examined many members of the jury has already been
acknowledged (i.e. at 19cd). Here it is suggested that his followers, described as wealthy
young men, have gone out and examined the adults with whom they associate. The jury,
the audience, and Socrates' particular accusers cannot be dissociated from this group. So
here again Socrates is accusing the jury of becoming angry at him rather than admitting
the presence or even appearance of ignorance in themselves:
The truth, I suppose, they would not wish to state, namely, that it has become
quite clear that they pretend to knowledge and know nothing. And because they
are concerned for their pride, I think, and zealous, and numerous, and speak
vehemently and persuasively about me, they have long filled your ears with
zealous slander. (23de)
Socrates' insistence that virtue is neither known nor taught by the Athenian
citizenry whom Meletus identified as the improvers of youth cannot help but be
maddening to well-regarded citizens and parents alike. He is upsetting the accepted idea
that virtue is easily known and taught to children, by parents or by hired sophists. This
attitude, which was no doubt shared by the jury, is illustrated at 20ab where Socrates
recounts asking his friend Callias about the education of his sons. He points out that if
the boys were horses or calves it would be easy to find someone to make them excellent in
their appropriate virtue. He then asks whether there is anyone who has knowledge of the
virtue appropriate to a man and a citizen. "To be sure," replies Callias using the short
answer style of the sophists:^® "Evenus, a Parian, Five minae."
'“Allen (1984) compares it to the style used by sophists at Gorg/as 449b, and Protagoras 334e - 335c.
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I counted Evenus fortunate indeed, if he really possesses that art and teaches
It so modestly. For my own part, at any rate, I would be puffed up with vanity andpnde II I had such knowledge. But I do not, Gentlemen." (20bc)
This is a caricature of an answer. The jury thinks that it's easy to find a teacher of
virtue. That Socrates denies having such a skill and professes the greatest admiration for
one who might possess it only highlights the Athenians' failure to recognize the
seriousness of the task. Socrates is clearly asking the citizens of Athens to question their
own complacency about the false knowledge they have of him, the false knowledge they
have of piety, and the false knowledge they have of virtue and its teachability. He is less
interested in denying that the charges apply to him, than he is in denying that they are
prosecutable and anything more than an effort to avoid aporetic reality. Socrates
concludes the first part of his defense with nothing less than an exhortation to inquiry:
Whether you inquire into it now or hereafter you will find it to be so. (24b)
2 .1 .4 Fourth Offense; Failure to Direct Pursuits toward the Good
I have been arguing that Socrates' defense was in many ways an accusation of his
juiy. At 24c ff., Socrates explicitly turns the tables on his chief accuser, Meletus, charging
him -- but not him alone it will turn out — with various "crimes":
But I claim. Gentlemen of Athens, that it is Meletus who is guilty — guilty of
jesting in eamest,^^ guilty of lightly bringing men to trial, guilty of pretending a
zealous concern for things he never cared about at all. (24c)
Socrates' charge boils down to a criticism of Meletus' ultimate concerns or aims; he is
asking what Meletus cares about. He has accused Socrates of impiety and corrupting the
youth, but Socrates here charges that it is Meletus who cares not for the youth or even for
the god, but rather for his own social profit.
"Grubc (1981) translates this: "dealing frivolously with serious matters." This is an interesting counter
charge in light of Socrates' reputation for irony, and refusal to mount a serious defense.
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Socrates' first question to Meletus is whether he thinks that the young should be as
good [PatlOTOl] as possible. Meletus says yes but then cannot say who it is that makes
the youth better [Patriot,;] (24de). I believe that Plato prefers the adjective bejtion
when he means better in a specifically moral sense, which is here consistent with the idea
that education should aim at aiete or moral excellence.'^ Where Socrates disagrees with
Meletus (and much of the rest of the Athenian citizenry) is over how arete is determined
and judged. Socrates treats arete as a divine ideal, perhaps accurately judgable only by
gods. Meletus seems to view arete in the traditional sense as something valued more for
the impression made on others than for its intrinsic value.^^
At first Meletus cannot say what or who improves the youth. At 24d he finally
says that the laws improve the youth, a reply that reveals his concern with social approval
rather than independent moral ideals.*^ When Socrates insists on a human improver of
youth, Meletus points to the judges, claiming that all of them are best able to educate and
improve the youth. Meletus here acts as though he is being judged by them and indulges
in flattery. After all, winning the case against Socrates would surely be a social boon for
Meletus, while losing would be a financial (36ab) and social loss. But the socially-aware
Meletus is concerned with more than the judges; eventually he fingers the audience, the
councilors, the assemblymen — everyone except Socrates as improvers of the youth.
This overwhelming abundance of educators, however, is no more capable of
improving the youth morally than of training horses for Olympic victory. The multitude
aren't even concerned with moral virtue, much less able to teach it. As Socrates says
‘Tor more on Plato's use of bdtion see section 3.3 and Hoerber (1962, p. 127).
'Taving a reputation for arete was infinitely more desirable than hang virtuous and so people
focused on the image rather than the reality of arete. Dover (1974, p. 226) points out that Athenian
expressions such as 'I want to be seen to be honest’, or 'to be regarded as honest' were often equivalent to our
'I want to be honest,’ adding that "goodness divorced from a reputation for goodness was of limited interest."
'This initial response reflects those of Lysis and Menexenus in Lysis.
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explicitly at 36bc, the multitude are concerned "with money or property or militar>' and
public honors and other office, or the secret societies and political clubs which keep
cropping up in the City." As was typically Athenian. Meletus is aiming to profit from his
indictment of Socrates.^^ answers to Socrates' question reveal Meletus' misplaced
goals:
But the fact is, Meletus, that you sufficiently show that you never gave thought to
the youth; you clearly indicate your own lack of concern, indicate that you never
cared at all about these matters. (25c)
Meletus is interested in social rather than moral goods. As Socrates explains at 23e - 24a,
the suit is brought on behalf of his accuser's social peers - not for the benefit of the youth
or the god. Meletus was angered on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the
craftsmen and politicians, and Lycon on behalf of the orators.
By showing that he has no reason to corrupt others, Socrates makes it clear that he
is being prosecuted for harming the complacency and reputation of the Gentlemen of
Athens -- not their sons or their gods.
But again, dear Meletus, tell us this: Is it better to dwell among fellow citizens
who are good, or wicked [xpriaxoTt; fj TCOVT^potc;]? Do answer, dear friend;
surely I ask nothing hard. Do not wicked men do evil things [KaKOv] to those
around them, and good men good things [dyaGoi dyaGov]? (25c)
Socrates tries to show that he would be stupid to intentionally corrupt the men among
whom he dwells; he points out that none of them has come back to wreak havoc on his
alleged corrupter. The sophists, by contrast, were often foreigners and nomads who had
little or no personal stake in the outcome of their teachings; Socrates mocks their situation
in considering exile as a penalty at 37d.
‘^Sce: Adkins (1960, p. 261 ):”thc Greeks generally would only do something if it was quite clear that
they would benefit fairgib/y thereby, or at the very least that calamity faced them of they did not do it."
65
In contrast to Meletus and most of the Gentlemen of Athens, Socrates is
committed to the god and to the moral improvement of the youth beyond all else. The
only possible way he could corrupt them is unintentionally:
And if I corrupt them unintentionally, it is not the law to bring action here for that
sort of mistake, but rather to instruct and admonish in private; for clearly, if I once
learn, I shall stop what I unintentionally do. You, however, were unwilling to
associate with me and teach me; instead, you brought action here, where it is law
to bring those in need of punishment rather than instruction. (26a)
The very fact that Meletus has brought Socrates before the court shows two things: first,
that Meletus is most interested in improving his social status by pillorying the man who
has embarrassed many of his peers; second, that Meletus has no knowledge on which to
base his indictment because if he did, he would teach that knowledge to Socrates instead
of punishing him for being ignorant. Socrates' examination of Meletus is nothing less than
an examination of the Athenian citizenry at large.
2,1.5 The Penalty: In Condemning Socrates Athens Harms Itself
My argument that Socrates is trying his peers rather than the reverse seems to be
confirmed at 30c, where the city is identified as the potential victim in a conviction:
Be well assured that if you kill me, and if I am the sort of man I claim, you will
harm me less than you harm yourselves And so. Gentlemen of Athens, I am far
from making a defense for my own sake, as some might think; I make it for yours,
lest you mistake the gift the God has given you and cast your votes against me.
(30c)
In a way, Socrates functions as the city's conscience — that little voice that squeaks "Are
you sure?" as everyone shakes hands and mumbles in agreement over their mutual
rightness. But this annoying pip-squeak refuses to accept and go along with society's
rules. He won't play the game of courtroom oratory and theatrics; supplication would be a
confirmation of erroneous charges. In short, Socrates refuses to view the jury as his
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ultimate judge, rather than the god. He rs not surprised at his conviction - in fact he's
most surprised at the number of acquittal votes (36a). He sees the event as Athens' trial
and conviction of herself, because it is she who will suffer the greatest penalty.
You must recognize that this one thing is
either in living or dying, and the gods do
true: there is no evil for a good man
not neglect his affairs. (41d)
Part of the reason this trial is less of Socrates than of Athens is that the city is the
only one who stands to lose. Socrates' commitment to the god (see sec. 2.2) and his
concern with justice as an ideal rather than the capricious decision of an easily
manipulated mob, give him a kind of Teflon coating. At 40e - 41b Socrates wonders if
death will be like a journey to another place where he will meet "true judges" and be able
to compare his life to those of demigods and heroes. He might also be able to question
Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer. "I would find a wonderful pursuit there," he says,
companng himself to others who had met unjust verdicts. "It would be inconceivable
happiness, he concludes. Socrates is convinced that the gods will judge him justly, his
worldly judges can only penalize themselves.
Socrates believes that true justice can be found only outside the courtroom. It is
for this reason that he has led such a private life and refuses to mount a traditional
defense at his trial.
It is impossible for any man to be spared if he publicly opposes you or any other
democratic majority, and prevents many unjust and illegal things from occurring in
his city. He who intends to fight for what is just, if he is to be spared even for a
little time, must of necessity live a private rather than a public life. (31e - 32a)
The huge jury of a classical Athenian court was easily swayed by slick rhetoric
and slander (see Euthy^hro 3b) not least because of their interest in looking good to
each other and looking good as a group. Socrates' insistence on remaining a private man
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and refusing public life was as much as anything an attempt to preserve his
self-determination in a democratic environment. The Athenian system of government and
criminal justice diminished an individual's sense of responsibility for what was done by
the group and elevated the consideration of community strength far above the question of
fairness to individuals. In some sense a vote to acquit Socrates amounted to siding with
the hated guy in opposition to one's friends and the social powers that be. These facts,
along with Socrates' frequent expressions of defeatism in the Apology, suggest that Plato
was out to criticize the moral assumptions behind Socrates' conviction at least as much as
the conviction itself/^
At 35b ff. Socrates explicitly spurns the tradition of bringing his family into court
in an emotional appeal to the jury. Were Socrates to make an emotional appeal for
acquittal, he would only prove himself guilty of the charges by looking to the jury rather
than to god to determine what is pious;
We ought not accustom you, nor ought you become accustomed, to forswear
yourselves; it is pious in neither of us. So do not consider it right. Gentlemen of
Athens, that I do such things in your presence as I believe to be neither honorable
nor just nor holy, especially since, by Zeus, it is for impiety that I am prosecuted
by this fellow Meletus here. For clearly, if I were to persuade and compel you by
supplication, you being sworn as judges, I would teach you then indeed not to
believe that there are gods, and in making my defense I would in effect accuse
myself of not acknowledging them. But that is far from so; I do acknowledge
them. Gentlemen of Athens, as none of my accusers does, and to you and to the
God I now commit my case, to judge in whatever way will be best for me and also
for you. (35cd)
Socrates' honor is conferred by the god, not by the men. Hence, he does not cower before
the jury as he says he has seen other men do, despite their reputations, when threatened
with death, acting "as though they would be immortal if you did not kill them." Since
'‘For more on the implications of the Athenian democracy see Field (1930, p. 86) and Dover (1974, p.
158). Arguments from Stone (1989) and others who show why Athens was right to convict Socrates based
upon the damage he did to their laws and society, are not neccssanly in disagreement with the Platonic
viewpoint, they merely fail to recognize Plato’s larger agenda.
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Socrates' real trial is to come later; he insists on adhering to the truth and to his honor in
the face of death:
It ts true I have been convicted tor a lack; not a lack of words, but lack of bold
shamelessness unwtllingness to say the things you would find it pleasant to hear
me r'J'I’if
saying and doing many things I claim to be unworthy of, but things of the sort you are accustomed to hear from others. I did not thenthink It necessary to do anything unworthy of a free man because of danger- I do
not now regret so having conducted my defense; and I would far rather die with
that defense than live with the other. (38de)
Socrates here acknowledges that it was not his lack of skill in oratory that caused
his conviction, but rather his unwillingness to flatter the jury. Indeed, his entire life has
been dedicated to showing the gentlemen of Athens that they aren't as wise as they take
themselves to be - he isn't going to start flattering them now. Socrates scorns his court for
being a place where justice has no chance of succeeding as long as judges look to their
own worldly interests rather than the ideal of justice in rendering their verdict. "The judge
does not sit to grant justice as a favor," he reminds them, "but to render judgment; he has
sworn no oath to gratify those whom he sees fit, but to judge according to law" (35c).
There is a sense in which Socrates' refusal to play the game of a traditional defense reveals
the corruption of the court system and of the city itself.
One of the more overt criticisms Socrates makes of the Athenian legal system is
that it offers enough time for emotional persuasion, but not enough for rational
persuasion. There is a lament at 19a that Socrates has so little time to remove a prejudice
that the jury has spent nearly a lifetime acquiring. At 24a, Socrates says that he would be
surprised if he were able to remove the prejudice against him in so short a time. At 37a
Socrates concludes that if Athens didn't insist on deciding death-penalty cases in a single
day, he believes the jury could be persuaded. Socrates' message here is not just about the
legal system, but about impatience in searching for truth. Belief in an unsupported myth
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or opm.on is a quick fix intended to replace a reasoned position. Constant questioning
and examination leads to better and better beliefs and decisions but it is a time
consuming, indeed life consuming, project.
Socrates says explicitly that his conviction amounts to a victory for wickedness
and that those who have condemned him will, like him, receive their just deserts:
Often in battle it becomes clear that a man may escape death by throwing down
his arms and turning in supplication to his pursuers; and there are many other
devices for each of war's dangers, so that one can avoid dying if he is bold enough
to say and do anything whatever. It is not difficult to escape death. Gentlemen: it
is more difficult to escape wickedness, for wickedness runs faster than death. And
now I am old and slow, and I have been caught by the slower runner. But my
accusers are clever and quick, and they have been caught by the faster runner,
namely Evil. I now take my leave, sentenced by you to death; they depart,
convicted by Truth for injustice and wickedness. I abide in my penalty, and thev
in theirs. (39ab)
What could Socrates' accusers' penalty be? Haven't they won in court, won't they receive
the spoils of victory - namely relief from Socrates? At 39cd, Socrates suggests not. He
prophesies that many other examiners will come to take his place, saying that he has
restrained them thus far. He warns that these younger examiners will be even more harsh
and that those who wanted to be rid of Socrates will be even more troubled. As an
antidote to this torment Socrates offers only one solution:
If you think by killing to hold back the reproach due you for not living rightly, you
are profoundly mistaken. That release is neither possible nor honorable. The
release which is both most honorable and most easy is not to cut down others, but
to take care that you will be as good as possible. This I utter as prophecy to those
of you who voted for my condemnation, and take my leave. (39d)
Socrates' conviction and penalty of death will end his service to the city, but it will not
meaningfully punish him. The loser of this trial is Athens; Socrates will be judged in the
divine realm.
But it is now the hour of parting — I to die and you to live. Which of us goes to
the better is unclear to all but the God. (42a)
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The three general charges or criticisms Socrates subtly levels against Athens in the
ApoJosy^ correspond with the three central aspects of Plato's project for education in the
early dialogues. The unquestioning acceptance of the first accusers is typical of the
attitude toward tradition, poetry, and myth that Plato hoped to eradicate by awakening
the minds of Athens. Memorization and dogmatic acceptance would be replaced with
critical analysis of poetry, prophecy, literature and drama. Next, the popular association
of virtue with wealth, gloiy, and practical skills would be replaced by a new intellectual
idea of the soul and arete as its perfection. Accordingly, intellectual pursuits would be
directed cooperatively toward the divine ideal of moral perfection. Honom confened by
the multitude — for victory in argument, elections, or even in court — would be at best
instrumental toward the higher good. Under this scheme philosophical inquiry would not
be criminal, but rather a supremely pious activity.
3ocratg$' Mtssionr A Defense of Philosophy as a Moral Pursuit
If the Apology is a defense of anything it is less one of Socrates, than of
philosophy as a way of life. Socrates was charged with impiety and with corrupting the
youth, but from his description of his mission he emerges as the inversion of those
accusations. Socrates defends his philosophical activity as nothing other than a holy
pursuit, a true mission aimed at perfecting man's most divine element: his soul. He
explains the divine origin of his mission, exhibiting a new attitude toward divine
proclamations as riddles to be solved rather than doctrine to be accepted. Socrates proves
that he values the god above reputation, wealth, power, his own family, even his own life.
A cessation of philosophy for Socrates would amount to disobedience to the god. He
sticks to his post even when his life is threatened. Socrates is a philosopher-hero.
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L2rl The Oracle Stpiy; The Divine Origin of Snrrates' Missinn
Socrates offers the oracle story in response to a hypothetical question from the jury
asking what he has done to give nse to such slanderous charges. In an almost shocking
departure from his habitual avowal of ignorance, Socrates answers that he is being
slandered for his wisdom:
Gentlemen of Athens, I got this name through nothing but a kind of wisdom
What kind? The kind which is perhaps peculiarly human, for it may be I am really
wise in that. And perhaps the men I just mentioned [sophists] are wise with a
wisdom greater than human — either that, or I cannot say what. In any case, I
have no knowledge of it, and whoever says I do is lying and speaks to mv
slander.*^ (20de)
^ >
As a witness to his wisdom, Socrates calls none other than the god at Delphi (20e). By
Socrates account of wisdom, this is the only sort of witness there could be; the god is the
only entity wise enough to judge whether Socrates (or anyone else) is truly wise. Indeed
Socrates' human wisdom turns out to be merely the knowledge that he does not know.
This knowledge contrasts directly with the alleged wisdom of the sophists who either have
superhuman knowledge or "I cannot say what." Clearly, the second half of this
disjunction is the proposition to be affirmed — as it has been repeatedly by the aporectic
outcomes of Socrates' examinations.
The oracle story itself is well known. Socrates' friend Chaerephon went to the
Oracle at Delphi and asked whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. The oracle
proclaimed that no one was wiser.^® It is not from this story that the slander against
Socrates has arisen, but rather from Socrates' reaction to it. Socrates treats the oracle's
proclamation as nothing other than a riddle to be solved. It doesn't replace Socrates'
” Does this final claim suggest that the oracle is lying and slandering by claiming Socrates wise? The
question forms a Platonic nddle, the answer to which seems to be no, since the oracle claims that Socrates has
human knowledge while the liars and slanderers claim he has superhuman knowledge.
‘“On Xenophon’s account, the oracle says Socrates is the most free, upnght, and prudent of all people.
See Socrates 'Dc/ensr 12 ff.; this is the Tredcnnick AVaterfield translation.
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conviction of his own ignorance, rather it prompts him to try and reconcile the two. He
knew that the divine word must be true, so this proclamation could be nothing other than
a paradox, a seeming contradiction, a riddle to be solved:
For when I heard it, I reflected: "What does the God mean? What is the sense of
this riddling utterance [aiviTxexai]?*^ I know that I am not wise at all; what then
does the God mean by saying I am wisest? Surely he does not speak falsehood; it
is not permitted to him." So I puzzled [f\7COpot)V] for a long time over what he
meant, and then, with great reluctance, I turned to inquire into the matter in some
such way as this. (21b)
It s clear that Socrates thinks it his duty to test the oracle; one he approaches reluctantly.
Commentators have puzzled over how Socrates extrapolated his elenctic mission
from the oracle's cryptic statement.^® Looking at the story from an educational angle,
however, helps to explain why he describes his reaction as he does. The traditional
Athenian reaction to such a proclamation would be to accept it unquestioningly; Socrates
need not test his knowledge because it has been confirmed by the God. For Socrates and
Plato, however, inquiry is the best reaction to any puzzle or dilemma. When the oracle
presented Socrates with a statement that could be seen as a riddling irony or paradox, he
was sent into aporia. He attempted to extract himself from that aporia by dialectical
inquiry. Socrates reacted to the oracular puzzle just as Plato hopes his audience will react
to the many puzzles he creates in his dialogues.
Such puzzles are not just fun and games, these riddling ironies and paradoxes are
indicators of divine truth that can't be expressed directly in the world of appearances; it is
a pious duty to inquire after them. At 21bc, Socrates describes how he tested the oracle:
‘’The definition of sinissomai according to Liddell & Scott: "to speak darkly or in riddles, to hint a
thing, give to understand." See also see. 1.3.4. and the description of Socrates’ daJmowon in sec. 2.2.4.
^ Stokes (1992, p. 73), Reeve (1989), Brickhouse and Smith (1989, p. 99), and Vlastos (1983) agree
that Socrates does not explain how the oracle prompts him to engage in elcnchus. Teloh (1986, p. Ill)
speculates that since serving the god requires knowledge of good and evil, Socrates immediately engages in
dialectic - the path to such knowledge. Even this explanation skips over the transition from the oracular
statement to Socrates' mission, however.
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I went to someone with a reputation for wisdom, in the belief that there if
anyu’here I might test [e^^^cov] the meaning of the utterance and declare to the
oracle that this man is wiser than I am, and you said I was wisest.” (21bc)
It IS important to understand that Socrates is testing the meaning of the oracle, not its
accuracy. Grote translates [^^^cov] "refute" the oracle and Tredennick, "disprove" the
oracle, but there is no evidence that Socrates ever doubts its truth. In his testing, Socrates
adopts a questioning stance thereby, taking an open approach to the riddle.^^ The subject
of the investigation is wisdom, not Socrates, and so he interrogates those reputed to be
wise (21c): poets, politicians, and craftsmen. Socrates' objective isn't to show that he is
wiser than his interlocutors, but to discover how he could be wiser; he wants to learn
something about wisdom. What Socrates learns is that he is wiser than these men
precisely in that he knows that he does not know:
So it seems, at any rate, that I am wiser in this one small respect: I do not think I
know what I do not. (21d)
Socrates describes his examination of a political man who "had the effect" on him
in conversation of seeming wiser. He learns that the man is not wise despite seeming that
way to others and "most especially to himself." Socrates then takes it as his labor (22a)
and duty to both the god and to the man himself to show him his ignorance. How can this
be \ Once Socrates learned from testing the oracle that knowledge of one's ignorance was
a kind of wisdom, he realized that false conceit was an obstacle to learning, and therefore
to improvement of the soul, and therefore to piety. If a man's piety consists in the moral
perfection of his soul, the false belief that he has achieved such perfection cannot help
but make him impious. Socrates is not trying to prove his own superiority by refutation,
rather he is trying to get others to acknowledge their human imperfection.
^'As Kierkegaard (1989, p. 35) points out, "Inasmuch as I ask a question, I know nothing and am
related altogether receptively to my subject."
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T t ^ things in which I testothers But very likely, Gentlemen, it is really the God who is wise, and by his
oracle he means to say that 'human nature is a thing of little worth, or none ' It
appeam that he does not mean this fellow Socrates, but uses my name to offer an
example, as if he were saying that "he among you, Gentlemen, is wisest who, like
Socrates, realizes that he is truly worth nothing in respect to wisdom. (23a)
222 Socrates' Service to the God
Despite the rewards he anticipates upon his eventual divine judgment (40e),
Socrates has paid dearly in social costs for his mission:
Nevertheless, I went on, perceiving with grief and fear that I was becoming hated
but still, it seemed necessary to put the God first - so I had to go on, examining
’
what the oracle meant by testing everyone with a reputation of knowledge.
(21e-22a)
As this passage makes clear, Socrates put his duty to the god above the approval of the
multitude and even the popular conception of piety. Here we find Socrates' true answer
to the jury's question about how the slander that he is impious has arisen. This answer,
however, implies that the jury know neither their own ignorance, nor what piety is. Is it
sheer stupidity that leads Socrates to denigrate the wisdom of his own jury? Or is it an
educational transference of the very riddle that sparked his own inquiry? Imagine a jury
member saying to himself, "I think I am wise, but Socrates here says I am not. What shall
I make of this conflict? What is this wisdom which he says I claim falsely, what kind of
wisdom can I achieve?" Of course, rather than pull himself from the pit of aporia
through inquiry, the jury member could simply eliminate the source of the aporia. For
Socrates, pious action is inspiring inquiry aimed at truth by introducing aporia and
riddling irony. Here, in the middle of his trial for impiety, he is doggedly carrying on that
mission by puzzling his jury.
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Now it's important to notice that Socrates' ignorance represents a philosophical
attitude that should not be confused with empirical ignorance. Like his audience.
Socrates was well read, well informed, and experienced, but he was ignorant of the most
imponanl things: the eternal and the divine^ The poets, whom Athenians traditionally
consider expert in these matters, are indeed in touch with the divine but not
knowledgeable about it:
So presently I came to realize that poets too do not make what they make by
wisdom, but by a kind of native disposition or divine inspiration, exactly like seers
and prophets. For the latter also utter many fine things, but know nothing of the
things they speak. That is how the poets also appeared to me, while at the same
time I realized that because of their poetry they thought themselves the wisest of
men in other matters - and were not. (22c)
Similarly, craftsmen who possess all kinds of knowledge about speaking, shoemaking, and
many another worldly skill fail to acknowledge their ignorance with respect to "things of
great importance," namely virtue.
But, Gentlemen of Athens, it seemed to me that the poets and our capable public
craftsmen had exactly the same failing: because they practiced their own arts well,
each deemed himself wise in other things, things of great importance. (22d)
Socrates is not accusing his jury of complete ignorance — only of ignorance of the most
important things — and a corresponding overemphasis on less important things like wealth
and reputation.
Socrates is asking the gentlemen of Athens to put god, and their own most godlike
quality — their souls— above all else. And he is asking them to do this first by
acknowledging their ignorance with respect to the soul and its virtue, and next by
pursuing arete through inquiry. He does this on behalf of and in order to help the god.
“Scc Kierkegaard (1989, p. 169): "He knew that it was, but he did not know what it was." Kraut
(1984, p. 284) concurs that the knowledge Socrates lacked was divine, claiming that "should any human being
ever make the moral discoveries Socrates wishes he could maike, then he would retain the status of a god."
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That is why I still go about even now on behalf of the God, searching andinquiring am^ong both citizens and strangers, should I think some one of them iswise, and when it seems he is not, I help the God and prove it. (23b)
Socrates calls this work a pursuit [^xo'kicx^] that eliminates opportunities for leisure,
family, and political matters; "I dwell in utter poverty because of my service to God," he
says(23c). It is important to note from this characterization of his mission that while
Socrates may consider divine uisdom unachievable, he believes the pursuit of wisdom
(i.e. philosophy) to be a supremely pious activity.
Ever the faithful servant of the god, Socrates suggests that the anger with which
his accusers come after him is better directed at themselves (23de). Instead they make
false accusations in an effort "not to seem at a loss." Avoiding the appearance of aporia
may be among the highest social goals in Athens, but Socrates has shown aporia to be a
holy state. It is easy to interpret the engraved advice at Delphi to "know thyself" as an
exhortation to acknowledge the truth of one's ignorance. Socrates' accusers are acting
emotionally rather than rationally, however, and putting appearances before truth. They
have charged a supremely pious man with impiety. Their behavior illustrates Plato's
motivation for educational reform.
2,2.3 Philosophy as Pious Activity
Meletus' charge that Socrates is an atheist (26c) is so diametrically opposed to the
devoutly pious man he takes himself to be^^ that Socrates cannot help but think the
charge some riddle like one that declared him wisest:
You cannot be believed, Meletus — even, I think, by yourself. Gentlemen of
Athens, I think this man who stands here before you is insolent and unchastened,
” Commentators disagree as to whether Socrates actually was guilty of impiety in the legal sense.
Socrates’ direct examination of Meletus demonstrated, in the words of BnckJiouse and Smith (1985, p. 29),
"that not even his most fanatical enemy can coherently believe that he is guilty of charges in the indictment."
Oddly enough, some of Socrates' greatest friends including Kierkegaard (1989, p. 160) and Vlastos (1991, p.
166) are prepared to admit that he was guilty.
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and has brought this suit precisely out of insolence and unchastened youth. He
seems to be conducting a test by propounding a riddle [aiviy^al: "Will Socrateshe wise man, realize how neatly I contradict myself, or will I deceive him and the’
rest of the audience?" (26e - 27a)
Meletus' insolence can be nothing other than the ubiquitous false wisdom Socrates is
sworn to eradicate. Meletus is unchastened precisely because he has avoided Socratic
examination - but that is about to change. Considering the fact that Socrates' indictment
was precipitated by this sort of examination, it seems hardly an appropriate defense to
perform one before the court. Socrates' piety requires him to reveal the ignorance of
self-appointed wisemen, however, not to defend himself against them.
Socrates quickly shows the charge that he is an atheist because he acknowledges
divinities different from those of the state to be self-contradictory:
So if I believe in divinities, as you say, and if divinities are a kind of god, there is
the jesting riddle [aivkxeaeai] I attributed to you; you are saying that I do not
believe in gods, and again that I do believe in gods because I believe in divinities.
. . . Meletus, you could not have brought this indictment except in an attempt to
test us — or because you were at a loss for any true basis of prosecution. But as to
how you are to convince anyone of even the slightest intelligence that one and the
same man can believe that there are things pertaining to divinities and gods, and
yet believe that there are neither divinities nor heroes - there is no way. (27de)
Plato's use of the verb ainissomai [diviaao^ai] here connects Socrates' attitude toward
Meletus' contradiction with his attitude toward the oracle's proclamation. Whereas the
oracle's riddle showed Socrates to have a special kind of wisdom, Meletus' riddle shows
him to have a special kind of piety. Socrates is wise in the gods' eyes because he
acknowledges his ignorance. Likewise, Socrates is pious in the gods' eyes because he
looks to them, and not to the city's approval, in his effort to be pious — as he should.^^ So
Socrates' speech exposes Meletus' concealed aporia by finding in the irony of his words a
confusion about the proper judge of piety. It also challenges the jury to reconsider the
^'Sec Euthyphm lOd ff. for an argument showing that gods, not human beings, determine the holy.
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court's authority on such matters. Socrates' was right to complain at 26a that the court
was no place for instruction. Meletus can neither judge nor teach Socrates with respect to
piety, because he himself doesn't know what it is.
Socrates sees the god as his only true judge and guide. Accusations, judgments,
and penalties imposed by the city and his peers cannot compromise Socrates' commitment
to the god. At 28b, Socrates addresses the hypothetical question of whether he is
ashamed to have pursued a course in life that threatens to have him put to death; his reply
shows that his aims are higher than the laws or judgment of other human beings:
You are wrong. Sir, if you think that a man worth anything at all would take
thought for danger in living or dying. He should look when he acts to one thing:
whether what he does is just or unjust, the work of a good man or a bad one. (28b)
Socrates apparently cavalier attitude toward death is an outgrowth not only of his
ultimate commitment to the god, but also of his pious acknowledgment of ignorance:
For to fear death. Gentlemen, is nothing but to think one is wise when one is not:
for it is to think one knows what one does not know. (29a)
Conventional fear of death is nothing more than human conceit — a belief that we know it
to be evil. Such fear is usually based on literary or poetic accounts which should not be
accepted unquestioningly as true. Indeed Socrates reinterprets the traditional heroic code
of virtue by comparing himself to Achilles in putting what is right above his own life
(29cd). Socrates had insisted at 27e that his rejection of tradition did not preclude a
belief in heroes. Here Socrates shows himself to be a new kind of hero; one who dies not
for glory or social esteem, but for virtue.
That Socrates equates his practice of philosophy with piety is most vividly
illustrated when a hypothetical penalty of a prohibition on philosophic activity is
proposed at 29cd. Socrates interprets such a ban as an affront to the god:
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If, as I say, you were to dismiss me on that condition, I would reply that I hold vonm fnendship and regard. Gentlemen of Athens, but I shall obey ?he God rafe^than you, and while I have breath and am able I shall not cease to pursue wisdom
(29cdT
‘ accustomed manner...
Socrates' reason for rejecting such a ban could not be clearer: god is his first commander,
Athens IS second. In some strange case where Athens' laws should conflict with those of
the god, Socrates would choose the god.
Ido know that to be guilty of disobedience to a superior, be he god or man, is
shameful evil. So as against evils I know to be evils, I shall never fear or flee from
things which for aught I know may be good. (29b)
The cessation of philosophy is a known evil because it amounts to neglect of both his own
and others' souls. Death, on the other hand, is not known to be evil and therefore is much
preferable to a ban on philosophy.^^
In stark contrast to Meletus' charge of atheism, Socrates shows himself to be a
soldier to the god so devoted that he would rather go to his death than abandon his post;
Gentlemen of Athens, truly it is so: Wherever a man stations himself in the belief
that it is best, wherever he is stationed by his commander, there he must I think
remain and run the risks, giving thought neither to death nor to any other thing
except disgrace if then, when the God stationed me, as I thought and believed,
obliging me to live in the pursuit of wisdom, examining myself and others -- if
then, at that point through fear of death or any other thing, I left my post. That
would have been dreadful indeed, and then in truth might I be justly brought into
court for not acknowledging the existence of gods, for willful disobedience to the
oracle, for fearing death, for thinking myself wise when I am not. (29a)
Philosophy, the pursuit of wisdom, is explicitly described here as an obligation to the god.
Indeed the abandonment of philosophy would be an ironic admission of the charges for it
would show Socrates to be impiously ignoring the command of the god. Rather than
“if the penalty for philosophy were a known evil, such as killing one of his children, would Socrates still
choose to philosophize? 1 think he would refuse to perform the evil as he did with Leon of Salamis.
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renounce his commitment to philosophy on pain of death, Socrates reaffirms his pious
commitment to test young and old, citizen and stranger:
For the God commands this, be well assured, and I believe that you have yet togam in this City a greater good than my service to the God. (30a)
Z2.4 vs, Deed?;; The Practical TTtihtv of the Philosophic
All of Socrates' idealistic posturing about the piety and importance of pursuing
wisdom makes for a weak defense of philosophy unless this new philosophic hero can
back up his claim with truly heroic deeds. At 32a, Socrates acknowledges the jurors'
preference for deeds rather than words and then proceeds to show that his philosophy is
not just theoretical. His most obvious philosophical activities, the examination of others
and inquiry after virtue (not things in the heavens and beneath the Earth, as charged) has
now been interpreted as heroic devotion to the god's command. But this sort of activity
can be interpreted as valuable only if it results in more conventionally virtuous deeds.
As evidence that he esteems god over the political and financial rewards offered by
the city, Socrates offers his poverty. He reveals that he has inhumanly neglected his
family and affairs in favor of exhorting his fellow citizens to care for virtue:
That I am just that, a gift from God to the City, you may recognize from this: It
scarcely seems a human matter merely, that I should take no thought for anything
of my own, endure the neglect of my house and its affairs for these long years now
and ever attend to yours, going to each of you in private like a father or elder
brother, persuading you to care for virtue. (31ab)
Indeed such neglect is only excusable if it is in the service of some greater ideal. But how
could the perpetually ignorant Socrates know enough to know that such asceticism is
right? He has a curious answer to this question: his divine sign or daimonion.
I have had it from childhood. It comes as a kind of voice, and when it comes, it
always turns me away from what I am about to do, but never toward it. (31d)
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The first think to notice about Socrates' daimonion is that despite its supposed
divine knowledge, it never tells Socrates what to do.'' The daimonion 's "negativity"
reveals something about Socrates own conception of the divine and his practice of it."
The divine asks you to question yourself - it doesn't give a direct answer. Likewise the
oracle posed a puzzle - stop and think about this - and Socrates imposed that puzzle on
others. Socrates trusts the daimonion 's warnings, even when he doesn't understand
them. For example, the daimonion opposed his desire to enter the public arena - a
warning he now realizes preserved his life. Socrates has learned to use the daimonion 's
prohibitions as confirmation of the correctness of his actions as well. At 40b he reassures
those who voted for his acquittal that his daimonion opposed neither his trial nor his
speech. He concludes that it must be good.
But what kind of recommendation for a philosophic life is the daimonion ?
Given Socrates close association of rationality with divinity, his daimonion need not be
anything more mysterious than a rational conscience — the intuition one has that a certain
conclusion is wrong before one is able find the fallacious part of the argument. Since (1)
Socrates takes the product of virtuous knowledge to be virtuous behavior; (2) the
daimonion has always warned him before he does some wrong or unvirtuous action; and
(3) the attempt to commit an unvirtuous action is frequently caused by a lack of
knowledge, it's plausible that a reduction in daimonic prohibitions over his lifetime might
indicate to Socrates that his knowledge of virtue is improving, even if it falls well short of
^^The daimonion 's negativity is specifically noted by Kierkegaard (1989, p. 159) and often lamented by
commentators for its ineffectiveness. Brickhouse and Smith (1989, p. 253) say that the problem with its alarms
"is not infallibility but uninformativeness." Adkins (1960, p. 261), says the daimonion was useless to Plato
since it was not rational and was peculiar to Socrates; "It endowed Socrates with a faith whereby he could live
— or die; but it endowed Plato with nothing on which he could build a political or moral theory by which men in
general could live and die." Reeve (1989, p. 70), by contrast, claims that "Socrates could not achieve certainty
[about his fate after death] except from a divine source," so we may conclude "that he uses the daimonion to
establish truths which he could not establish any other way."
Xenophon, by contrast, charactenzes Socrates' daimonion as commanding and not just warning
( Memorabilia. 1,1,4; IV, 8, 1; Apology', 12).
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being perfect. Furthermore, it's likely that the reduction of prohibitions might correlate
with his accumulation of philosophic activity.
Socrates' story about his refusal to capture Leon of Salamis at 32a-e shows that
the philosophic life, which aimsat an ideal rather than a socailly-dctermined conception
of justice, has indeed produced good deeds. There is no mention of the daiwonion.
Rather, Socrates used his ideal conception of justice to disobey an unjust order from an
unjust government. In so acting he risked death, but he avoided it when another
government quickly took over. Governments and their demands change, justice does
not. Socrates is a good man as a result of pursuing the good:
But I then showed again, not by words but by deeds, that death, if I may be rather
blunt, was of no concern to me; to do nothing unjust or unholy - that was my
concern. Strong as it was, that oligarchy did not so frighten me as to cause me to
do a thing unjust.
.
.
(32d)
Although the philosophic life (and some help from his daimonion ) have resulted
in virtuous behavior for Socrates, it seems to have done the opposite for some of his
followers. Charmides and Crito in particular seem to have been corrupted by their
association with Socrates. He refuses to take the blame (or praise) for his followers
actions, however, pointing out that he is not a teacher:
I never gave way to anyone contrary to what is just - not to others, and certainly
not to those slanderously said to be my pupils. In fact, I have never been a teacher
to anyone. If, in speaking and tending to my own affairs, I found anyone, young
or old, who wished to hear me, I never begrudged him; nor do I discuss for a fee
and not otherwise. To rich and poor alike I offer myself as a questioner, and if
anyone wishes to answer, he may then hear what I have to say. And if any of
them turned out to be useful men, or any did not, I cannot justly be held
responsible. To none did I promise instruction and none did I teach; (33ab)
As a philosopher Socrates pursues wisdom and justice. He tries to rid fellow citizens of
false complacency as a service to the God, but he can no sooner replace their false
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opinions with true ones than he can say exactly what wisdom and justice are. The moral
perfection of one's soul must be achieved individually (see sec. 5.3, below). Just as
Socrates takes it upon himself to solve riddles from the gods, he expects his interlocutors
to take responsibility for their own escapes from sporia.
Socrates goes on to point to several pupils who have not been corrupted by his
teaching: philosophy does not make a bad man; rather, as he seems to suggest, the
rejection of it does. True, the pursuit of wisdom may earn the scorn of others who think
themselves more deserving authorities, such as parents and governments. Such problems
occur, however, only where there is a conflict between their demands and what is just.
These things. Gentlemen of Athens, are both true and easily tested. For if I am
corrupting some of the youth, and have corrupted others, it must surely be that
some among them, grown older, if they realize that I counseled them toward evil
while young, would now come forward to accuse me and exact a penalty. (33cd)
Alcibiades speech in the Symposium poignantly captures the way young men might be
tom between Socratic ideals and the glorious rewards of the state. Alcibiades never
chaiges Socrates with cormpting him, and no follower apparently ever has. In fact, many
of Socrates associates sit in support of him at the trial. "What reason could they have of
supporting me now," Socrates asks at 34b, "except that it is right and just. . .?"
2.2.5 Penalties
After Socrates is convicted and a penalty of death recommended, the court allows
him to propose a counter-penalty. As with the rest of the proceeding, Socrates takes this
opportunity to further plead the case of philosophy. The tone is set when he rhetorically
asks what price he should pay for being different:
What do I deserve to pay or suffer because through life I did not keep quiet, and
yet did not concern myself, as the multitude do, with money or property or militaiy
and public honors and other office, or the secret societies and political clubs
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cropping up in the City, believing that I was really too reasonable andtemperate a man to enter upon these things and survive? (36bc)
This IS a statement about the proper objects of our pursuits and a not-so-subtle dig at the
objectives commonly chosen by the multitude. Socrates' project has been to exhort his
fellow citizens to care for more important things:
I undertook to pemuade each of you not to care for anything which belongs to youbefore first caring for yourselves, so as to be as good and wise as possible, nor to
care for anything which belongs to the City before caring for the City itself, and so
too with everything else in the same way. Now what do I deserve to suffer for being
this sort of man? (36cd) ^
Socrates decides that he should suffer a "good thing," something fitting for a good
man who has served his city well: free meals at the Prytaneum as are offered Olympic
victors. After all, he says, the Olympic victor can only make people "seem happy" w'hile
he makes them "happy in truth" (36d). The contradictory nature of this suggestion is
instructive. Socrates' "crime" is in fact a service, as he says explicitly at 36c. His "penalty"
then should fit the crime. Public subsistence would help Socrates in his mission as the
god's gift to the city.
Despite its subtle logic, the first suggestion no doubt elicited little more than rolled
eyes and snickers from the gallery. To such indignation Socrates responds:
Shall I choose instead a penalty I know very well to be evil? Imprisonment,
perhaps? But why should I live in prison, a slave to men who happen to occupy
office as the Eleven? (37bc)
Socrates is the god's slave and he cannot betray that master by becoming a slave to some
temporary government. As the Leon of Salamis story shows, governments are temporal
while justice is eternal. Socrates adds that a fine amounts to prison since he is unable to
pay it. When his allegedly corrupted followers later come to his aid and offer to pay the
fine for him, he accepts this empty punishment since it does not conflict with his mission
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and money has no value to those lacking virtue anyway.'® The next suggestion is exile,
which at best offers the prospect of being driven from other cities since he would continue
his philosophic activity; at womt he would be forced to keep quiet and so abandon his
pious mission;
If I say that to do so [keep quiet] would be to disobey the god. and therefore I
cannot do it, you will not believe me because you will think that I am being sly
and dishonest [that is, an eiron]. If on the other hand I say that the greatest good
tor man is to fashion arguments each day about virtue and the other things you
hear me discussing w'hen I examine myself and others, and that the unexamined
life is not for man worth living, you will believe what I say still less. I claim these
things are so Gentlemen; but it is not easy to convince you. (37e - 38a)
Indeed the jury is not convinced and so Socrates resigns himself to the prospect of
death. Death would be a kind of exile — one that resembles a deep sleep, or one where he
would be judged justly, then allowed to compare his life to those of demigods and heroes
who also received unjust verdicts (40e - 41b). Socrates speculates that he may be able to
continue elenchus (without being prosecuted for it) in the land of the dead, perhaps
examining Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer. "It would be inconceivable
happiness," he concludes. At the end of the Apology', Socrates makes a telling request of
his friends that confirms his belief in the value of the elenchus:
When my sons are grown. Gentlemen, exact a penalty of them; give pain to them
exactly as I gave pain to you, if it seems to you that they care more for wealth or
an3hhing than they care for virtue. And if they seem to be something and are
nothing, rebuke them as I rebuked you, because they do not care for what they
ought, because they think themselves something and are worth nothing. And
should you do that, both I and my sons will have been justly dealt with at your
hands. (41e - 42a)
Socrates' final exhortation to carry on his mission for the benefit of his sons was
heeded by Plato perhaps more than any other man present at Socrates' trial. There is a
sense in which Socrates considered all Athenians his sons (31a), and a sense in which
^®Sec Kierkegaard (1989, p. 195).
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Plato brought countless generations into the family by continuing Socrates' mission m
hteraiy form. Plato's Apology' does indeed tell the stoiy of an accusation and a defense,
but the accusation was that Socrates charged Athens with being lazy of mind, shallow of
pnnciple, and misdirected in aim. The defense was of philosophy as an antidoic to these
deficiencies. Treat poetry, prophecy, and divine proclamations as riddles, says Socrates.
Acknowledge your own ignorance with respect to virtue and pursue wisdom relentlessly.
Aim for an ideal of virtue, justice, piety, and courage that transcends the worldly
concerns. Awaken, acknowledge, aim: this is Plato's educational project.
13 Socrates; Ironic Moral Hero of thp
As a companion piece to the Apology, Crito continues the historical thread of
Socrates' execution while accentuating and enforcing the educational lessons of the
former work. Socrates faces a serious dilemma and his methods for solving it are displayed
in contrast to popular ideals. There is a clear rejection of popular opinion and
appearances. A moral decision is logically derived from agreed-upon principles. Finally,
an imagined dialectic between Socrates and the personified laws is used to reason through
a difficult situation. From it all, Socrates emerges as an ironic hero: one who can
formulate, derive, and act on moral principles even in the face of death; and one who, by
fleeing his punishment, would turn out to be what he was unjustly convicted of being.
The philosopher-hero of the Apology^ is seen in action in Crito.
231 Does Spcrateg Practice What He Preaches?
At Apology 32a Socrates recognizes that the men of Athens in his jury esteem
deeds more than words. In Crito, Plato offers Socrates' deeds as proof of his integrity.^^
”For the importance of action vs. theory see Laches 180 - 181.
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Whatever the historical accuracy of the dialogue's arguments and conversations, the fact
of Socrates' action - that he did accept poison rather than escape from jail - is
unquestioned reality. It could be said that Plato exploits the historical force of 's
conclusion in an effort to enhance its moral lesson. Admittedly, death may seem like
dubious support for an argument.^'* In accepting his penalty, however, Socrates ironically
proves his innocence and so highlights the injustice of his conviction. Ultimately the
victim is Athens, not Socrates.
The most directly educational of Plato's early dialogues, Crito gives a step by
step illustration of practical problem solving. In contrast to tradition and sophistic
opinion, Socrates practical actions recognize virtue as the greatest good rather than
money, glory, or reputation. The conflict betu^een virtue and law in Crito illustrates the
narrow line Plato must walk in his efforts to discourage dogmatic adherence to doctrine
w'hile instilling an appreciation for absolutes. That the conflict emerges as a puzzle is in
keeping with Plato's educational technique and indicative of his belief that it needed
discussion.
What we see in the Crito is an intellectual approach to a real-life dilemma. This
approach would have surprised the ancient Athenians much more than it surprises us.
Socrates' position is a reasoned one that avoids both the self-serving relativism of the
masses (as represented by Crito) and the unquestioning obedience of the personified
Laws. Plato does not offer a formula for action in the Crito, no new maxim to be
memorized and adopted. Such a move would be hypocritical since Socrates routinely
rejects any formula handed to him by his interlocutors. There are accepted principles,
Kostman (1984) thinks that Plato makes a tacit criticism of Socrates’ decision to go to death in the
Crito by having him ignore key arguments. This position either ignores the fact that Plato continued to
endorse the themes propounded in the Crito, or must commit itself to the theory that Plato is critical of
Socrates in the later works as well. Remember also, that death was a key component in the heroic.
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such as that of never doing injustice, but Plato explains clearly that these are derived from
discussion and never accepted dogmatically.
Dialectic is used in at least three ways in the Ciito. Past dialectical exercise has
yielded the working principle of never doing injustice. The opening dialectic between
Socrates and Crito transcends the emotion of the situation and examines several proposals
m relation to accepted principles. Finally, there is the imagined dialectic between
Socrates and the personified Laws of Athens which is represented as a method Socrates
has used on his own to think through the situation. The educational force of the Crito
derives from the fact that these dialectical exercises lead to concrete action.
2J.2 The Rejection of Public Opinion Despite the Pen;.lty
At 44bc, Crito lets loose an emotional exhortation to Socrates to escape. His
reasoning, however, is based on appearance and not reality:
Quite apart from the loss of such friendship as I shall not find again, people who
don t really know us will think I didn't care, because I could have saved you if
only Id been willing to spend the money. Yet what could seem more shameful
than the appearance of putting money before friends? People won't believe that
you refused to escape even though we were eager to help. (44bc)^^
Crito's concern with the opinions of strangers and the appearance of stinginess puzzles
Socrates, who replies:
But Crito, why should we be so concerned about what people [xcov TCoXXcav] will
think? Reasonable men, who are the ones worth considering will believe that
things happened as they did. (44c)
Although Socrates is not swayed, Crito's arguments were no doubt compelling to Plato's
original audience, since they represented commonly held values and beliefs. Indeed
All translations of Cnto arc by Allen (1984) unless otherwise indicated.
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commitments to friends and family remain forceful arguments today. But Crito's concern
rests ultimately on appearances and popular definitions of what is shameful and bad:
Tm ashamed, Socrates, ashamed both for you and for your friends, because it’s
going to seem that the whole business was done though a kind of cowardice in us
. . . It wall look as if we let slip this final opportunity because of our owm badness
and cowardice, whereas we could have saved you or you could have saved
yourself if we were worth anything at all. These things are bad and shameful to
both you and us. (45e - 46a)
The move Cnto makes here from appearing shameful to actually being shameful reflects
a confusion common among ancient Greeks.^' Plato presents it as instrctive irony:
Socrates and Crito are shameful and bad but only in the empty world of appearances.
Being a longtime follower of Socrates, Crito has no doubt rejected public opinion
in the past. What provokes him to espouse such reasoning in this instance is a recognition
of the power to kill men over mere slander:
Surely at this point, Socrates, you see how necessary it really is to care about what
the people think. The very things now happening show that they can accomplish,
not the least of evils, but very nearly the greatest, if a man has been slandered
among them. (44d)
For Socrates, however, the threat of death is not sufficient reason to act against his
principles. As Socrates sees it
,
the power to kill amounts to no power at all since it can't
affect the soul. Having reiterated their agreement about the primacy of the soul at 48a,
Socrates further points out that the multitude can't even make a man wise or foolish since
those, too, are conditions of the soul (44d). In a point parallel to Apology 29a, Socrates'
reasoning shows Crito's worry about death to be a false conceit; Crito thinks he knows
death to be evil when he doesn't.
Dover (1974, p. 226) points out that Arete wcis a quality valued more for the impression it made on
others than its intrinsic value: "...the Athenians tended to use expression such as 'be seen to...', 'be regarded
as...', and these expressions were also used where we would refer neither to conscience nor to reputation, so
that an Athenian’s 'I wanted to be regarded as honest' is equivalent to our 'I wanted to be honest.’ In such
cases there wa.s no intention, of course, of drawing a distinction between disguise and reality; it was rather that
goodness divorced from a reputation for goodness was of limited interest. "
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Another aspect of popular morality that Plato wants to reform and therefore has
Cnto represent is relativism. Again, Socrates reminds Crito that they have discussed the
issue before.
Don t you think it s satisfactoiy to say that one shouldn't value the beliefsman but rather of some men and not others, and that one shouldn't value
belief of men, but some beliefs and not others? Isn't that right? (47a)
of ever>^
every
The argument against relativism, via analogy to an athletic trainer, culminates in the need
to refer to a single entity in ethical matters:
Then perhaps we shouldn't give much thought to what the multitude tells us my
friend. Perhaps we should rather think of what he will say who understands’
t mgs just and unjust — he being but one man, and the very Truth itself. (48a)
I take this last sentence to be an ambiguous reference to the good, the rational soul, and
Socrates.33 The Greek 6 eTtaicov, above translated 'he who understands,' denves from
the verb eTcaico which can mean to bear, perceive, feel, understand, profess, or be a
professor. The 'he' and 'man' Allen translates are in the Greek the ambiguous article 6.
The antirelativistic point for Plato is that there is a single truth we should aim at in
making our decisions. Socrates then contrasts this principled aim with the considerations
of the multitude:
But as for these other considerations you raise about the loss of money and raising
children and what people think — Crito, those are really fit topics for people who
lightly kill and would raise to life again without a thought if they could — the
multitude, (48c)
Socrates emerges from the first exchange as a man who will stick to his principles
even in the face of impending death. Showing that he is more than a theorist, he shuns
moral relativism and concerns about appearances even though the chips are down.
“Translations vary greatly. For example, Grube says, ". .
.
but what he will say who understands justice
and injustice, the one, that is, and the truth itself." Trcdennick. translates, ". .
.
the expert in right and wrong, the
one authority, who represents actual truth."
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We must consider carefully whether this thing is to be done, for I am now andalways have been the sort of man who is persuaded only by the argument whichon reflertion proves best to me, and I cannot throw over argument I formerly
cepted merely because of what has come; they still seem much the same to'^me,an I honor them as I did before. If we can't find better ones, be assured that 1 will
t give way to you, not even if the power of the multitude were far greater than it
children with its threats of confiscation, bo^ds, anddeath. (46bc)
The pnonty Socrates and Crito have placed on reason and aigument are defended and
stay intact despite Crito's barrage of rationales for abandoning them at the last minute.
Mundane objections aside, Socrates can now apply his craft to the problem at hand.
2J.3 Moral Decision Derived from Principle
I have emphasized that Plato wanted to establish fixed principles that could guide
moral deliberation even while maintaining a questioning stance. The Crito provides a
textbook example of this process. At 49-50, the principle that one ought never do
injustice is introduced. Plato makes it clear that this principle was derived from past
deliberation, yet must be agreed upon once again by the two men.
Is the doing of injustice in no way honorable or good, as we have often in the past
agreed, or have those former agreements been cast aside these last few days? (49a)
Admittedly Socrates' tone is somewhat sarcastic, but he doesn't rule out questioning the
principle in light of its consequences. This differentiates Socrates' approach from the
traditional unquestioning acceptance of authority or myth. Socratic principles are always
subject to revision based on rational grounds.
Crito then acknowledges that "not returning injustice for injustice" follows
logically from the principle, despite what "most people think." The popular practice of
returning an injuiy for an injustice is also ruled out on the basis of its logical
incompatibility with the initial principle. In the space of a few lines, a logical principle
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has been denved and used to strike down a popular one. Socrates sticks to his initial
pnnciple and keeps it open to evaluation even as it proves incompatible with popular
notions.
At 49e, Socrates gives Crito a second chance to back away from the principle if he
doesn’t truly believe it. Crito holds his ground. Socrates then shows that the principle
entails that he not escape from jail and Crito is at a loss:
Socrates, I can't answer what you ask, for I don’t understand. ( 50a)
Given the passion of Crito’s appeal for escape, it’s not surprising that he can’t see how the
principle prevents it. Crito is not asking Socrates to go back on the principle, he just fails
to see all of its consequences. He is asking for help.
2.3.4 Moral Decision Derived from Imagined Dialprtir
Socrates next demonstrates how he extracted himself from a similar aporia by
performing a dialogue ~ with himself. He personified his opponent, the laws of Athens,
then imagined a conversation between himself and the Laws.^^ Beginning at 50a, he
reenacts this dialogue for Crito, exhorting him to "look at it this way." Socrates’
exhortation is both specific and general. Specifically, he is saying that Crito will better
understand the problem if he hears the imaginary conversation. Generally, Plato is saying
that moral dilemmas can be profitably solved by imagining a conversation between
opposing viewpoints.
Socrates’ internal dialectics are referred to and performed frequently in Plato's
dialogues.^^ Far from a means for self-assurance, Socrates’ imagined dialectics sport
” Following Kraut (1984), I will use the capitalized 'Laws' to refer Socrates’ personified character;
lowercase laws represents the actual laws of Athens.
”Sec for example: "The many" in Protagoras, "The house guest" in Hippias Major, and comments at
Apology 21b, and Sophist 263e.
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opponents as hostile and challenging as his real life interlocutors. The Personified Laws
of Athens reveal their conceptual distance from Socrates when at 52c they call his
acceptance of death a "pretense." From Socrates' point of view, it is anything but. The
Cmo makes that clear. This contrast identifies the Laws as a true opposing viewpoint.
The dialectic is honest and effective.
By personifying an inanimate thing, such as a set of laws, Socrates makes them fit
into his principle of doing harm to no one - now the Laws are someone. In addition, the
personified Laws go far beyond the letter of written laws.^® In this way Plato can criticize
the legal conception of impiety that convicted Socrates while esteeming law in general.
For Plato, personifying the laws is a way of encouraging Athenians to interact with their
laws as they would with people. Plato wants citizens to respect the laws and other
sources of principle, but not to accept them unquestioningly. You can't question Homer,
the Gods, or the laws directly, but you can adopt a questioning stance by personifying
them and performing an imagined dialectic.^^
There is a point in Socrates' conversation with the Laws which may seem to rebut
my thesis that Plato is espousing educational reform in the Crito. At 50de, the Laws get
Socrates to endorse traditional Athenian education:
"Did we who are the laws established for that purpose prescribe incorrectly
when we directed your father to educate you in music and gymnastic?"
"Con-ectly", Fd say.
At first glance, this passage seems to be an explicit Socratic endorsement of traditional
Greek moral training.^® While the passage does show that Socrates accepts music (which
’*See Kraut (1984, p. 82): ’'What the Laws say in the Crtto includes much that no law of Athens ever
said and the Laws can see through the city's errors."
”See HippiasMwor 365cd.
’'See Kraut (1984, p.308): "More generally, Socrates’ attitude toward traditional Greek moral training is
far from hostile. He thinks that it contains serious errors, and that it is radically incomplete; but he also takes
conventional paidaa to be a benefit so great that it secures his loyalty to Athens even to the point of death."
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included memorization of poetiy) and gymnastic as a good educational foundation, it
does not imply that he consideis them to be good moral training.” Such an admission
would be incompatible with Socrates’ pcisistent criticism of the poets, rhapsodes, and
even military commanders as adequate teachers of moral technique."' It is also notable
that he makes no reference to his training in music and gymnastic during his moral
deliberations in the Crito.
In addition, Socrates' conversation with the Laws does explore the limits of
obedience to the law in a way that sheds light on his actions. The parent-child analogy
and the doctrine of persuade or obey which are brought out in Socrates' conversation with
the Laws are the subject of a lively scholarly debate.'*^ What they show educationally is a
way of bringing oneself under laws that allows the citizen to take an active, questioning
stance while upholding proper respect. Having failed to persuade the jury of his
innocence, Socrates goes on to show his respect for the law by accepting its penalty. He
does this despite the injustice of the penalty. By emphasizing Socrates’ respect for the law
in the Crito, Plato is not trying to compensate for the lawless image Socrates presented at
his trial. Rather, Plato is showing a new way to approach the laws and a new way to
make principled decisions in moral dilemmas that upholds one’s respect for law without
forcing dogmatic acceptance of it.
2.3.5 Socrates: An Ironic Moral Hero
SuF>erficially, the Crito looks like a lesson in not standing by principles: Socrates
does and he dies. But Socrates' attitude and statements hang a question mark over that
” Kraut (1984, p. 309) reinforces his contention that Socrates considers these "moral training": "As the
Crito shows, [Socrates'] doubts about the unteachabiiity of virtue cannot be interpreted as an expression of
contempt for conventional methods of teaching. He accepts unjust treatment from Athens partly because he
values the traditional moral training the city gave him."
^These issues will be addressed directly in chapters 3, 4, and 5, above.
^'See Kraut (1984); Panagioutou (1992); BrickJiouse and Smith (1994); Reeve (1989).
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interpretation and cause the audience to ask themselves why Socrates, despite his
execution, seems like a hero in a sea of wrongdoers. In fact, the message is not so
subliminal. The Laws make it clear at 54cd:
You now depart, T you depart, the victim of injustice at the hands of men, not at
the hands of us who are the laws. But if you escape, if you thus shamefully return
injustice for injustice and injury for injury, if you trespass against your compacts
and agreements with us, and work evil on those you least ought - yourself, your
friends, your Country and its Laws -- we shall be angered at you while you live
and those our brothers who are the Laws in the Place of the Dead will not receive
you kindly, knowing that you undertook so far as in you lay to destroy us.
It is Socrates' piety that allows him to accept the penalty for impiety. As Kraut
observes (1984, p. 24): "To disobey the god's command would have been an act of
impiety, according to Socrates, and since impiety is injustice toward the gods
{Euthyphro 12cl0-d4), giving up a philosophical life would have been an act of
injustice." Socrates does what he believes to be just despite the legal consequences.
Were he to disobey the law and escape, on the other hand, he would prove himself guilty
as a corrupter of youth. As the Laws contend:
Again, you would confirm the opinion of your judges and lead them to think they
rendered judgment justly, for a corrupter of laws may surely also be thought, and
emphatically, a corrupter of young and ignorant men. (53c)
Plato must separate Socrates from a purely negative skeptic who, as Kierkegaard puts it,
"cuts down the trees" of consciousness, then abandons the youth, never offering anything
positive.'^^ Purely negative interpretations of Socrates contrast sharply with the character
'^From this comment and Kierkegaard’s statement at (1989, p. 196): "We find nothing in all of this, but
we do find a most consistently sustained irony that lets the objective power of the state breakup on the
rock-firm negativity of irony. The objective power of the state, its claims upon the activity of the individual, the
laws, the courts - everything loses its absolute validity for him. He divests himself of all of them as imperfect
forms; he nses ever more lightly, sees it all disappear beneath him in his ironic bird’s-eye view, and he himself
hovers over it in ironic contentment, borne up by the absolute self-consistency of infinite negativity." I can only
conclude that Kierkegaard must either ignore the Crito (he makes only two references to it, both of which
ignore its arguments), or stipulate that its attitude about laws is drawn from Plato and not Socrates.
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in the Crito who abides by principles derived from past deliberation and uses specific
techniques to resolve a matter of life and death.
In Cnto, Plato shows that had Socrates escaped, the rest of his philosophy would
have collapsed like a house of cards. The Laws present their argument as a reductio.
They assume Socrates' escape and ask what he will do with his life:
What will you discuss, Socrates? What arguments? The ones you used to offer
here, about how virtue and justice are of highest worth for men along with
prescriptive custom and the Laws? ( 53c)
Then they ask for themselves, for all the citizens of Athens, and even those of us in the
future who would look to Socrates as an example:
But as for those arguments of yours about justice and other virtues -- what will
they mean to us then? (54a)
The Crito makes it clear that Socrates had the courage and integrity to be a hero, even if
his heroism meant acceptance of unjust death. With the Apology and Crito. Plato
establishes Socrates as a new moral hero, albeit an ironic one. Plato starts his work at the
end of Socrates' life; with appropriate irony, he has begun at the end.
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CHAPTERS
awakening the mind in and
and 07^^ subtle criticisms of popular values and
educarionwhrieoffenngPhriosophyasananridote.
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Criticism mtensifies. In Plato illustrates the shortcomings of poeric education,
distinguishing its system of memorization and recitation from the practical use of
knowledge characteristic of a Rato’s enthusiasm for a technical conception of
virtue is then carefully refined in HIppiasMnor where the first half of the dialogue
shows the moral neutrality of poetiy and and the second half subtly establishes
a conception of the good man that distinguishes moral qualities from practical and
popular ones. These dialogues play a foundational role in Plato's educational project
because they clarify his conception of arote, the accepted goal of education, while
illustrating the failure of music and sophistiy to achieve that objective.
Engaging the Mind: Interpret;»tinn vs. Exhihitirm (ru
^ power, like the power in a stone which Euripides
ubbed the Magnesian', but which most people call the 'Heraclean'. This stone,you see, not only attracts iron rings on their own, but also confers on them a powerby which they can in turn reproduce exactly the same effect which the stone has,
so as to attract other rings. The result is sometimes quite a long chain of rings and
scraps of iron suspended from one another, all of them depending on that stone for
their power. (533de)^
While Plato has emerged from history as a harsh critic of the arts. Ion reveals a
deep respect for poetry. Plato's criticism is aimed rather at poetry's traditional role in
education and the rhapsode Ion's belief that his knowledge of Homer gives him practical
knowledge or a techne. Ion attempts to revise popular ideas about what it is to learn and
know something, what it is to have a techne, what is the difference between exhibition
All Ion translations are by Saunders (1987) unless otherwise noted.
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and explanation, and how the kaloa [to koXov, beauty, fineness] of something is to be
judged. Guthrie (1975, p. 211) called Ion "a lighthearted little piece" better enjoyed
than taken seriously. Part of Plato's message in the Ion, however, is that even things
designed for enjoyment must be taken seriously for the effect they may have upon their
audience. The power of the divine Muse, described above in the Ion 's famous ring
analogy, must be critically examined as part of a serious analysis of the role of poetiy in
education.
2A1 Appearance vs. Abil ity; The Rhapsode and Hk AnHi^nr^
That the /on is educational and not merely aesthetic criticism is evident from the
passage where Socrates relates his ring analogy to the audience or student:
Well then, do you realize that your spectator is the last of those rings which I said
received their power from one another, under the influence of the Heraclean
steno? The intermediate one is you, the rhapsode and actor; the first is the poet
himself. Through the agency of all these the god draws the souls of men wherever
he wishes, by hitching one man to the power of another. An immense chain of
dancers and teachers and assistant teachers [5i5otaK(xXcov Kai \)7Co6i6ocaK(xXcov]
dangles down, as if from that stone -- all dangling sideways from the rings in the
series suspended from the Muse. One poet depends on one Muse, another on
another. Our description of this is 'he is possessed' - and that's pretty close,
because 'held' is just what he is. (535e - 536ab)
Two things should strike the attentive reader in this quotation. The first is that Socrates'
use of the word didaskalos [SlbocaKoXoq, teacher] to describe members of the poetic
chain. More is going on during the performance of poetry than entertainment. The
process of learning, performing and experiencing epic poetry, as I showed in Chapter 1,
was an integral part of ancient Athenian education. Second, one should note Socrates'
comment that the people in the chain are "possessed" and "held" by the magnetic power
of the muse. The intense emotional identification with poetic stories made them effective
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as education but Plato worried that it discouraged individual reason and judgment. For
educational purposes, at least, the audience should be released from "possession" by the
muse. The image of the rings is not an indictment of poetry per se, rather it helps us to
critically examine poetry's role in education.
Ion himself turns out to be a kind of poster boy for the inadequacies of poetic
education. As Protagoras 325e - 326b made clear, a large part of a young Athenian's
education consisted in the memorization and recitation of Homer. Ion is the undisputed
master of these things and so a kind of model schoolboy. It's no wonder, given the role of
Homer in Greek education, that he thinks his ability to remember and recite Homer has
also conferred upon him various practical skills, including the ability to lead Athens'
military better than anyone else! What's even more (comically) disturbing is Ion's failure
to see the implications of his own admissions in argument. In contrast to characters such
as Cntias and Euthyphro, Ion is always a pleasant and willing interlocutor. His failure to
follow the discussion's arguments does more than reveal Ion as a comical air head however
— it shows the pitfalls of even an exemplary poetic education.
Ion is introduced as a winning and no doubt beautifully appointed rhapsode^ who
has just returned victorious from a competition at Epidaurus. One of the first things
Socrates does is comment on rhapsodes' skill and beauty:
You know. Ion, many times I've envied you rhapsodes your profession [xe^vriq].
Physically, it's always fitting for you in your profession [texvtl] to be dressed up
to look as beautiful [KoX^viaxoiq (paivecrGai] as you can; (Woodruff translation,
530b)
As might be expected, Socrates' ambiguous use of techne and kalon here is ironic. It
represents the common use of words whose meanings Plato seeks to revise in the dialogue.
^Rhapsodes were renowned for their beautiful robes. See Marrou (1956, p. 49 - 50).
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Ion's profession turns out not to be a techne at all because he does not have the ability to
judge the good and bad in his subject. Ion's kalon, meanwhile, is based on external
appearance, whereas Plato wants to reveal kalon as a metaphysical notion connected
with the divine. Not only does Ion don a beautiful robe,' he brags about how well he has
"dressed up" [KEKoapriKa; perfect active of Koa^eco] Homer as well. In fact, Plato's
mam aesthetic thought in the Ion can be found in his revision of kalon: it shows that
the physical beauty or pure enjoyment of art does not exhaust its value.'*
Ion s adornment of both himself and his subject serve him well, however, because
the multitude respond best to kalon in its external manifestation and Ion depends on the
multitude for his considerable competitive and financial success. The rhapsodic
competitions Ion routinely wins were judged by a popular vote of the audience which at
Epidaurus, Ion's latest victory in the dialogue, numbered 20,000.^ Ion openly credits his
success to his ability to attract the audience and engage them emotionally with his
performance:
At each performance, I look down on them from up there on the platform as they
weep and look at me with dire emotion in their eyes, in amazement at my story.
You see, I have to pay a lot of attention to them -- since if I make them ciy I shall
laugh all the way to the bank, whereas if I provoke their laughter, it's I who'll do
the crying, for loss of money. (535e)
Ion takes his popular success to be evidence of a techne: after all, the audience opened
their purses in a direct response to the pleasure and emotion he was able to evoke. But
Socrates will divorce the criteria for techne from the ability to obtain an emotional
response or financial reward from the multitude
. As Socrates makes clear at Goigias
464ab, the goodness of a thing cannot be judged by appearances. A body judged most
^NotcPlato's use of pha/nest/iaj, which can mean 'seem' as well as 'look.'; Ion sec/ns beautiful on the
outside, but is he beautiful with respect to his soul?
'For detailed account of this idea, see Moravesik (1982, p. 33).
^See Robb (1994, p. 162).
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beautiful by the masses, for example, may not ,n fact be healthy. It takes a t.chn„es
[trezvtTrii;, expert, craftsman] on bodies, namely a doctor to judge a body's health.*
Even if Socrates is not impressed with Ion's popular success, he deeply admires
Ion's ability to undemtand poefy. That >s, Socrates would admire Ion ,f he in fact
understood the poet:
And how enviable also to have to immerse yourself in a great many good poets
especially Homer, the best and most inspired of them, and to have to get his’
ought [biavoiav] and not just his lines! For if one didn't understand what thepoet says, one would never become a good rhapsode, because a rhapsode has to be
an interpreter of the poet's thought [6idvoioq] to the audience, and that's
impossible to do properly if one does not understand what he is saying. So all this
IS worth envying. (530bc) ^
Socrates' statement is a characteristic suppressed conditional. Just as he generously
assumes that Euthyphro knows what piety is or that Laches knows what courage is,
Socrates here assumes that Ion knows Homer's dianoia [Sidvoioc, thought, meaning ].^
Predictably, it will turn out that Ion does not. Socrates' suppressed conditional, however,
does give us an idea of what a rhapsodic techne would be, if it existed.
The fact is that Ion's knowledge of Homer is limited to his lines and he is capable
only of epideixis exhibition, display] of those lines based on memorization
and mimesis. Ion's response to Socrates' conditional compliment reveals his confusion
between epideixis and episteme — the kind of understanding associated with a techne
that yields the ability to judge:
Ion: True, Socrates, true. At any rate, I find this side of my art [te%VTi(^] has given
me a lot of work, and I talk on Homer better [KaXXiaxa] than anybody. Neither
Metrodorus of Lampascus nor Stesimbrotus or Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor anyone
else who has ever lived has had so many fine thoughts [K(xAdc<; 6iavoiot<;] to
Woodruff (1983, p. 7) makes a similar observation, noting that "no one who measures his success
merely by popular opinion, rather than the facts, can lay claim to a texiine, according to Socrates.”
^According to Liddell & Scott, dianoia is ( 1 ) thought, the intellect, or mind or (2) a thought, intention;
a notion, belief: the sense or meaning of a thing.
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fhf
as I. .
. I th.nk rve got to the point where 1 desenre to have
trie Homendae crown me with a golden crowm. (530cd)
Ion has clearly confused his performance of Homer's poetiy with an understanding of
Homer’s dianois. Plato underscores this confusion by emphasizing Ion's concerns with
appearance and victory (^kaJh'sta means more beautiful as well as better).® The
Homeridae, to whom Ion compares himself, claimed to be descendants of Homer and were
known for their ability to expound his poetry and discourse on his questions.' There is no
evidence that rhapsodes like Ion (who is unknown outside Plato) combined recitation
with exposition. By linking himself with the Homeridae, Ion shows arrogant confusion
about the educational scope and benefit of memorizing and reciting Homeric poetry.
3.1 .2 Exh ibition VS. Expertise; The Limits of the Rhapsode^s Art
It is telling that Socrates opens his initial line of questioning at 531a by referring to
Ion's ability as deinos [5eiv6q, terrible, able, skillful]. The mixed meaning of this word,
which is repeated four times by Socrates (531a2, 531cl, 532b4) during the opening
argument against Ion having a techne, contrasts sharply with the meaning of techne. Ion
remains unfazed by Socrates' choice of words, however; all the while assuming that his
knowledge of Homer's words makes him able to explain even unfamiliar poets:
Soc.: Does your expertise (5eiv6<;) extend to Homer alone, or to Hesiod
and Archilochus too?
Ion: By no means -- only to Homer. That strikes me as enough.
Soc.: But is there any topic on which Homer and Hesiod say the same?
Ion: Oh, I expect there are plenty.
Soc.: So on these topics would you give a better explanation of what
Homer says, or of what Hesiod says?
Ion: On these topics, on which they say the same things, Socrates, I'd be
equally good in either case? (531ab)
’Compare Woodruff’s (1983) translation: "And that's the part of my profession that took the most
work. I think I speak more beautifully than anyone else about Homer; neither Mctrodorus of Lampsacus nor
Stcsimbrotus of Thasos nor Glaucon nor anyone else past or present could offer as mjmy beautiful thoughts
about Homer as I can."
’See Guthrie (1975, p. 200 - 201); Homeridae are also mentioned at Phaedrus 252b.
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Ion's response reveals an important assumption in poetic education. He thinks that
"saying the same thing" is equivalent to meaning the same thing and so he concludes that
memonzing the words of one poet is sufficient for understanding anyone who speaks
similarly on the same subject. Ion doesn't merely take himself to know what Homer says
about chariot driving; he thinks he understands chariot driving itself on the basis of his
knowledge of Homer's words. Furthermore, as long as Hesiod says the same things Homer
does about chariots. Ion is as much an expert in Hesiod as he is in Homer. Never mind
that when Homer says "slacken the reins" he wants to keep the horses on balance whereas
Hesiod's advice to slacken the reins may be in an effort to get them to accelerate; for Ion
it's enough to know to slacken the reins.
Socrates next asks about cases where the poets don't say the same things and Ion
again reveals the shortcomings of his ability;
Soc.: Now then, in their descriptions of divination these two poets
sometimes agree and sometimes differ. In either case, who would give a better
explanation of their words, you or one of the good prophets.
Ion: One of the good prophets.
Soc.; And if you were a prophet, then since you'd be capable of explaining
the points on which the poets' statements agree, you'd also know how to expound
those on which their statements differ, wouldn't you?
Ion; Obviously.
Soc.; Then why on earth does your prowess (Seivoq) extend to Homer but
not to Hesiod or the other poets? (531 be)
Whereas Ion claimed he could explain any poet who said the same things as Homer on a
given subject, he here admits that someone with a techne in the subject matter could
explain the poets' words both where they say the same thing and where they speak
differently. Whereas Ion identifies with the text and attributes the author's apparent
expertise to himself, the prophet is separate from the text and judges it as an object in
comparison with his own technical knowledge.
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Socrates goes on to make it clear now that in contrast to a technites who can
judge all good and bad speakers i his subject area. Ion's ability is intimately tied to, and
therefore limited to, Homer.
Soc.: So then. Ion, my dear chap, when several people are discussino
nurnbcr, and one of them speaks best of all, someone, I imagine, will know which
ot them this good speaker is?
Ion: I agree.
Soc.: Will that be exactly the same person who also knows which speakers
are bad, or someone different?
Ion: The same, I suppose. (531de)
Socrates reinforces his point at 532e - 533c with the examples of expertise in various arts
including sculpture, music, and even the judgment of rhapsodes! Ion, for his part, fails to
see his own limitations despite Socrates' examples and continues to insist on his expertise.
Socrates then applies the criterion that an expert be able to judge all cases in his
subject matter to Ion's case:
So, my excellent fellow, we shan't go wrong if we say Ion is an expert (6£iv6v)
equally in Homer and in the other poets, seeing that you yourself admit that the
same person will be an adequate judge of all who speak on the same themes, and
that almost all poets do take the same themes to compose on. (532b)
Despite his apparent acceptance of the argument. Ion resists this conclusion, noting that
he dozes off when talk turns to any poet besides Homer. Ion's fixation on Homer, as
propagated by traditional education and his popular success as a rhapsode, is a new twist
on the Platonic tradition of epistemic complacency in Socrates' interlocutors; he's satisfied
with his limited knowledge. Ion says straight out at 531a that knowing Homer and
nothing else seemed sufficient to him, echoing the idea that traditional poetic education
was sufficient training in morality.
Ion justifies his concentration on Homer by an appeal to Homer's authority and
superiority. This is an aristocratic tactic. Although Plato disdains appeal to authority.
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Ion's real mistake here is over-identifying with poetry and attributing Homer's expertise to
himself. At 531d - 532a, after Socrates makes the point that the expert on a given subject
IS the only one qualified to judge who speaks well and who poorly on that same subject,
Ion justifies his expertise by pointing out that Homer is the best of the poets. Ion doesn't
think he needs to judge the good and bad speakers on a subject since he already knows
who the best speaker is. But Ion has decided that Homer speaks the best on subjects such
as warfare and the relation between men and gods, having learned all he knows about
those things from Homer to begin with. Ion has no independent way of judging Homer's
expertise, his acceptance of Homer's authority is unquestioning.
Socrates, on the other hand, won't even accept the word of god without question,^®
and his questioning of Ion has revealed that a technites in any field must be able to
judge the good and bad in that field. To be a judge, one must separate oneself from the
l^hing judged and consider it in comparison to some body of knowledge. Epic poetry and
moralistic stories were effective as moral education precisely because they encouraged
students to internalize and identify with them (see sec. 1.1.3). Ion, a product of this
tradition, refuses to separate himself from his subject and so he cannot understand it, he
can merely exhibit it. Ion's limitations at the end of this section are clear:
It's obvious to everyone that you are unable to speak about Homer with skill and
knowledge [xexvTI Kai etucrxfmxi] - because if you were able to do it by virtue
of a skill, [xe^vn], you would be able to speak about all the other poets too.
(532cd)
3.1.3 Inspiration vs. Interpretation: The Knowledge of the Poet
In his first group of arguments, Socrates rejects Ion's memorization and mimesis
of Homer as a techne, which implies that poetry does not lead to episteme (the
‘°See his response to the Delphic oracle at Apo/ogy 21a ff.; see also sec. 2.2.
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knowledge associated with tcchne ) and cannot, by itself, prov.de a complete education.
But Socrates is not adding insult to injury when he places Ion with poets and the Muse in
a "mindless" chain dangling from the god:
Similarly, the Muse herself makes some men inspired, from whom a chain of othermen is strung out who catch their own inspiration from theirs. For all good epic
poets recite all that splendid poetry not by virtue of a skill, but in a state of
inspiration and possession. (533e)
Rather he is identifying poetry's connection with the divine, something he repeatedly
descnbes as kaJon (533c7, 534a2, 534b8. and 534d8). Being a poet, a rhapsode, or even
a frenzied Bacchic dancer is nothing to be ashamed of. Thinking yourself knowledgeable
as a result of divine inspiration, however, is a clear failure to heed the Delphic instruction
to "know thyself." Plato's criticism is designed to discourage this false conceit in Ion,
poets, and anyone else who believes that poetic inspiration gives him or her practical
knowledge.
At Apo/qsr 22c, Socrates includes poets in his list of those whose reputations for
wisdom have been proven hollow by his questioning. He adds that practically anyone
else could give a better account than the poets of what they themselves had produced.
Socrates explains this phenomenon by the fact that poetic genius is inspired, a temporary
gift from the god during which the poet actually leaves his senses.” The reason that
others could better explain poetic "genius" is that they are separate from it and therefore
able to evaluate it as an object, just as Socrates evaluates all thoughts that occur to him.”
Plato's educational point in this Apology passage is that poetry should be evaluated from
a distance with a fully engaged mind rather than internalized and identified with
emotionally.
"For more on poets leaving their senses see PJ7aexIrus 245a and Laws 719c; diviners are said to leave
their senses at Timaeus 7 le - 72b; an interesting anomaly given that divining is considered a tedme here.
"Sec, for example, Chanwdets 173a.
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The long discussion of poetic inspiration in Ion serves a similar purpose. At
534b. Socrates makes it clear that poetry gains its value from its connection with the
divine, which is more or less complete depending on the extent to which the poet leaves
his own human senses:
A poet, you see, is a light thing, and winged and holy, and cannot compose beforehe gets inspiration and loses control of his senses and his reason has deserted him.No man, so long as he keeps that, can prophesy or compose. (534b)
Socrates takes the results of his earlier argument (532c - 533d) as evidence for the
mindlessness of poetic inspiration. Poetic composition must not be a techne because, if it
were, the poets' expertise would not be limited to one topic on a subject, but they would
be able to expound on other relevant topics as well (534c). Note that this account of
poetic techne has nothing to do with aesthetic qualities of verse such as rhyme, meter, or
alliteration. Plato's educational concern is with what the poet says; how beautifully he
says It IS not at issue here. In fact, Phaedws 245ab suggests that poetic skill in
composition is worthless in comparison with divine inspiration. The inspired poet is
superior because he aims not for the aesthetic pleasure of his audience but rather to
deliver a divine message through the weak medium of human language.
At 534de, Socrates presents the example of Tynnichus the Chalcidian, an
otherwise bad poet who wrote one great poem as proof that poets are a hermeneus
[^|Lir|ve'uq, interpreter, mouthpiece] for the gods:
In this more than anything, then, I think, the god is showing us, so that we should
be in no doubt about it, that these beautiful poems are not human, not even from
human beings, but are divine and from gods; that poets are nothing but
representatives [^|Lir|veT|q] of the gods, possessed by whoever possesses them. To
show that, the god deliberately sang the most beautiful lyric poem through the
most worthless poet. (Woodruff translation, 534e)
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Ion declares that Socrates’ words "touch his soul" and agrees that poets present
[^ptlvenciv] the god s message and the rhapsodes then represent [^pTlve\»exe] the
poets' representations. "So you turn out to be representatives of representatives
[eputivecov ^privfi?]," concludes Socrates. "Quite right," Ion replies (Woodruff
translation, 535a).
At the conclusion of this exchange, Socrates changes gears and gives Ion a familiar
Socratic warning:
Hold on a minute, Ion, and tell me this — and do be frank about answering
whatever I may ask you. (535b)
In so many words, Socrates is asking Ion to say what he believes — a request especially
pertinent in Ion's case since the rhapsode has so much trouble separating his own beliefs
from those of the poet. At a similar juncture in HippiasMinor (365cd), Socrates
specifically requests that Homer be left out of the discussion since it is impossible to
question him about the intentions behind his words.^^ Throughout the dialogue Socrates
himself has displayed an impressive ability to recall and recite Homer, but he has always
presented the passages for intellectual analysis rather than for the pleasure of his
audience. Getting Ion to make a similar intellectual separation is not easy; hence his
direct admonishment to Ion to answer for himself.
Socrates asks Ion about his own state of mind while giving performances of
Homer. Ion agrees at 535b-e that his best performances come when he is most fully given
over to the Muse. As with the poets, the transformation is not always complete, which
explains why human imperfections creep in to the supposedly ideal message of the god.
Still there emerges from Socrates' discussion of inspiration a kind of inverse relationship
For similar passages, see Protagoras 347e, and MenolXA.
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between the production and performance of poetry on the one hand, and the engagement
of the human intellect on the other. It seems as though the best pcetty is the farthest
removed from the human intellect, while the human intellect functions best when
removed from identification with poetry.” Note that such a principle does not denounce
the value of poetry itself, rather it suggests that the human mind functions best at solving
its own problems when solidly grounded in its own world. Like a parent’s decision to turn
the music off while homework is completed, the judgment is not an aesthetic one but an
educational one.
Given Plato's concern with the tendency produced by poetic education to
emotionally identify with the text, one should not overemphasize his characterization of
poetic inspiration as mindless. This is exactly what Ion does at 536d when, despite his
admissions that Socrates' account of inspiration "touched his soul" and that he himself
deeply identifies with the characters in his recitations, he resists the idea that he is in a
state of madness during performance.^^ Socrates never implies that inspired poets,
rhapsodes, and their audiences behave like stark raving lunatics. Rather, he emphasizes
the fact that inspiration touches us on an emotional rather than intellectual level, evoking
the sort of responses appropriate not to actual situations but rather to fictional ones:
Well then. Ion, take a man dressed up at a feast or festival in elaborate clothing
and golden crowns. If he has lost none of these things, but nevertheless breaks out
in tears, or if he gets into a panic in spite of standing among more than twenty
thousand friends, when no one is denuding him or doing him any harm, are we to
say he's in his senses at that moment? (535d)
'^That Plato believed the gods to be truthful can be seen at Apo/ogy 21b and RepubUe 382c.
Woodruff (1982, p. 146) claims that Plato's "radical conception of inspiration" is ridiculous because the poets
exhibit none of the unanimity and clarity he attributes to the gods. At 719c, Plato blames poetic
contradictions on conflicting characters given to him by the Muse.
‘^Woodruff (1983, p. 8) agrees with Ion's resistance to Socrates' account of inspiration since Ion would
be in ecstasy when he recites Homer; if it were true, which he plainly is not.
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Since poetiy was memorized and recited in an effort to teach to help people to act
well in their own particular situations, it should be clear that it fails as education insofar
as it takes them out of themselves and out of their situations. Plato's educational goal is
to engage the intellect the way it is engaged by a craftsman practicing his techne. Poetic
inspiration and memorization disengages the intellect and therefore fails as education.
3.1.4 Techne. Ixigni. and Fpistt-mf^
Whereas earlier arguments established that the memorization and recitation of
poetry, even at Ion's level, is not a techne, 536d - 541d shows that valid technai like
military science cannot be learned from poetry and then transferred to real life. While this
thesis may be laughably obvious to modem readers, the practice of poetic education made
this very assumption. Furthermore, as Ion so comically displays, it failed to equip its
students with the mental skills necessary to follow an argument.
The first move Plato makes in this section is to establish at 537d that separate
technai are distinguished by having have separate fields of knowledge ( episteme ). An
example of number is given to illustrate how both Socrates and Ion know Socrates has
five fingers on a hand by virtue of the same skill - skill in number. The thing to note here
is the separation of the object and the body of knowledge in the example. Socrates' and
Ion's knowledge of number is abstract and based on other experiences and examples —
they don't know that Socrates has five fingers because he says so or Homer says so, or just
by contemplating his hand -- they apply outside knowledge of number to a particular
object (Socrates' hand) by virtue of their skill.
From the previous conclusion that having a techne requires a person to have a
particular field of knowledge and the recent inference that different technai have
'^Number is also given as an example of knowledge at 53Id and in HippiasMinor at 367a.
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different fields of knowledge, comes the new claim that anyone who does not possess a
given techne will not have full knowledge of the words or deeds that lie within its
province. That is, one won’t be able to judge the good and bad in one's field, as was
established earlier. There is an interesting move here that shows professional knowledge
to include the ability to judge words. The idea is reinforced at 538b - 539d when Ion
admits that some passages from Homer are best judged by experts from the relevant fields
such as charioteers, doctors, fishermen, or prophets. When Socrates asks Ion at 539e to
point to a corresponding passage in Homer which would best be judged by a rhapsode.
Ion replies: "I maintain he [the rhapsode] judges everything, Socrates" (539e).
Ion’s anogant comment prompts Socrates to joke that Ion must be forgetting
something (539e). The joke ironic since rhapsodes were renowned for their mnemonic
abilities and Ion claims to know every bit of Homer by heart. Plato mocks Ion's alleged
mnemonic ability by having Socrates recall nearly all of the obscure Homeric verse quoted
in the dialogue. Ion has forgotten something, but it is not words. Words are all he can
remember, and that’s the real problem. What Ion has foigotten is the implications of the
previous argument -- he has failed to understand the meaning and intention of the words
that have gone before, even while he remembers the words themselves. What part of
Homer is he capable of judging, given this limit on his intellectual power? Words.
At 540b, Having admitted that the rhapsode must defer to professional experts in
judging passages about their particular skills. Ion claims that he knows what may suitably
be said by men and women, slaves and freemen, rulers and subjects. Again, he thinks it
sufficient to know the right words, even if he lacks the appropriate technai. Socrates
promptly forces Ion to admit (540b-d) that he wouldn’t know the proper words for a
steersman, doctor, cowherd, or spinning-woman. But Ion surprisingly maintains that he
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would know the appropriate words for a general. He goes so far as to insist that there is no
difference between the professions of general and rhapsode (540e - 541a) and that
because he’s the best Greek rhapsode he’s the best Greek general as well (541b).
Again, the comic absurdity of Ion's claim is tempered by the fact that Greeks used
the memorization and recitation of Homer as a central part of moral education. Ion
probably picks military science while conceding other technai because Homer was the
traditional authority on militaiy matters in Ancient Greece.^^ Furthermore, the accepted
aristocratic education for future generals was precisely the memorization and recitation of
Homer.‘« Socrates' argument showed that knowing how to do something (i.e. having the
relevant tec/me ) allows doctors and charioteers to judge what Homer says about that
subject. Knowing what Homer says about a subject, however, does not allow Ion to claim
that he knows how to do the activity.^’ Ion goes wrong not only by assuming that his
knowledge of Homer gives him the practical skill of a general, but also by identifying
himself so closely with the poet and his text that he has no objective basis on which to
judge any subject.^® These are Plato’s central complaints about the traditional use of
poetry as education.
Conc lus ion; The Proper Use of Poetry in Education
By the end of dialogue the words epidends and kalon should have expanded
their meaning for Plato’s audience, if not for Ion himself.
But really. Ion, if there is truth in your claim that it is thanks to skill and
knowledge that you have the ability to praise Homer, you’re not playing fair with
"For Homer's authonty on military matters see Aristophanes' Frogs 1032ff.
**The general Laches displays his knowledge of Homer at 191b.
‘’Woodruff (1983, p, 10) says the conclusion that poetry should be judged by different standards from
those we use in more ordinaiy' life, "that, for example, what a general should say in a real battle is different from
what a general should be made to say in a poem about a battle" would have been a novelty in Plato's time.
“The main thrust of Plato's argument against poetry in education at NopubJicIII 392 - 398 is that the
young should not be allowed to play the part of bad characters; to identify with them; we may read about
TTiersites, but not act as Thersites. See also Urmson (1982, p. 128).
113
me You assure me that you know a great many fine
undertake to give an exhibition ( epidevds ) of them,you're nowhere near giving me an exhibition. (541e)*
things about him, and you
But you're deceiving me and
In .he opening of the dialogue a, 530d, Socrates ashed Ion for an epideixis of ,he poe.s.
During the dialogue, however, the meaning of epidends has shifted from the mimetic
exhibition of Homer's words, of which Ion ,s eminently capabi, to an edrfymg explanation
of Homer's dianoia, of which Ion has proven to be entirely incapable.
Kalop too, shows different meanings on the lips of Socrates and Ion at the
conclusion of the dialogue:
Soc.: However, if you do not possess skill (xexviKog, but it is because ofdivine dispensation and because you are possessed by Homer that you say a lot of
tine (KaAxx) things about that poet, in a state of ignorance, as I said was your
condition, then you are not unfair (o\)8ev otSiKeTq). So, choose which alternativeyou prefer; to have us think of you as an unfair fellow, or as a divine one?
Ion: There's a lot of difference, Socrates: it's a much finer (Kd>Aiov) thing
to be thought divine. ^ ^
Soc.: Well then, let's grant you this finer (KdcA,>^iov) status in our eyes. Ion:
as a eulogist of Homer you are not skilled (xexviKOV), but divine. (542b)
Whereas Socrates associates kalon with the divine nature of poetry (he uses it four times
in describing divine inspiration: 533e7; 534a2; 534b8; 534d8), Ion associates kalon
with public admiration. He chooses being divine not because he understands the
argument, but because it is "more beautiful" {kaWon ) to be thought divine. Plato sees
kalon as a metaphysical rather than aesthetic quality which, as I show later, plays a large
part in determining arete. Socrates battles the popular tendency to regard kalon as an
external appearance throughout the early dialogues.
The expanded meanings of kalon and epldena's at the end of the dialogue
remind us that Ion is not a rejection of poetry perse, but rather a rejection of poetry's
traditional use in education. The magnetic power of the poetic muse contains divine
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kahn but it also puts students into an emotional rapture that discourages critical
intellect necessary for true epidcMs. The result is such complete emotional identification
wtth epic heroes that people like Ion actually believe themselves to be capable generals.
At Protagoras 313d, Socrates worries about sophists who take the various subjects of
knowledge from city to city and offer them for sale to people who have no way of knowing
whether the teachings will be beneficial or harmful to the soul. Poetry presents a similar
sort of danger, selltng rtself though rhythmic enchantment without providing the means for
critical judgment of it or any of its messages.
That Plato believed poetry, approached critically, has an important role in
education is evident from Socrates' impressive familiarity with and constant use of it in
Ion and nearly every other dialogue. Plato rejected poetry, and Homer in particular, as
the moral authority and educator of Greece. Ion's claim that his knowledge of Homer
qualifies him to be a general is not so absurd in light of Herodotus' (VH, 161) explanation
of how the Athenians claimed the high command in an expedition against the Persians
based on the Iliad (2, 552 - 554). Plato disdained the Greek tendency to isolate the
words and deeds of epical characters from context and use them as moral maxims and
justifications. He specifically criticizes use of mythological examples to excuse
wrongdoing at Republic 377e, and 391d, Laws 941b, and as I show later, Euthyphro
5e - 6ab.^^
Furthermore, by pointing out Ion's dependence on public approval and subtly
criticizing his consequent emphasis on producing pleasure for his audience, Plato reminds
us that the poet's motivation is likewise the pleasure of his audience rather than their
moral edification. To the extent that there is a techne of poetry or even rhapsody, it is
^'Similar observations arc made by Vcrdcnius (1949, p. 262).
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aimed at creating a work or performance that will be pleasurable to the audience. Since
Plato does not believe the production of pleasure to be intrinsically good for mankind,
he considers the poetic and rhapsodic techna! of little value.“ It would seem that poetiy
IS valuable just because of the divine message it carries over from inspiration. Indeed, Ion
finally accepts being divine rather than skillful (542a) - but only because he thinks it
makes for a better public image.
Plato rejected the belief that Homer understood the virtues, vices, and technical
skills of his characters, just as Socrates rejects the belief that Ion understands Homer.^^
The antecedent of Socrates' conditional statement that a rhapsode would be great if he in
fact understood the dianoia or intention of the poetry is clearly denied by the account of
inspiration - an account which also reveals that the poet himself knows nothing of the
divine intentions behind his art. At Republic 600e, Plato calls poets mimetaieidolon
aretes, imitators of images of excellence, and he claims (602b) that the poet produces
these imitations ignorant of how they are good or bad. Indeed it is only to the extent that
the poet is relieved of his understanding that the divine message can get through:
That s why the god relieves [poets] of their reason, and uses them as his ministers,
just as he uses soothsayers and divine prophets -- so that we who listen to them
may realize that it is not they who say such supremely valuable things as they do,
who have not reason in them, but that is the god himself who speaks, and
addresses us through them. (534cd)
Poetry's divine kaion establishes its place in the early Platonic educational
scheme as a guiding light whose vagueness demands the critical intellect to derive benefit
from it. Timaeus 9d shows how accurate imitation and articulation of divine things is
difficult if not impossible. What the Muse tries to communicate through the poet is
^^Moravcsik (1982, p. 32) makes a similar observation.
”Sce Guthrie (1975, p. 209): Plato thought Homer’s role as educator "was spurious, because in fact
Homer and the others did not understand the technical or other principles underlying the actions which they
describe; and many of their stories, even of the behavior of the gods, were the reverse of morally edifying."
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something powerful, but not directly observable or describable for human beings. What
poetry can do is give us a glimpse of divine ideals and encourage us to aspire to them by
applying our cntical intellect.^^ Socrates’ response to the divine oracle at Apo/c^ 21a
ff., to consider it a riddle and question its meaning, serves as a model for the proper
educational approach to the divine element in poetry, paradox, puzzles, and irony.^^
Understanding the divine message encoded in inspired poetry requires an independent
human intellect and a critical approach to verse — the tools and approach displayed by
Socrates throughout the early dialogues. In /on, Plato criticizes traditional poetic
education for its tendency to magnetically attach the student by the emotional inspiration
of the muse, effectively paralyzing the intellectual tools necessary to gain a real benefit
from poetry's divine message.
3.2 The Nature of a Wiseman in Ffippins Minor
Finally I went to the craftsmen. I was aware that although I knew (ETCiaxafxevcp)
scarcely anything, I would find that they knew (e7CiaTanevo\)(;) many fine things
(kcxAxx). In this I was not mistaken: they knew things that I did not, and in that
respect were wiser (aoq>d>xepoi). But, Gentlemen of Athens, it seemed to me that
the poets and our capable public craftsmen had exactly the same failing: because
they practiced their own arts (xexvav) well, each deemed himself wise
(cTOtpcoxocxoc^) in other things, things of great importance. This mistake obscured
their wisdom. ( Apology 22cd)
Hippias was renowned as a sophist, not a craftsman, so it may seem at first glance
that this passage from Apology refers to a different class of Socratic interlocutor.
Likewise, Ion was a rhapsode and not a poet, but Socrates' examination of him was an
indirect examination of poetry in its educational role. Plato never depicts a conversation
^^For a detailed account of the instrumental value of poetty see Moravesik (1982).
^^Vlastos (1991, p. 171) similarly concludes that "there can be no conflict between Socrates’
unconditional rccidiness to follow critical reason wherever it may lead and his equally unconditional commitment
to obey commands issued to him by his supernatural god through supernatural signs. These two commitments
cannot conflict because on/y by the use ofh/s own criticalreason can Socrates determine the twe meanjng of
any ofthesesigns " (Italics his).
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between Socrates and a cobbler, doctor, or blacksmith (or poet, for that matter), but he
does depict several conversations between Socrates and sophists. Perhaps this can be
explained by Plato’s educational concerns in the early dialogues and his belief that
sophists taught technm and not Since excellence in vanous technai could be
called arete, sophists often claimed to teach arete. But the moral that Plato
believed to be the goal of education is not gained through excellence in oratoiy,
mnemonics, or even argument. The sophists’ big mistake, analogous to Ion and the poets’
mistake, was to believe that their excellence in particular skills conferred moral excellence
upon them. My analysis of the HippiasMinor begins with a discussion of how Plato
compares Socratic and sophistic approaches to wisdom while showing poetry and
technai to be morally neutral. Next. I show how Plato attempts to distinguish a moral
category for the edification of his readers. By showing that technical knowledge cannot
yield arete. HippiasMinor seeks to turn Athens’ educational effort from its focus on
memorization and skills.
^.1 Opening: Portrait of a Wiseman
The opening of HippiasMinor invites an interesting comparison between
Hippias and Ion. Hippias has just presented an epideixis but, unlike Ion’s epideixis
which was a performance of poetry, Hippias has spoken critically about poetry and
included information from other poets besides Homer in his speech. This fact tells us right
away that Hippias has achieved the separation from his subject matter and the
comprehensiveness of knowledge that prevented Ion from legitimately claiming a techne.
Socrates asks Hippias to comparatively judge characters in the Iliad and Odyssey.
Such critical judgment was taken in Ion to be a hallmark of techne. Right from the
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beginning, Hippias is shown to possess the tec/me that Ion lacked. What Socrates will
proceed to show are the limits of even the greatest and most vematile tccfwkes around.
The conclusion of Hippias' lecture apparently finds Socrates in a rare state of
speechlessness:
Why are you silent, Socrates, after Hippias has given such an exhibition
(em&l^afievot)]? Why don't you either join us in praising some point or other in
what he said, or else put something to the test if it seems to you
anylhmg was not well said - especially since we who most claim to have a sharein the practice of philosophy are now left to ourselves? (363a)^^
The exhibitions of sophists, like those of rhapsodes, were famous for being engaging and
impressive. They had to be. As I explained in chapter 1, Sophists were freelance
educators who attracted customers by impressing pupils and parents with their skill and
wisdom.^^ The epideixis might be a sample lecture that expounded some particular point
or a improvisational question and answer session in which audience members could ask
anything they chose.^® Hippias (like Ion) was apparently famous for his exhibitions,
which carried off prizes at the Olympiad (363d) and saw him claim to be wisest at the
greatest number of technai (368b-d). Protagoras 315c describes Hippias delivering his
lecture from an elevated throne. Such methods are diametrically opposed from those of
Socrates, who expresses his confusion and asks Hippias to teach him clearly what was
said in the epideixis :
You see, when you were delivering your lecture to the crowd of us indoors, I got a
bit lost, since I didn't want to question you — there were so many people in there,
for one thing, and also I thought my questions would have interrupted your lecture
[eJCldei^ei]. But now that there are fewer of us, I ask you, at Eudicus' instigation,
to explain [6l5(X^ov]^^ clearly what you were saying about these two men. On
what grounds were you distinguishing them? (Waterfield translation, 364bc)
^‘AJI Hippias Minor translations are by Smith (1996) unless otherwise noted.
^^Sce Marrou (1956, p. 49 - 50)
^®Sce Hippias Minor 363d, and Oorgjas 447c.
” didaskon is the aonst imperative of didasko, "to teach."
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Hippias replies that it would be deina [8eivd] if he refused Socrates' request.
Hippias uses forms of this word deinos [6eiv6^, terrible, able, skillful] to say such things
as "it would be strange behavior" (Smith translation) or "it would be monstrous"
(Waterfreld translation) at 363c, 364d, 365c, and 375d (see also Hippias Major 292c).
Socrates mimics him at the end of the dialogue, saying it would be for us as well
as for Hippias if he can't help to free us from our dilemma (376c). Alert readers will
recognize deinos as the word used by Socrates to describe Ion's ability, which is
specifically shown not to be a techne at 531a, 531c, 532b, and in his conclusion at 541e.
Plato seems to be using the word's dual meaning of skillful and terrible to point up
limitations in both men's ability. Ion's ability was not quite a techne and Hippias'
technai do not amount to arete. It wouid be monstrous if Hippias were not able to
answer Socrates' questions (363c) when Hippias gets paid for teaching others to do so
(364d). Likewise, it would be strange if the truthful man and the liar were the same kind
of person (365c); or if those who commit injustice voluntarily are better than those who
do it involuntarily (375d). It is precisely Hippias' confusion of techne and arete, the
insufficiency of his wisdom, that causes these "monstrous" conclusions as well as his
inability to answer Socrates' questions. Hippias says it would be deinos if all these
things were true and Socrates concludes that it is deinos that the limitations of Hippias'
"skill" leave us in such confusion (376c).
After Hippias expresses his preparedness to answer Socrates' or anyone's
questions, Socrates sarcastically compliments his confidence with the kind of suppressed
conditional he used in Ion to indicate the subliminal subject of his inquiry:
Soc.: What a godlike state of mind you're in, Hippias, if you go to the
temple at every Olympiad so confident about your soul's wisdom [Jcepi xfji^
eii; aotpiav]! rd be amazed if any of the athletes of the body goes there to
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itryou:imd“c,r'' " y-
^in^„ I u'^" I* f ™= <0 be in that state of mind, Socrates. Eversince I began taking part in the contests at the Olympic games, I have never metanyone supenor to me in anything. (354a)
f. i n
If Hippias truly had the kind of supreme wisdom that would enable him to answer any
question, even about the most important things (see Apo/qs^ 22cd quoted above), he
would be in a godlike state. That is, he would have the kind of knowledge appropriate
to gods. Hippias brashly reveals his overconfidence by claiming this godlike state to be
reasonable. It is a great dramatic moment when Hippias simultaneously fails to heed the
Delphic oracle's command to "know thyself"” and challenges its proclamation that no
man is wiser than Socrates” by declaring that he's never met anyone superior to him in
anything. Socrates cleverly replies that Hippias' fame is a monument to his wisdom.
After all, it has already been shown that Hippias takes his popular success - Olympic
contests in oratory were judged by a vote of the audience^^ -- as evidence of his godlike
wisdom. How the multitude can judge godlike wisdom is left conspicuously unanswered,
For Socrates, godlike wisdom would indicate arete in its possessor and enable
him or her to act justly without fail.^^ For Hippias, in contrast, his godlike wisdom
indicates a wealth of technai and the ability to win contests. When he claimed to be
more of an expert [CTOtpGyxaxoq] at more areas of expertise [te%vcx<;] than anyone (368b),
Hippias surely counted arete in his bundle of technai. Plato took such confusion
between arete and techne to be a hallmark of the sophists, and illustrated the point
with Hippias' comportment in both dialogues bearing his name and with Protagoras'
explicit comparison of arete and techne at 326e - 328b. While Socrates may have
’“Sprague's translation of Charmjdes notes (n. 45) that this Delphic inscription probably meant
something like "realize your mortal condition."
“‘See Apology 21a.
“See Waterfield's notes in Saunders (1987a, p. 275).
“See chapter 4 and Socrates dream at Cliarm/dcs 173a-d.
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believed arete to be analogous to a techne. HippiasMtnor shows that he was able to
distinguish between moral and technical skills while Hippias, the prototypical sophist,
was not.^'*
2l22 The Moral Neutrality of Pn^tr^;
There follows an exchange (examined closely in the section 3.3.1) during which
liippias claims that Homer made Achilles [^laxoq, best, bravest, noblest] and
Odysseus polutropatos, the superlative of poIuTropos [TCO^lmpoTCoq, well-travelled,
versatile, wily]. Hippias then says how Homer intended his use of those words and
concludes, based on that interpretation, that Homer thought the liar and the truthful man
to be different kinds of people. Socrates' response to Hippias' confident explanation of
Homer's dianoia is a characteristic request to his interlocutor to "say what you believe":^®
Well, let's leave Homer out of this, since it's impossible to question him about his
poetic intentions in these lines; but you can answer for Homer as well as yourself
since you're obviously undertaking the responsibility of doing so, and you agree
’
with Homer's words as you see them. (Waterfield translation, 365cd)
Here, Socrates criticizes Hippias' failure to question the words of the poet, while
pointing out to the audience that he is examining Hippias and not Homer. As with Ion at
535b, Socrates uses the "say what you believe" question to separate the opinions of the
interlocutor from those of the poetic source — something traditional poetic education
discourages. Socrates still allows Hippias to answer for Homer, as long as he agrees with
the poet and takes responsibility for his answers. Notice, however, that Socrates says
Hippias agrees with what he, Hippias, takes Homer's words to mean. Socrates is asking
Some commentators, including Irwin (1995, p. 68-70) believe that Socrates equates arete and
tec/we, which causes them problems in interpreting Please note that an between
tech/ie and arete is very different from the sophistic belief that arete is a techne or is derivative of technai.
^^Interlocutors are supposed to say what they truly believe, not to give the opinions of another. See. for
example, Protagoras 347b, Euthyphro 9d, Crito 49c, Ion 535b. Sec also, section 4.1.1.
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Hippias to defend his interpretation of Homer's words since that interpretation is
importantly different from the poet's meaning, whether Hippias thinks so or not.
It soon becomes apparent that Hippias' interpretation of Homer's words is
self-serving. When Socrates asks at 365c whether Homer thought the truthful man
different from the liar, Hippias replies, "How could he not, Socrates?" When Socrates
asks Hippias whether he agrees with the poet, he declares that it would be demos if it
were otherwise. It hasn’t occurred to Hippias that he and Homer may disagree on this
matter. But unlike Ion who always agrees with Homer because he overidentifies with the
text, Hippias’ agreement is based upon what Hippias takes to be an obvious fact. Hippias
selected and interpreted Homeric verse specifically to support his thesis about liars and
truthfulness. It is no surprise, then, that at 366a Hippias personally commits himself to
the thesis he attributed to Homer at 365c. Rather than honestly asking what Homer
meant, Hippias assumes that the poet agrees with him and exploits the verse to support his
personal belief. Hippias views Homer as an ally in his attempt to win an argument, not as
the inspired bearer of a divine message.
After a brief argument against Hippias’ thesis, Socrates trots out some Homeric
passages supporting his side of the argument (370a - 371c), the latter of which is
unfamiliar even to Hippias, the great memorizer. This is part of Socrates’ "sophistic"
behavior that bothers some commentators.^^ The educational point of this competitive
exchange of poetry, however, is to show the moral neutrality of the text itself ~ that it can
be wielded to support either side of the argument . Unlike Hippias, Socrates uses verse as
a tool to better understand the argument, while the sophist decides on his thesis and then
deploys the verse to support it.
For a review of the issue, see Santas (1979, p. 6).
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Hippias' response to Socrates’ Homeric counteroffer is a protest that Socrates is
looking at the passage wrongly (370e). The right way, of course, is Hippias’ way.
Getting your opponent to see things your way may be great method of persuasion, but
does It lead to truth? One of Plato’s key complaints about the sophists was their
relativism - the lack of standards beyond victory and popular approval as criteria for
success. Socrates approaches poetry in an honest attempt to understand the nature of
lying and truthfulness and he follows the argument wherever it leads - even when it
seems to wander away from common assumptions. Hippias approaches the discussion as
an opportunity for victory and adulation; he interprets the text in a clear effort to support
his point and resists the argument's propensity to deviate from his thesis. Socrates’
approach is honest inquiry, Hippias’ is stubborn defense. The larger point of their
exchange is that the poetry itself cannot answer their moral question. Homer can tell us
about Achilles and Odysseus, but to learn about arete we must inquire.
32.3 The Moral Neutrality nf
While the exchange of quotations between Hippias and Socrates at 364c - 370e
shows the moral neutrality of poetry, the argument itself shows the moral neutrality of
technai. Socrates first establishes (365d) that liars, literally men who are pseudes
lying, false, saying things that are not true], have a dunamis [8\)va|Liiq, power,
ability]. Next it is agreed that liars are intelligent, knowledgeable about what they are
doing, and wise about their subject matter (365e). The astute reader will immediately
suspect that Socrates is here establishing lying as a kind of techne. The liar has a relevant
body of knowledge that he uses for action in a particular field — the liar is skilled. The
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readers suspicions’ are immediately confirmed beginning at 366c when Socrates compares
lying to known technai such as calculation, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy.
Eveiy time a techne is mentioned in this section, Hippias acknowledges himself
to be Its preeminent practitioner. He is the most experienced calculator of all (366c), the
best arithmetician (366d), a leading geometer (367de), and even better at astronomy than
all his other fields of expertise (367e - 368a). It becomes clear that we’re dealing with the
epitomy of all craftsmen when Socrates reveals that Hippias has billed himself as the
"wisest of people in the greatest number of crafts" (368b). This claim is supported with a
well-known story of how' Hippias once appeared at Olympia having single-handedly
crafted each of his personal items from his sandals to his ring and of course his poems and
speeches (368bc).
For each of Hippias’ original technai, Socrates gets him to admit that his expertise
makes him not only the best expounder of those subjects but also the best liar about them.
Socrates then asks whether the same isn’t true for all of the sciences [e7Ci(Txe|icov].^^
Hippias expansive familiarity with and possession of technai make him an ideal person
to answer this question, but he admits at 369a that he can’t think of a techne in which
the best expert is not also the best liar. The validity of this argument turns precisely on a
distinction between the moral and technical aspects of truth and falsehood telling.^® As
long as moral questions about lying are left out and the argument deals only with an
agent’s technical ability to lie, the argument is valid and its conclusion uncontroversial.
The point is that technai and all sciences are morally neutral, just like poetry.
^^From epistcme — a word specifically used to describe the body of knowledge pertaining to technaj.
^®This claim is argued in section 3.3.2. Several commentators have noticed that the appau'ent invalidity
of the argument is mitigated when a distinction is made between the character ( tropos ) of a liar and his ability
( dunamis ). See, for example, Weiss (1981) and Mulhem (1968).
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Why does Plato care to point out that poetry and tcchnai are morally neutral? It
IS important to him because he's interested in education and Plato's conception of the goal
of education, arete, is anything but morally neutral. Whereas Plato showed that Ion
could not learn morality (or techne ) from poetry, he now shows that you could learn a
laundry list of technai from sophists like Hippias without ever approaching arete in its
moral sense. You might even be Hippias, the greatest of the Greeks at the largest number
of technai. and still be unable to discern the moral dimension of lying from its technical
dimension.
2i2A The Intention Behind Hippias'
Once Socrates has shown the liar and the truthful man to be similar in a technical
sense, Hippias counters that Odysseus differs from Achilles in terms of the voluntariness
of his actions (370e). The subsequent passage identifies intention rather than skill as the
harbinger of the moral quality of an action and so raises the educational question of how
such intentions are determined. Plato's key complaint about the sophists was that they
offered practical techne without providing any ideal toward which to aim those skills
other than popular and political success.^^
The sophistic conception of the good is characteristically self-serving. At Goigias
466b Polus defines power as something good for him who has it. Hippias, too, takes his
competitive and financial success as evidence of his goodness. At 369c, Hippias reveals
his criteria for goodness and wisdom while stating the goal of his argument with Socrates:
So now, if you wish, Fll prove to you by sufficient argument, based upon much
evidence, that Homer made Achilles better (oc|Lielvco) than Odysseus and not a
liar, whereas he made the latter deceitful, a teller of many lies, and worse (xeipw)
than Achilles. If you wish, you may then offer counter arguments to mine to the
^’Pcnncr (1992, p. 137- 138) makes a similar observation, concluding that: 'The sophists and
rhetoricians purport to put persuasive means in their student’s hands to achieve whatever goals "seem best" to
them without raising any questions about what people take to be their ends."
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effect that the other is better (d|.ietvcov). That
which of us speaks better (d|Lieivov). (369c)
way, these people here will know
Hippias thinks that the audience will detemnne not only who is right about Homer and
who wins the argument, but also which man is ameinon [apEivov, better], Ameinon is
the comparattve form of agathos, the adjective corresponding to arete. It is a word with
definite moral overtones, as Hippias first two uses of it make clear.
Plato delights in making Socrates resemble his interlocutor in skill and tactics
while preserving their crucial differences. Just Socrates challenged Ion with his
memorization and performance of Homer, the philosopher matches Hippias' knowledge of
poetry and employs a few of his sophistic techniques. When Socrates needs to show
Hippias that the experts are also the best liars at 366c ff., he uses a spoonful of flattery to
help the conclusion go down. Playing up Hippias' superlative expertise in arithmetic,
Socrates asks him to answer "with the same nobility and grandeur" questions that
establish the best arithmetician also to be the best liar about arithmetic (366e). Although
Socrates flatters Hippias in order to encourage him to accept the argument, he does not
pursue the argument merely to win a new batch of customers or an eristic moots contest.^®
Indeed Socrates' dogged pursuit of the argument is in sharp contrast to Hippias'
anxiousness to conclude it.'*^ Socrates' goal is the truth of the matter about lying; his use
of "flattery," therefore, is unsophistic after all.^^
^“Friedlander (1958, v. I, p. 155) points out that "what r£idic«illy separated [Socrates] from [sophistic
eristics] was the final goal he aimed at: even when Socrates adopted Sophistic ways, when — as in the Hippias
Minor - he was knowingly deceptive, he still aimed at the truth of the matter."
^‘Observes Weiss (1981, p. 301): "Though the Socrates of the Hippias Minor has been accused of
deceit and sophistry, he has surely been unjustly maligned. Twice in the argument Hippias prematurely
concludes that voluntary adikountos are superior, but neither time does Socrates let it go at that. . . What we
witness here is Socrates continuing the dendius until he is satisfied that the conclusion has adequate support
from the argument, not being content to merely 'trap' Hippias."
^^For more on the distinction, see Dover (1974, p. 230): "Modern convention makes it a little hard for
us to tell the difference between 'showing admiration' ( tJiaumazdn ) for a person and 'flattering' him
( koJakeudn ), but the distinction was clear enough to the Greeks and lay essentially in the fact that the ko/ax ,
'flatterer', 'parasite', hoped for personal, individual gain, where ais admiration was disinterested. "
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Socrates also manages to weave a critical obsetvat.on about Htppias' goals mto
his speech praising the sophist’s incredible display of handicrafts at Olympia. Socrates
tells how he overheard Hippias describing his "great and enviable wisdom” by listing the
array of handicrafts he was displaying at the competition:
nd what seemed to everyone most unusual and an exhibition (CTiSeiY^a) of the
^eatest wisdom (aotpioo;) was when you said that the belt you wore around your
y^LTrcil
expensive Persian ones, and that you had plaited it
This simple observation shows how wisdom, for the sophists, could be demonstrated by a
craft item that was beautiful in appearance. The fact that "eveiyone" is concerned with
this kind of techne and wisdom rather than the moral sort reveals how the multitude
simultaneously accept and determine the sophistic criteria for what is good. Do the
multitude admire what is good or is a thing good just because the multitude admire it?^^
Plato later makes no secret of his disdain for polymaths, people claiming a wide
variety of skills and knowledge.'*^ What bothers him most about Hippias' skills, though, is
that they seem to be designed solely to impress others. Of course, impressing others was to
a sophist's success in attracting students and earning a living. But Plato suspected that
such drive for popular approval and financial reward actually corrupted Hippias' status as
a technites. Socrates mocks Hippias' well known mnemonic technique at 369a, as he
mocked Ion s mnemonics at 539e, to contrast the ability to remember words with his
inability to remember the logical consequences of an argument:
Soc.: Even [further deliberation] won't help, in my opinion. But you
should remember what the argument entails if Fm right, Hippias.
Hip.: I don't quite see what you're getting at, Socrates.
Soc.: I suppose you're not using you mnemonic technique -- you obviously
don't think it's called for. (Waterfield translation, 369a)
'’This question reflects a central issue in Euthyphro, see section 5.1.
"See, for example Laws 81 lb and 819a, and PJiaexiws 275ab.
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Indeed, Hippias' mnemonics help him to appear expert on many subjects while lacking
the dedicated specialization of a true technites. « Since public approval is the goal of all
Hippias' efforts, his achievements lack principle and diminished in Socrates' eyes.
Technai aimed to please the multitude are necessarily disjoint from the Platonic
conception of arete which requires one to aim at a particular ideal.
2.2.5 Contrasting Attitudes towards
To whatever extent Socrates resembles a sophist in HippiasMinor (Aristophanes'
Clouds shows how much he did in his contemporaries' eyes), it is most instructive to
examine how Plato contrasts Socrates with his interlocutor. Socrates and Hippias make
comments and do things in the dialogue that reveal veiy different approaches to wisdom.
Given that the sophists were Socrates' and Plato's greatest rivals as educators, it's not
surpnsmg that the contrast in their approaches to wisdom takes on educational overtones.
At 369bc, just after Socrates has argued that the liar and truthful person are one and the
same, Hippias complains about Socrates' method of questioning:
Hip.: Oh, Socrates! You're always weaving arguments of this kind. You
pick out whatever is the most difficult part of the argument and fasten on to it in
minute detail, and don't dispute about the whole subject under discussion.
.
.
Soc.: Hippias, I don't dispute that you are wiser than I, but it is always my
custom to pay attention when someone is sa)dng something, especially when the
speaker seems to me to be wise. And because I desire to learn what he means, I
question him thoroughly and examine and place side-by-side the things he says, so
I can learn. If the speaker seems to me a worthless person, I neither ask questions
nor do I care what he says. This is how you'll recognize whom I consider wise.
You'll find me being persistent about what's said by this sort of person,
questioning him so that I can benefit by learning something. (369b-e)
It's obvious that Socrates' nit-picking rather cramps Hippias' grandiose style; damn
the details, Hippias' goal is to make an impressive showing that will win over the
^^Scc Marrou (1956, p. 55): "It is known from other sources that Hippias taught a system of mnemonics
and some think that ail this imposing learning meant no more in practice than providing the orator with the
minimum amount of knowledge necessary to enable him to pose as an expert without ever getting caught out."
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audience. Beyond that, however, th.s passage brings up an interesting question. What is
really at stake here? After Hippias complains that Socrates won't dispute the "whole
subject under discussion," Socrates replies that he doesn't dispute Hippias' wisdom. Is
Hippias' wisdom the subject under discussion? From Hippias' point of view, it probably
is. As I suggested in the last section, Hippias takes this conversation with Socrates to be a
competitive game, a contest to see who is wiser (369c), into which Hippias confidently
strides undefeated (SaScd)/^
Socrates, by contrast, says he wants to learn from Hippias - although he refuses to
be a good student and listen to the lecture. What does he hope to learn? One of Hippias'
technai ? They are never discussed in depth. Hippias' famous system for mnemonics? It
didn t help Hippias to remember the consequences of his reasoning (369a). They are
discussing the difference between Odysseus and Achilles, but Socrates makes it clear that
he's not interested in learning about Homer (365c). The question is not simply, who is the
better of these two characters? The question is, what makes a man good, better, the
best? Hippias and Socrates are discussing arete, a thing of great importance in the words
of Apology 22d. But Hippias views arete in terms of his reputation for wisdom and
ability to win the argument, while Socrates views arete as a concept to be explored.
Why does Socrates think he can learn from Hippias by bombarding him with
questions? It seems reasonable to go to Hippias, a wise man by profession, in order to
gain wisdom - but Socrates remains ignorant. It turns out that it's not Hippias' wisdom
that Socrates is after, it is a higher form of wisdom with different criteria:
Do you see that Fm telling the truth, Hippias, when I say that Fm persistent in
questioning clever people? This is probably [Klv6\)ve\)C0j my only good point: in
other respects Fm pretty useless. I mean, Fm ignorant about the way things are,
'‘Dewey (1993, p. 43) says the sophists’ used argument and discussion for "downing the other man,
which was the thing in the Sophists which Socrates always reprobated.
. . But Socrates and Plato really had the
idea of intellectual intercourse where all the participants were equally concerned to arrive at the truth. "
130
whose wisdom is famous and vouched for by all ,he GrTeL my gnorl ebecomes evident, because we disagree on almost eveiythmg. X^at greX nroof of
3^°bc)”“
«i<h experts? (Waterfield translaLn,
Socrates’ disagreement w-ith the experts is proof of tii^a,^ ignorance? Notice that he
examines men whose wisdom is "famous and vouched tor by all the Greeks." It is the
multitude with their fickle disfnbution of fame that determines the wisdom of Hippias and
others. Socrates disdains such criteria," he wants to know "the way things are." When
Socrates says that he doesn't dispute Hippias’ wisdom, he is using ’wisdom’ in Hippias’
sense and essentially saying that he doesn’t dispute Hippias’ fame. When Socrates says
that he is ignorant, he is using his own higher criteria.
As It turns out, Socrates doesn't seem to learn anything from Hippias at all; he is
still vacillating on the matters discussed at the dialogue's end:
However, as I said before, on these matters I waver (7C>va.vo5^al) back and forth
and never believe the same thing. And it's not surprising at all that I or any other
ordinary person should waver (TC^^vaaGai). But if you wise men (aocpoi) are
going to do it (TcAxxvfjcreaGe), too — that means something terrible (6eiv6v) for us,
if we can't stop our wavering (7i?td.vTig) even after we've put ourselves in your
company. (376c)
Smith notes that the primary use of the verb pJanan is "to wander" but that Socrates uses
it in the middle passive form which indicates an inability to make up his mind. The word
can't help but evoke the description of Odysseus as poJutiopos. the main meaning of
which is "much-travelled or wandering." Add to this the connection between Hippias the
poJymuthos and Odysseus the polutropos, and you end the dialogue with an image of
wild horses roaming everywhere. The image is appropriate to Plato's criticism of the
sophists' relativism and the last sentence shows his disdain for them as teachers.
See also, for example, 184c-e; and Cnto 47a ff.
^'Socrates accuses Hippias of behaving like Odysseus at 370c. Hoerber (1962, p. 131) also makes the
connection.
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The final aporia of Hippias Minor is as much a confusion about education as it
is about the nature of a good man. While Plato doesn't offer answers to either question,
co-ptic clues are sprinUed around the dialogue. First, Plato makes it clear that Hippias’
infallibility is a barrier to his learning." In contrast to the sophist's boast that his wisdom
has never been matched (364a), Socrates identifies humility as his own greatest asset in
learning:
ut, astonishingly, I have this single good point, my saving grace: I am humble
enough to learn, so I probe and ask questions, and am extremely grateful to anyone
who answers me. I always repay my debts by never passing the lesson off as a
discoyeiy of my own and so denying the fact that I have learned something. No
I extol the cleverness of my teacher as I explain what he taught me. (Waterfield
translation, 372c)
Hippias is so convinced of his supreme knowledge that he thinks he is beyond learning.
His incredible knowledge doesn't even make him a good teacher, however. When Hippias
IS ready to abandon the discussion in frustration over Socrates inability to recognize the
obvious, Socrates asks him to continue for everyone's benefit:
Soc.: So please be nice and don't refuse to cure my soul. You'll do me a
much greater good if you give my soul relief from ignorance, than if you gave my
body relief from disease. But if you wish to give a long speech, I tell you in
advance that you wouldn't cure me, for I couldn't follow you. If you are willing to
answer me as you did just now, you'll benefit me a great deal, and I think you
yourself won't be harmed.
.
.
Eud.: By all means don't do otherwise, Hippias. For our sakes and for the
sake of what you said earlier, answer what Socrates asks you. (372e - 373d)
Socrates is here asking Hippias not to teach him by applying some techne, as a doctor
applies his techne to cure a patients body.^® Nor would Socrates learn from an
^’observes Perkinson (1980, p. 10): "First, human improvement can take place only if man is fallible;
infallibility leaves no room for improvement. And if man is fallible, then he can never know what the good is, so
the only way he can improve is by discovering or uncovering his own mistakes, his own errors, and then
eliminating them. Therefore, rather than skepticism and nihilism, Socrates' negative approach leads to
optimism ajid progress."
^“Indeed Socrates says things elsewhere that suggest he thinks teaching is a kind of doctonng of the
soul. See, for example, Charmides 155b ff., especially 157bc.
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epidebns. It is the process of questions and answers that benefits all parties concerned,
including the audience of the dialogue.
The nature of the wise man is to impress the multitude, but he has no criteria
independent of their approval for his own improvement. As such, he is neither an
effective teacher, nor a potential achiever of arete. Indeed, he acknowledges neither a
moral ideal separate from popular success, nor his own imperfection. The wisdom of the
wise man turns out to be shallow. In the Hippias Minor, as I show in the next section,
Socrates' questions reveal a confusion about the moral dimension of the good man and a
lack of fixed standards for judging his goodness. These are the shortcomings of sophistic
education and challenges for Plato's educational project.
3t3r Thg Nature of the Good Man in ffjppias Minnr
Perhaps the best evidence for the educational value of Hippias Minor is the
testimony of Plato's great student, Aristotle. Aristotle mentions Hippias Minor
specifically and shows elsewhere that he learned the lessons implied by, but not stated
explicitly, in the dialogue. At Metaphysics A 1025a2-14 Aristotle calls the Hippias
Alinor "misleading," but he does not mean that Plato was trying to deceive his audience.
Rather, the dialogue is misleading in a provocative way that makes its readers wonder why
its conclusions are so counterintuitive. Aristotle goes on to explain that the moral
character of a false man must be distinguished from the ability to tell lies. The distinction
is even more clear in Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle judges liars on the basis of the
intentions behind their lies, rather than their capacity for lying:
It is not the capacity that makes the boaster, but the choice; for it is in virtue of his
state and by being a man of a certain kind that he is a boaster. (1127bl2-16)^^
^‘AII Aristotle translations are by Ross (1984), unless otherwise indicated.
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The second thing Aristotle learned, a kind of corollan- to the first, is that is
a state of character and not a rechne. At Kcon,ache.n BMcs 1129a6-17 Aristotle
makes this point in discussing justice:
We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state which makes peoolei^sposed to do what is just and makes them act justly and wish forwhaUs just;
h r"”
^ ^ that state which makes them act unjustly and wish lorwhat IS unjust. Ut us too, then, first lay this down as a rough sketch
same is not true of the sciences and the faculties
[ /acW ] as of states For itseems that the same faculty or science deals with contraries; but a state of
character which is one of two contraries does produce the contrary results
The argument that practitioners of and can produce contrary results is
given at H,pp,asMinor 366e - 369a. Although justice in particular and arete in general
are not explicitly distinguished from rechne in the dialogue, such a distinction must be
made in order to avoid the objectionable conclusion of the argument. Later in the
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle distinguishes phronesis [(ppovtiatg, prudence, practical
wisdom], something specifically connected to arete, from techne :
But further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art
[ techne ], there is no
such thing as excellence in practical wisdom {phronesis ]; and in art he who errs
willingly IS preferable, but in practical wisdom, as in the excellences {aretai
] he isthe reverse. Plainly then, practical wisdom is an excellence
f arete ] and not an art
[ iochne ]. (ll40h21-25)
The argument that he who errs willingly is preferable is found at Hippias Minor 369d -
376b. It is clear from his writings that at least one student of Plato, Aristotle, got the
indirect educational message of Hippias Minor.
The Moral Category
It has been suggested that the HippiasMinor may not be an authentic work of
Plato because the fallaciousness of its arguments is so obvious that no philosopher of
Plato's stature could possibly have made them. The fallacy Plato is most often accused of
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making is equivocation. Several of the argument’s terms shift in meaning from one part of
the argument to the next. Aristotle noticed the fallacies and his reference to the work is
testimony to its authenticity. I think that every other student of Plato, including his
modem day readers, was intended to see the fallacies too - and to ieam from them, as
Aristotle did, that moral character as arete of the soul is crucially distinct from practical
technai and success or popularly-determined excellence.
It doesn’t take a philosopher of Aristotle’s caliber to notice the ambiguous use of
agathos [dyaeoi;, good, (Homer) brave, noble, morally good], even in Socrates' first
speech at 363ab, where he says that Eudicus’ father thought the Iliad a finer
[ kallion,
Kda.?aov, comparative of kalos] poem than the Odyssey just because Achilles is a better
{ameinon, dpeivcov, comparative of agathos] man than Odysseus. Notice that it is some
quality of the characters that makes one poem more beautiful or fine than another, rather
than the aesthetic value of the verse. Notice also that being a "better man" has a moral
connotation here that will be absent when ’better’ and ’best' are later discussed in
reference to techne. Socrates' question to Hippias about which character he thinks is
aweinon is as much a question about how Hippias defines agathos as it is about his
interpretation of Homer.
At 364c, Hippias replies that Achilles is aiistos and Odysseus is polutropos.
Now aiistos [dpiOToq] is the superlative of agathos and therefore connected to arete.
The breadth of possible meanings for agathos. however, allows aiistos to mean best,
bravest, noblest, or even most virtuous. Smith (1996, n. 3) theorizes that Hippias is using
the word in its Homeric sense of military rather than moral excellence and so translates it
"best and bravest." There is no reason why Plato wouldn't intentionally leave the
meaning vague here, however. It is characteristic of the dialogue that Socrates and
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Hippias use the same words while having different meanings and often no clear
definitions in mind. Indeed, this lack of clear def.nit.ons is one of the faults of the
sophists that Plato challenges in his educational project.
The word Hippias uses to describe Odysseus at 364c, polutmpotstos. is simply
the superlative of po/utropos
ftcoXpTpoJCOg] the word used by Homer to describe
Odysseus in the opening line of the Odyssey. Again, Smith (1996, n. 4) takes Hippias'
attitude into account, noting that while Homer seems to mean "much traveled" by the
word, Hippias seems to have the word's sense as "shifty, vematile, and resourceful m
mind," Hence his translation: "wily," The broad meaning of this word, however, even
confuses Socrates who asks Hippias to explain (364e). Hippias proceeds to connect
po/utropos to pseudes [vt-eu8f|i;], usually translated as "liar," which means "false" or
"saying things that are not true" (365b).“
Citing a passage in which Achilles calls Odysseus polumachan, Hippias
concludes:
In these lines he clearly shows the way of each man, that Achilles is truthful and
simple, and Odysseus is wily {polutropos
] and a liar [ pseudes ]. (365b)
Now polumachan [7ro>.\)pfiXT)v] means resourceful or inventive and is a possible
synonym of polutropos in the latter's non-moral sense. Hippias' conclusion, however,
suggests that he is making a moral judgment on the men. He is talking about "the way of
each man, a phrase which suggests character. Indeed, the Greek word tropos [xpoTCOc^]
can refer to a man's character or temper and so it seems reasonable that Hippias takes
poJui£opo? to refer to Odysseus' character.^^ Nonetheless, Hippias' interpretation of
The suggestion implicit in the term iiar’ that the telling of falsehoods is voluntary may also be present
in the Greek, term pseudes. There would be an ambiguity similar to that we find in comparing liar with its
definition as someone who tells falsehoods. See Weiss (1981, n. 4).
"This connection is observed by Mulhern (1968), who claims that Hippias wants po/ytropos to be a
tropos or distinguishing characteristic of behavior equivalent to pseudas. Socrates, in contrast, treats
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po/utropos as practically equivalent to pseudes seems quite a stretch from Homer's use
of the word. In addition, pseudcs need not be a descnptor of moral character any more
that polytmpos. ” It soon becomes cleat that Socrates doesn't think it is.
3 ,3t2 Being Good vs. Beinf? pood at Sompthing
That the meaning of agathos and its correlates is intentionally confused at the
beginning of the dialogue is confirmed by the way the arguments root that confusion out.
Having claimed that Homer thought the liar and truthful man to be different sorts of
people (a proposition to which he personally commits at 366a), Hippias concedes that
liars are powerful, intelligent, knowledgeable, and wise in the things they do as liars (365d
- 366a). The idea that the liar and truthful man are opposites is based on an assessment of
their moral character, however, while Hippias' concessions about liars' qualities are based
on an assessment of their skill. When the two assessments are mixed, there emerges the
odd conclusion that a person lacking wisdom and power could not be a liar (366b).
Hippias is unfazed by this conclusion, however, and the discussion proceeds.
Next it is established that the powerful person (i.e. one w'ho has a dunamis ),
barring external impediments, can do what he wishes. By way of example, Socrates points
out that Hippias' dunamis in the techne of arithmetic allows him to skillfully give
correct answers to mathematical problems. Then at 366d Socrates asks;
Soc.: Are you, then, merely wisest and most powerful, or are you also best
\aristos
] in those things in which you are most powerful and wisest, that is,
arithmetic?
Hip.: Best
[ aristas ] also, for sure, Socrates. (366d).
poJytropos and pseudas as a dunamis, or power, rather than a characteristic.
'^Smith (1996, n. 6) notes that pseudcs means only saying things that aren’t true and applies to people
like storytellers who have no intent to deceive. He thinks the argument is about ability to speak falsely not
about the character issue of intention to deceive.
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There is that Wily word ag^hos again. In this passage, Socrates asks whether being
,he
supreme practmoner of a grven tecj,„e makes Hippias "best." H.ppias, with no, a little
pride, answers tha, he is "best." Surely Hippias undemands that th,s "best" applies only
to the rechne in question, doesn't he? He realizes tha, being best .r someth.ng is
different from being best in a moral sense, doesn't he? Does he?
Remember that Hippias took the lac, tha, Achilles is truthful as evidence for his
being no, jus, a better speaker or soldier or strategist than Odysseus, Hippias took
Achilles' truthfulness as evidence for his being a betterman than Odysseus. Now
Socrates points ou, tha, since Hippias is best at arithmetic, he should be most able to tell
ruth about those things. Hippias agrees. Hippias' truthfulness is thus connected with
his being best and, since Hippias cites truthfulness as the reason Achilles is a better man
than Odysseus, Hippias may very well think that his truthfulness and technical ability
make him a better man in a moral sense. After all, Hippias boasted at 364a that he has
never met anyone superior to him in anything.
Next, Socrates shows that telling the truth best must also allow Hippias to lie the
best, since he wouldn't involuntarily tell the truth while trying to lie:
Soc.: Do you see, then, that the same person is both a liar and truthful
about these things, and the truthful person is no better than the liar? For, indeed,
now
person and the two are not complete opposites as you supposed just
Hip.: He does not appear to be, at least in this field. (367cd)
In the face of this counterintuitive conclusion, Hippias tries to limit its scope. He
concedes the conclusion for that particular field only. But Socrates is in luck because
Hippias turns out to be versed in a host of different technaL Socrates simply repeats his
line of questioning in reference to several of Hippias' other skills then asks whether he can
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think of any techne or epfstewe in which the liars and truthful men are distinct.
Hippias admits that he cannot:
Well, It has been demonstrated that both lying and honesty reside in the sameperson. It follows that if Odysseus was a liar, he is honest too, and vice versa for
Achilles: they are not different from each other, let alone opposite - they are
alike. Now do you see? (Waterfield translation, 369b)
The burst of frustration with which Hippias responds to this conclusion no doubt
reflects the response of much of Socrates' wider audience. The frustration is based on a
confusion between the moral and technical senses of lying and truthfulness.^^ Socrates'
line of reasoning is sound because he does make the distinction; he speaks about lying
and truthfulness purely in their technical senses as abilities belonging to the practitioners
of technai. The conclusion, when read as applicable to technai and not moral
character, is supported by Republic 333e - 334c and was accepted by Aristotle
( Nicomachean Ethics 1129a6-17). If it seems surprising that the supremely wise Hippias
can t see the distinction, remember what Socrates said about sophists in the Apoiogy
:
they mistakenly thought that their technical wisdom extended to things of "great
importance" (22cd).
:^3.3 Good Action vs. Competent Action
Socrates next serves up some Homeric quotations of his own that suggest Achilles
and not Odysseus to be pseudes. He then restates his question from a fresh state of
aporia :
“Mulhem (1968, p. 286) agrees: 'The credibility of the paradox which this line of argument purports to
establish — namely, that the same man is both false and true - depends throughout upon the failure to
dissociate dunamis - concepts from tropes - concepts."
^^Weiss (1981, p. 289) notes, in response to Mulhern, that Socrates accepts and uses pseudes in its
dunamis sense after 366b. Therefore, she concludes, "the assumption that edafhes and pseudes revert to
their tropes sense in the conclusion is not supported by the text, but seems to be based on nothing more than
that this is their ordinary sense." She then notes that when the words are read in their dunamis sense the
paradox of the conclusion vanishes.
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rm confused[airopcov] as to u hich of these two men was represented as better bv
thinking that both were "best and bravest" andrtat it's hard to discern wh“h isbetter, with regard both to lying and to truth, and to virtue fdpetficl as well- fm this also the two are quite similar. (370de) ^
Here, for the first time, is explicitly put forward as a criterion for determining which
is the better man. While Hippias seems to have had 3rete in mind all along. Socrates'
comments confirm the suspicion that he was somehow separating from lying and
truthfulness which he spoke of as abilities. He now claims that in 3wte as well, the two
men are similar.
Hippias' reply reflects his continuing frustration:
That's because you don't look at it right, Socrates. When Achilles lies, he's
portrayed as lying not on purpose but involuntarily, forced to stay and help by the
misfortune of the army. But the lies of Odysseus are voluntaiy and on purpose
By introducing the issue of voluntariness to the argument, Hippias confirms that his
concern is with a moral rather than a technical comparison of Achilles and Odysseus.
Until he makes a clear distinction between techne and arete, however, the addition of
voluntariness does not resolve his confusion about agathos. Socrates points out
(371a-d) that Achilles said different things to different people and even contradicted
himself in front of Odysseus, then asks Hippias whether this is not purposeful:
Hip.. It doesn t seem that way to me, Socrates. Rather in these things, too, it was
because of his guilelessness^® that he was led to say something different to Aias
"This IS not easily done according to Grube (1980, p. 217): 'The Greeks always tended to identify the
useful and the good, and the word arete was used to indicate both a particular excellence and virtue in general
. . . Hence the Socratic formula arose in a perfectly natural way; its first meaning was: 'to be good at something
IS a matter of knowledge' and then it came to mean ’ to be good is a matter of knowledge'. "
Smith (1996, n. 12) notes: "Two of the three surviving manuscripts of the HippiasMinor have the
word euetheias ("guileessness" or "simplicity") here. The Oxford Classical Text (J. Burnet, ed.) follows the
other surviving manusenpt in printing eunoias ("goodwill or kindness"). I have departed from the Oxford
Classical text here, for it seems clear that Achilles vacillates so publicly only because he is guileless. And the
dispute between Hippias and Socrates is not about whether or not Achilles is a man of goodwill - it is about
whether or not he is straightforward and without guile."
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and to Odysseus. But when Odysseus tells the
when he lies, it's the same. (371de)
truth, he always has a purpose, and
Again, Hippias' explanation of h.s tnterpre.ation shows that he is forctng moral meaning
onto an ambiguous word. There is a clear distinction between innocence and
incompetence. Being guileless or simple hardly seemsa good criterion for proving Achilles
the better man. The moral value of honesty depends on its ends - on principles. Naivete
may be endearing but it is a dubious virtue, as Socrates observes;
Soc.: Then it seems that Odysseus is better [d^eivcov] than Achilles after
Hip.: Not at all, surely, Socrates.
Soc.;^ Why not? Didn't it emerge just now that the voluntary liars are
better [Pe5\.xio\)(;] than the involuntary ones?
Hip.: But Socrates, how could those who are voluntarily unjust, and are
voluntary and purposeful evildoers be better [paxiot)q] than those who act that
way involuntarily? (371e - 372a)
This passage contains a subtle change in terminology that suggests a further move
toward the moral realm. Up to and including this statement at 371e, Socrates has used
ameinon to mean "better."^’ In his next sentence he uses beltion [peXxicov] which is
also a comparative of agathos meaning "better," but which generally has a moral
connotation. From this point on, ameinon and beJtion are used interchangeably which
further confuses the moral and non-moral senses of agathos. By using bettion to make
a point about voluntary liars being better than involuntaiy ones, Socrates seems to be
drawn into the confusion as well.
To me, Hippias, it appears entirely the opposite to what you say: those who harm
people and commit injustice and lie and cheat and go wrong voluntarily, rather
than involuntarily, are better [(3e>vXlo\)(;] than those who do so involuntarily.
However, sometimes I believe the opposite and I go back and forth about all this -
"This was tracked and noted by Hoerber (1962, p. 127)
"Hoerber (1962, p. 127) tracks the uses of comparatives awa/ion and heJt/on in the Hippias Minor
and suggests that one who errs willingly may be amanon (i.e. superior in craft, science or physical skills) but
not be/tion (i.e. in the realm of ethics); Hoerber concludes that it would be hard to prove that Plato had such a
distinction in mind, however.
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plainly because I don't know. But now at this moment a fit of lightheadedness has
er than those who do so involuntarily. I blame the precedine
fhSe tho
(372<S^
‘"''“Ittntanly are more worthless than those who do them voluntarily.
Socrates is confused because he's now making the same mistake Hippias made. He is
mixing the idea of morally better (indicated by his use of Ae/tjas ) with the results of the
preceding arguments, which focused on technical competence and left out moral issues.
Socrates goes on to mix moral language with technical examples in his argument
for the superiority of voluntariness (373c - 374e). The examples he uses ate physical
activities such as running, wrestling, seeing, walking, steering ships and playing musical
instruments, but the adjectives and adverbs applied have clear moral overtones. For
example, at 373d, it is agreed that one who runs slowly tuns badly and is a bad runner,
while one who runs quickly runs well and is a good runner. The words used to describe
the running and the runner, forms of agathos and kakos, are also used to describe the
moral nature of man.“ So when Socrates adds the even mote moralistic words aischron
[aictxpov, shameful] and poneros [jcovqpot;, worthless, morally bad, villainous] to
describe slow runner and his performance in a race at 373de, it becomes very confusing:
Soc.: So the good [cxyocGot^] runner voluntarily accomplishes this bad
[KaKOv] and shameful [aiaxpov] thing, and the bad runner, involuntarily?
Hip.: So it seems at least.
Soc.: In a race, then
,
one who accomplishes bad things [KaKOc]
involuntarily is more worthless [TCOVT^poxepOi;]^^ than one who does them
voluntarily. (373e)
These are statements that clearly mean one thing if the terms are taken in their moral
senses and something completely different if the terms are taken in their technical senses.
A more appropriate comparative for physical supenority might be kwittan. Hoerber ( 1 962, p. 1 27)
notes that Hippias misuses this word to refer to his Olympic success in non-physical competition.
“ Ponaros is also used in a noun form to indicate "villainy " at 368e5.
142
It IS instructive that Socrates here gives examples of physical prowess, or excellences of the
body, since
.snefe is an excellence of the soul. Socrates accentuates the contrast at 374ab:
What about in other physical activities? Isn't the physically better [pAtiaivl
person able to accomplish [Sbvaxai] both sorts of things: the strong and the
weak, the shameful [aicrxpot] and the fine [ko^xx]? So whenever he
accomplishes worthless [jcovtipot] physical results, the one who is physically
better [Pe>-Xltov] does them voluntarily, whereas the one who is worse
[7COVT)6repO(;] does them involuntarily? (374a b)
The discussion then shifts from physical activities to bodily organs and it is agreed
that having voice, feet, and eyes which allow one to voluntarily accomplish worthless
things is better than having organs which involuntarily function poorly (374d). From
bodily tools, the conversation then shifts to practical tools such as boat rudders, bows,
lyres, and flutes, and it is agreed that the best sorts of these, too, are those that allow
voluntary error rather than those that cause involuntary blunders. Significantly, all these
examples pertain to activities of the body rather than those of the soul. As such, their
scope is limited to the technical realm. Despite the moralistic language used and the
popular importance of athletic and technical success, the activities considered in this
section are decidedly non-moral. They are not the things of greatest importance that the
craftsmen mistakenly claim as part of their repertoire. Technai, including running and
lyre playing, may be performed well or poorly independent of the moral value of the
activity. Accordingly, these arguments, like the first, are sound only if interpreted from a
purely technical point of view.
13A The Argument Applied to the Soul
At 375a there is a subtle but significant move from the world of the physical to the
world of the soul. Socrates takes up the case of a horse which is both a tool and an
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ensouled bamg. Here we learn ,ha. the horse's soul and not ,ts physical qualities ntakes i,
a better tool and so with all other animals:
Soc.. With the better horse's soul, then, one would voluntarily do the“ Lrii^^ - wo’uid do
Hip.: Certainly. (375a)
The transition has here been made to the idea that a better soul makes for voluntary acts.
The better soul belongs to the beast at this point, presumably because what makes a beast
good IS the extent to which it obeys its master. Anyone who works with animals knows
that temperament is more important than physical strength and hence they look for
animals that are willing, well - mannered, and "have a lot of heart." Modem tendencies to
deny psychic qualities to animals may prevent us from seeing Socrates' point here, but
what makes a good animal are the ar^t3i of its soul. \We are now inching into the realm
of the human soul and the moral dimension of what makes a human being good.
At 375bc the argument finally takes up the issue of the human soul explicitly. It is
established that craftsmen, such as archers and doctors, have better souls if those souls
allow them to voluntarily act correctly or incorrectly in their craft
:
Soc.: As to the soul that plays the lyre and the flute better and does
everything else better in the crafts and the sciences -- doesn't it accomplish bad
and shameful things and miss the mark voluntarily whereas the more worthless
does this involuntarily?
Hipp.: Apparently. (375bc)
Now this apparent goodness of soul is only beneficial to the craftsman qua craftsman; it
does not determine the moral intention behind the technical activity. So although
Socrates is talking about a good human soul here, he still has not reached what he
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considers the important aspect of the soul: its moral dimension. The argument, if i, is to
be sound, remains on the technical level.^^
When Socrates proceeds to conclude that the best condition for our own souls is
one in which we voluntarily act badly (375cd), Hippias balks precisely because he is
thinking of moral and not technical activity;
rn o ,
Would we not wish to possess our own soul in the best
[peATiaXTiv] condition?
Hip.: Yes
Soc.: So will it be better [PeXticov] if it acts badly [KaKOupyfi] and misses
the mark voluntarily or involuntarily?
Hip.: But it would be terrible [5eiv6v], Socrates, if those who commit
injustice [o5iKO\)Vxe<;] voluntarily are to be better [(3eXxio\)c] than those who do
it involuntarily!
Soc.: But nonetheless they appear to be, at least given what's been said.
(375cd)
Hippias finally puts his cards on the table here and makes the move from craft to morality.
Whereas Socrates uses a relatively generic term derived from kakos for acting badly,
Hippias jumps to a form of adikos [otbiKOi^, unjust] which has a definite moral tone.
Justice is perhaps the supreme form of arete in the Socratic/Platonic scheme.
Socrates picks up Hippias' 'injustice' and runs through the argument with it. He begins by
noting that justice is a sort of power or knowledge, or both (375d), which connects justice
with the other technai like the lying, running, and geometry that they have been talking
about. This short argument concludes that:
Soc.: Whenever [the soul] accomplishes shameful [aiaxpd] results, it
does so voluntarily, by power [bbvapiv] and craft [xexvTiv], and these things
appear to be attributes of justice, either both or one of them.
Hip.: So it seems.
"in fact, the argument merely parallels the earlier argument about lying. Says Mulhem (1968): 'The
two senses of "voluntary" correspond exactly to the two senses distinguished above for each of po/utwpos,
pseudes, and dunatos //. When "voluntary" is taken to indicate what is in our power, it is used of a duna/ms
concept; when it is taken to indicate what we [normallyl wish or desire, it is used of a tropos concept."
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Soc.: And to do injustice is to do bad, whereas to refrain from
to do something fine [koaoc].
Hip.: Yes.
injustice is
Soc.t So the more powerful [5vvaT(0T^a] and better [dpcivcovl soul
mvoluntarilyr''*'"'"’
worthless [trovnpoc] soul
Hip.: Apparently. (376a)
This argument depends on the conditions stated at 375de that justice be a power
( dunarms ) or knowledge ( episteme ), or both. But these words were earlier considered
as qualities belonging to a practitioner of a techne. It was Hippias that inserted justice
into the argument arriving at a conception of justice as a dunamis and techne that
allows a soul to commit injustice voluntarily - as with any other craft. This argument
takes another step toward unacceptability by further confusing arete and techne. If the
doing of justice is construed purely in its technical sense as the ability to accomplish
certain acts, there is still no conflict.
3.3.5 The Good Man
At 375b, Socrates makes the radical shift from talking about crafts and powers of
the soul to the indisputably moral topic of the good man. He establishes that the good
man is one who has a good soul and the bad man one who has a bad soul. Applying the
previous argument to this premise, he concludes that the good man does injustice
voluntarily while the bad man does it involuntarily. But it was just established at 376a
that doing injustice is bad - voluntary or not. So there is a clear conflict picked up by
Hippias and Socrates which disallows them from accepting the conclusion:
So the one who voluntarily misses the mark and does what is shameful and unjust,
Hippias -- that is, if there is such a person — would be no other than the good man.
(376b)
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There is much speculat.on about why this ccnclus.on is unpalatable to Socrates and
Hippias and to what extent. Some commentators have concluded that Plato and Socrates
are m a genuine aporia. This conclusion requires that Socrates agree with all the
premises including the technical description of the good man^' and the equivalence of
techne and arete.
The phrase "if there is such a person," however, suggests an effort by Socrates to
personally dissociate himself from the conclusion.^^ It is plausible that Socrates does not
agree with one or more of the premises, most of which were suggested conditionally or as
articulations of Hippias' position. I have been suggesting that Socrates wants to
distinguish arete, which he sees as a moral quality, from techne, which he sees as a
power independent from morality. I take the fact that Aristotle clearly distinguishes moral
wisdom or phronesis and its corresponding product praxis from technical knowledge
or episteme and its product poesis at Nichomachean Ethics 1140b3-7 as evidence that
he understood the HippiasMinor 's educational lesson.^® Indeed the argument at
Weiss (1981, p. 304) argues that: " Ho Agathos of the Hippias Minor is thus not the standard
agathos who is judged on the ba.sis of his actions. Since the agent in this dialogue is judged solely on the basis
of his skill, things may be said with impunity about this man that could not be said so freely about the ordinary
iio agathos. We need only bear in mind that ho agathos here is 'the man skilled at justice’ - not the 'just
man.” Note that saying a man may be skilled at justice assumes justice is a techne.
“ Kraut ( 1 984, p. 3 1 3), for example, takes Socrates' dilemma at the end of the Hippias Minor to be
genuine because he attributes an equivalence between virtues and crafts to Socrates which implies that the
voluntary wrongdoer in virtue must be better, just as the voluntary’ wrongdoer in archery is. Irwin (1995, p. 70)
says: Socratic psychological eudaemonism makes it easy to believe that the logical possibility raised by the
Hippias Minor creates no difficulty for the identification of virtue with craft. . . then the point of the Hippias
Minor is not to cast doubt on the identification of virtue with crafts, but to show that we must accept
psychological eudaemonism. ”
‘"Hoerber (1962, p. 128) identifies this phrase ciper tis cstin otitos as a warning Plato uses to show
personal disagreement with the premises being discussed. Other uses of the phrase include Euthyphro 7d, 8e
and Gordias 480e.
Hoerber (1962, p. 127, n. I) notes that Play employs poiein and ergazesthai in Hippias Minor,
avoiding pratteih throughout. These verbs are distinguished at Charmidos (162a, 163e-d ) in order to
differentiate tcchnai and ethics. This suggests that Socrates doesn’t think he's discussing ethics in Hi. Mi.
Contrast Irwin ( 1 995, p. 7 1 ) who says that Socrates has a chance to make a distinction similar to
Aristotle when Critias distinguishes poeiosis and praxis at Channides 163a - c, but he doesn't because he
thinks virtue is a techne. Irwin takes Aristotle’s comments at Nicowachean Ethics 1 140b21 (quoted above)
as criticism of Socrates' failure to distinguish productive knowledge from practical wisdom in
;
he sees Hippias
Minor and Charniides as errors on Plato’s part.
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Gojgi^s 460c ff„ which parallels Hippies Minor 366c ff„ lacks soundness precisely on
the basis of the premise that justice is a techne.
Justice, at least as Socrates and Plato normally describe it, does not allow the
cntenon, denved from the nature of techne, of voluntaiy incompetence. While a
techne allows its practitioners to produce contrary results, as Aristotle noticed,'" justice
does not. A doctor may purposely misdiagnose an ailment or perform unnecessaiy surgery
for his own financial gain and he would still be practicing his techne. " The Hippiss
Minor conclusion stated that the man who is voluntarily unjust must be the good man
(376b), but being good in this sense can't be the same as being just. It must mean being
good at the doing of just (and therefore also unjust) things. But while medicine is a
techne and a doctor's actions are often just, what makes those actions and hence their
practitioner just is some other principle that determines the intention and goals behind the
actions. The lifesaving removal of an inflamed appendix is no different, in terms of
technical skill, than the self-serving removal of a healthy appendix for personal gain. The
relative justice of the tu'o surgeries is quite different, however.
The Hippias Minor makes a key point about the relationship between arete and
techne for Plato's educational project. In the first place, arete may be a species of
techne, or analogous to a techne, but there are crucial differences between arete and
common technai such as medicine, running, and ship-building. At the minimum, a
person with arete does not do unjust or morally shameful things voluntarily whereas
practitioners of technai may skillfully apply their technai to misdeeds. Socrates' famous
**This was noticed by Santas (1979, p. 152); Justice is compared to techne at Gorgjas 464b - 466a.
Nicowachean Ethics 1 129a6 - 17, quoted above.
Contrast Tiles ( 1 984, p. 53) who argues that a doctor who does unnecessary surgery for his own
financial gain is not, in Plato's view, acting as a doctor. I think that Plato recognizes that the doctor’s medical
techne does not affect the moral aspect of his action, but you can hardly say that in doing surgery, necessary or
not, the doctor is not using his medical skill. Plato’s point is that the moral element present in the intention
behind the action is separate from the technical skill and must be developed separately.
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dem^lo! then, might be the only distinction between and needed
to avoid the Hippias Minor's troublesome conclusion/^
More IS at stake, however. A corollaiy to Socrates’ denial of akrasia is his belief
that arete is intimately connected to knowledge and so wrongdoing is done out of
ignorance.^^ We know from Ion 536e - 541a that are separate and involve
separate bodies of knowledge. The knowledge corresponding to arete, then, will be
separate from the knowledge corresponding to any particular skill. By all counts (as I
show in Chapter 4) arete requires a knowledge of good and evil. Whereas technical
knowledge, such as knowing what will heal a patient, does not automatically imply
performance in accordance with that knowledge, knowing the good does imply acting in
accordance with it.
Plato s educational point in Ion and Hippias Minor is not to eliminate practical
and poetic training, rather such training must be accompanied by a separate effort to
develop arete. Practical technai, when accompanied by arete, will be put in the
service of the good. But having a practical techne - indeed having a boatload of them
as Hippias does (368b) - does not guarantee the just use of such skill anymore than
knowing Homer allows Ion to lead Athens into battle. Arete cannot be acquired simply
by learning technical skills or by memorizing words. From the poets and the sophists,
then, a student might learn skills that yield popular approval and political and financial
success. Money can't buy arete, however, and anyone who offers it for sale is mistakenly
confusing literary and practical skill with moral excellence.
'^Guthrie (1975, p. 198) concludes that the Hippias Minor is a reductio argument defending the
Socratic denial of akrasia. See also Penner (1973a, p. 135) who concludes that Socrates' denial of akrasia is
necessary for understanding how virtue can be a techne.
"See, (or example Gorgias 460b-d, 509e and Protagoras 345c, 360d.
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CHAPTER 4
A NEW VIEW OF ARETE IN C/MRAfTDES AND LACHES
When my sons are grown, Gentlemen, exact a penalty of them; give pain to them
exactly as I gave pain to you, if it seems to you that they care more for wealth or
anything thari they care for virtue. And if they seem to be something and are
” U
^ rebuked you, because they do not care for what they
themselves something and are worth nothing. And
should you do that, both I and my sons will have been justly dealt with at yourhands. ( 41e- 42a) ^
It is telling that Socrates wanted his sons to pursue only aicte [dpexfl, virtue], to
forget about appearances, and to abandon complacency - and that he thought his style of
inquiry and examination might achieve that end. As I argued in Chapter 1
,
awte was
the traditional goal of education in ancient Greece and Plato accepted that goal. His
conception of what arete was and how it could be achieved differed significantly from
the tradition, however, and in Charmides and Laches these differences boldly emerge.
Having established in Hippias Minor the difference between being good and being good
at something, Plato here shows how true arete must be distinguished from the fame,
glory, success, and popular esteem traditionally associated with virtue. The drive to
distinguish arete from its mere appearance leads Plato to intellectualize, unify, and
ultimately to idealize the quality as a kind of health of the soul. This revised conception,
in turn, demands a novel approach to education.
4.1 Reshaping Conceptions of Arete in Charmides and Laches
In the Charmides and Laches, Plato challenges traditional education to look
inward instead of outward in its seach for arete. The various interlocutors, who here
represent traditional conceptions of arete, tend to confuse the appearance of or
reputation for arete with its actual presence in a person's soul. The kaion [to KOt^v,
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beauty] associated with the handsome youth Charmides, for example, is based more on
his physical appearance, breeding, and social manners than on some intrinsic quality of
his soul. It is the connection between arete and to kaJon, agreed upon by all, that
allows Socrates to reveal arete as an invisible quality of the soul. Arete is confirmed not
by the approval and honors of ones peers, but by the divine judgment of the gods.
4J..1 Looking for Arete in All the Wrong Places
The opening sections of both Laches and Charmides criticize traditional
conceptions of arete. Some of Plato’s strongest tools in this criticism are his characters,
each of whom represents a particular tradition and exhibits its flaws as well as his own in
a dramatic prophecy of collapse. Plato is critical not only of the way these characters
approach and perform in the dialectic, but also of their personal methods for gaining and
revising definitions. Laches, Nicias, Charmides, and Critias are, in addition, some of
Plato's most famous interlocutors and he ties their future failures in life to the character
flaws revealed by Socrates' examination. Whether or not these meetings or conversations
ever took place, the reality of their possibility cannot help but enhance Plato's point.
Critias and Charmides' terrible future as members of the Thirty Tyrants would
have been known to Plato's original audience and hangs heavy over their discussion of
temperance. The traditionally aristocratic tendency to preserve appearance and
reputation above all, deters Critias and Charmides from the kind of soul-baring inquiry
required to cultivate arete. Charmides, in his attempts to define the sophrosune he
allegedly possesses, thinks only of how others see him. Critias proposes definitions he
thinks that Socrates will praise, rather than accounts he takes to heart. When Critias asks
whether Socrates agrees with his proposal, Socrates reminds him:
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. . .we are not investigating what I think but rather what you now say. (163e)‘
Likewise in the Uches. Nicias commences his examination by offering what he
takes to be Socrates' own definition (194d); this after Lysimachus opened the dialogue by
deriding such behavior:
Now there are some people who make fun our frankness and if anyone asks their
^ u 1 ’u ‘ ^ ®hot at what the other manwould like to hear and say something different from their own opinion. (178ab)
Laches is the best of the interlocutors at giving his true opinion, a reflection perhaps of his
courage m inquiry. Once refuted, however, he is seized by the desire for victory and
scrambles belligerently to avoid losing face in front of Nicias and the others (194ab).
A popular way to preserve one's reputation in a discussion with Socrates is to
dissociate oneself from the propositions he refutes. This phenomenon allows Socrates to
refute commonly-held or traditional opinions in the course of examining a single person,
but It also shows the ancient Greeks' inability to separate their own views from those
acquired through poetry, literature, or sophistic indoctrination (see sec. 1.2.1). At 156a,
Socrates asks Charmides whether he will take his advice with or without permission.
"With it, of course," Charmides replies, laughing. But Charmides' friend, Critias, turns out
to be a regular idea-pirate. When Charmides mocks Critias with a definition's failure,
Critias betrays himself as its source by saying.
Do you suppose, Charmides, that just because you don't understand what in the
world the man meant who said that temperance was 'minding your own business',
the man himself doesn't understand either? (162d)
These words are soon proven to be hypocritical when Critias himself fails to explain this
definition and others he borrowed from Hesiod and the inscription at Delphi. Laches' first
'All translations of CJiamudes and Laches are by Sprague (1992) unless otherwise noted.
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definition, likewise, was borrowed from poetiy, and Nicias' ideas come from Socrates
(194d) and Damon by way of Prodicus (197d).
The problem with this system of borrowed wisdom - which was a hallmark of
poetic education - is tha, i, fails to demand the evaluation and renect.on necessaiy ,o
make an opinion truly one's own.
-^ocrates asks his interlocutors to look inside themselves
for answem (159a, 160d), or at least to thoroughly question any opinions they acquire
from so-called experts. Therefore, he challenges Nicias' pack rat approach to knowledge,
which involves picking up ideas from various wisemen and adopting them without
question or reflection. Socrates is so annoyed by Nicias' unquestioning acceptance of
ideas that he asks directly whether Nicias has any views of his own:
Socrates: ... Do you agree with this or have you some other view on the
Nicias: I agree with this one. (198c)
subject?
Nicias' docility may make him popular - remember that Socrates' insistence on
examination and inquiry made him a hated man (^Apology 21e) - but it won't help him
to achieve anete. Nicias accuses Laches of an external focus at 200b:
It strikes me that you're behaving in a t5rpically human way ~ you keep an eye on
others, but you never take a good look at yourself. (200b, Watt translation)
This criticism is profitably turned back on Nicias himself. Reliance on external sources for
knowledge turns out to be Nicias' critical failing, historically as well as in the dialogue; his
reliance on seers was a notorious cause of his downfall at Sicily.^ Once Nicias has
distinguished knowledge of the fearful and hopeful from technical knowledge, Socrates
asks Laches whether he understands. Laches replies prophetically:
Yes I do " he is calling the seers the courageous. Because who else will know for
whom it is better to live than to die? What about you, Nicias -- do you admit to
being a seer, or, if you are not a seer, to not being courageous? (195e)
^See Thucididcs (vii, 50); this point noted by Sprague (1992, n. 57) and Devereux (1977, p. 134).
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Laches' shortcomings in the dialogue reflect his personal shoncomings as well.
Recall that Laches counted the
.mntensity of the odds to be faced rather than the nob.lity
of the goal in judging the courage exhibited in action. His eventual death on the
battlefield at Mantinaea was no doubt atfnbutable to that sort of courage. Similarly, the
"courage" Laches shows in inquirj- is based not on the desire lor truth, or the good, or for
3rete as Socrates hopes, but rather "an absolute desire for victory [<paoviKta]”(194a).
Predictably, Laches becomes combative in the argument and then disinterested when he
sees little hope for victory over Nicias(197e). At Symposium 221ab, Alcibiades
compares Socrates' andmiu favorably to Laches' in the retreat from Delium. Here in the
pursuit of arete. Socrates emerges the more andteios again. It is Socrates' revised
conception of arete that accounts for his continuous display of it.
Plato’s criticism of the aristocratic, poetic, military, and sophistic attitudes toward
arete in Laches and Charmides can be generalized as an accusation of confusing the
appearance of arete with its presence in a person or action. The aristocrats failed to see
that arete was neither transmitted genetically nor manifested in a man's beauty. The
poets and warriors failed to see that the actions that brought a man fame didn't always
represent his most admirable choices. And the sophists learned that there was more to
arete than the technical skill that wins hollow prizes such as wealth, esteem, and
elections. This indictment of traditional conceptions of arete is also an indictment of
traditional approaches to education. By revising the popular idea of what arete is, Plato
is revising the idea of how it might be achieved through education.
Lest this effort to keep up appearances seem outrageously hollow behavior for the
interlocutors, it should be remembered that most Ancient Greeks would have considered
Laches' battlefield valor, Charmides physical beauty, Lysimachus' wealth, Melesias'
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athletic skill and Critias' political promtnence to be real signs of ’ This was due to
a combmation of factors including the aristocratic tradition, democatic reforms, and
Athens’ dependence on the military for rts sumval.^
-ftere was little or no distinction
between a public reputation of .ne/c and some internal quality that produces virtuous
behavior. Accordingly, traditional education focused on the military, political, and
rhetorical skills that cultivated the reputation for a^,e. rather than the soul.
By the time he wrote the Republic, Plato was still fighting the battle between
reality and appearance:
tehew tThe "hat theybelr ve o b so, even rf they aren't really so, and they act, acquire, and form xheit
to beto'
satisfied to acquire things he merely believesgood, however, but everyone wants the things that really uk good anddrsdarns those that are merely believed to be so. (Grube translation, 505d)
One need not look further than and Chumides, however, to see where Socrates
and Plato thought the tradition wrong and set out to revise it.
4,1.2 Examining the Aristocratic Ideal of in Charm,
In chapter 1, 1 explained the aristocratic belief that arete is a product of breeding
that manifests itself in a man's physical beauty. An aristocratic man was not just kalos
[KO^oq, beautiful or fine], but kaJos tekagathos [KoXoq xe KayaGo^, beautiful and
good]. Ka/os and kagatkos are words specifically connected with They were
even combined to form a single word, kaJokagathia [KoXomyaGia] which described a
man who was both good to look at and manifested his goodness in action.^ The
^Sce Sprague's (1992) character descriptions.
'For more on these issues see sections 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 above, and Dover, (1974, p. 161): "The
continued existence of a Greek city-state depended ultimately on the military qualities of its adult male citizens.
. . It is not surprising, therefore, that an archaic mode of indicating that a man was all that a man should be
confined itself to two aspects of his character, his valor on the battlefield and his wisdom in discussion (sc. of
tactics, organization, and other matters relevant to war).”
^ Lysis is said to be such at Lysis 207a.
^Sec Dover, (1974, p. 41).
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anstocratic theory that ^j^re was transmitted genetically receives a blow at the opening
of the Uches. however, when Lysimachus laments that he and Melesias have failed to
inherit the of their fathers (179a ff.).' In the Charmidcs. however, Charmides’
beauty and breeding are taken to be indicators of his amte:
his Charmides not only outstripsr contemporanes rn beauty of form but also in this very thing for which you sotyou have the charm; it was temperance, wasn't it?"
"Yes, indeed it was," I said.
fU reputation of beingthe most temperate young man of the day, but that he is second to none in
everything else appropriate to his age."
II T
Charmides, that you should be superior to the rest in
all such things, I replied, "because I don't suppose that anyone else here could so
readily point to two Athenian families whose union would be more likely to
produce a more aristocratic lineage than that from which you are sprung. Your
ather's family, that of Critias, the son of Dropides, has been praised for us by
Anacreon,, Solon, and many other poets for superior beauty, virtue, and eveiything
else called happiness. It's the same on your mother's side.
.
." (157d - 158a)
Whereas Critias takes Charmides' "reputation" for sophrosune [aco(ppoa\)VTi,
temperance, self-control] - a form of arete - as clear evidence for his possession of it,
Socrates description of Charmides' uncle's "reputation" for aiete makes no such leap.
For while Socrates admits that Charmides has inherited physical beauty, he adds:
But if, in addition, you have a sufficient share of temperance and the other
attributes mentioned by your friend here, then your mother bore a blessed son in
you, my dear Charmides. (158ab, italics mine)
The dialogue will show that Charmides indeed may have the kind of sophmsune
identified with a reputation for it, but he has not inherited the intrinsic sophrosune
Socrates cares about. At 158bc, Socrates asserts that if sophrosune is present in
Charmides he won't need to be "charmed" by Socrates, but at 176b, Charmides admits
that he is very much in need of that charm.
'Sec also Protagoras 319e where famous fathers have failed to pass their arete to their sons.
156
Charmides' response to Socrates' question about whether he thinks himself
temperate shows straight away that he ts most concerned about appearances and the
judgments of others:
with the many others to whom, by his account, I appear to be tempemt; BuHf
apjL?dttestfut So I d“ 't?' “hpear dista e l. on t know how I am to answer. (158d)
It looks as though Charmides habitually offers whatever answer is most pleasing to othem.
Now he’s in a pickle because he doesn't want to contradict those to whom he appears
temperate and doesn't want to appear immodest by praising himself. Charmides looks
around at the others in deliberating his answer, rather than looking inside himself,
Socrates therefore exhorts Charmides to look inside for sopAjvsune and after
initially shying away he reluctantly defines it as quietness (159b) - a definition
commentatois have recognized as traditionally aristocratic.* Having secured the boy’s
agreement that sophrosune is ksjos (159c), Socrates proceeds to apply Charmides'
definition of quietness to various physical activities such as writing, boxing, and running,
to show that such bodily things are actually less kalos when done quietly or slowly
(159d). The argument then progresses toward the soul and mental activity, with Socrates
concluding:
And, further, in the operations of thought and in making plans, it is not the
quietest man, I think, and the man who plans and finds things out with difficulty
who appears to be worthy of praise but the one who does these things most easily
and quickly. (160ab)
See North (1966
,
p. 156), who calls Charmides and Critias' definitions "the four traditional
definitions." See also Watt (1987, p.l83), and Santas (1973, p. 107), who concludes: "Plato is clearly taking on
a venerable tradition and trying to show, as he does in many early dialogues, that the traditional definitions of
the virtues are inadequate."
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/s in
Bu, is the man who to be t^los. and therefore praiseworthy, always
fact worthy of praised Charmtdes. react.on to the conCus.on that cu.chness ts more
admtrable than quietness is: [..vboveuet, it seems so](160b). Plato's
choice of term here is telling because W.../ also means to run a risk or hazard: it
implies danger and indeed there ts danger in what Channides agrees to. In "decid.ng” that
quickness makes an action admirable. Charmides and Socrates admit that the external
appearance of an action reveals its worth or beauty ( tok.Ion ). Socrates’ admonition at
160b that the conclusion applies only "as far as this aigument is concerned" hints that
they might do better to begin again with another definition of sophnx,une. Again, he
exhorts Charmides to "look inside yourself with greater concentration" (160d), but
Charmides' next definition, that of modesty, is also based upon the perceptions of his
peers. Again, it fails to transcend the aristocratic identity between the reputation for
anete and the actual possession of it.
The focus then switches to Critias who, though he denies it, supplies Charmides
with the next definition for sophrosune
, minding one's own business. Critias, too, is
more worried about how he appears before Charmides and the group, than what he can
learn from Socrates:
Now Cntias had clearly long been champing at the bit in his eagerness to impress
am himself up until then, and this was the last straw. I think it's absolutely
heard his answer about self-control. So Charmides, who did not want to explainthe answer himself, but to have Critias do it, kept tiying to provoke him and
pointing out that he had been refuted. This was too much for Critias. It appeared
to me as though he had got irritated with Charmides, just as a poet might do with
an actor who treated his poetiy badly. So he gave him a look and said 'Is that
what you think, Charmides? That if don't know what on earth the man
meant who said that doing one's own job was self-control, he doesn't know
either?' (Watt translation, 162cd)
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Socrates thus lures Critias into the argument by exploiting his own aristocratic concern for
reputation. Though he doesn't really expect Critias to have the answer, Socrates adopts a
popular voice and says that Charmides' ignorance is excusable because of his youth, but
the more experienced Critias should be able to explain the saying. In the ensuing
conversation - which will be examined in detail below - Critias is clearly more interested
in saving his reputation than discovering what sophiosune is. He changes his definition
repeatedly In an effort to avoid Socrates' objections, and when he reaches a state of
apon'a, his pride won't let him admit it:’
But since [Critias'] consistently high reputation made him feel ashamed in the eyes
of the company and he did not wish to admit to me that he was incapable of
ealing with the question I had asked him, he said nothing clear but concealed his
predicament. (169c)
4«l t3 Exanuning the Heroic ~ Military Ideal of Amt^ in rjirht^f:
Just as the well-born Charmides' first definition of sophiosune reflected a
traditional aristocratic account, the definition the of the virtue andieia [dv5peio,
manliness, bravery, courage] offered by the famous general. Laches, reflects traditional
poetic and military values. Where Charmides and Critias were concerned with social
behavior and acceptance. Laches is concerned with military behavior and victory. Laches'
basic failure to differentiate between arete and its external appearance, however, is
nearly identical to the opening account of Charmides.
Laches, a general renowned for his valor on the battlefield, declares that he has no
difficulty saying what courage is:
... if a man is willing to remain at his post and to defend himself against the
enemy without running away, then you may rest assured that he is a man of
courage. (190e)
’ Santas (1973, p. 108) notes; "Critias, it seems, will say anything to get out of trouble."
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Th,s definition ts a fair paraphrase of the poet Tyrataeus, a favorite of the Spartans whom
Laches professes to admire (182e ff.). At 12, 1-18, Tyrateus connects
.r.,.
With battlefield valor, and specifically with the ability to stand one's ground. Similarly, in
the Iliad, a hero best proves his arete by standing firm against the enemy.'" It was the
reputation earned by such battlefield heroics that counted as in the poet.c trad.tion
and reputation for ara,e was perhaps the greatest thing a man could have; he would do
nearly anything to preserve it." On this traditional view, a:^re is something granted by
one's peers or one's government. For example, an epigraph commemorating the Athen.ans
who fell at Potidaea states that "having placed their lives onto the scale, they received
aaete m return."'^ Furthermore, those whose battlefield heroics were preserved in the
words of a poet achieved a kind of immortality." Given all of this, it's not surprising that
Uches fails to distinguish courage from a courageous man who has behaved a certain way
in battle.^^
In addition to its poetic inspiration, Laches' fii^t definition reflects the importance
of observable heroic actions in determining arete in a warrior society. Nicias' speech at
182a reflects the practical emphasis on military skill and the political importance of
skilled soldiers in 5th century Greece. A man who stands his ground in battle is essential
to the survivalof the state and so he is considered virtuous, whether the act was caused by
spmtual courage or by his boots being stuck in the mud. Either way the act looks the
same from the outside and has the same effect for the state. Likewise, it is only because of
Socrates deeds on the battlefield at Delium, which Laches experienced firsthand (181b),
that the general is willing to talk to him about aiete :
'“Sec Snell (1982, p. 171 - 174).
"See Beck (1964, p. 56).
'^Sce Nchamas (1985, p. 300).
‘“Sec Snell (1982, p. 164).
"A point noted by Stokes (1986), and Sprague (1992, n. 37).
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Now I have no acquaintance with the words of Socrates, but before now I believehave had expenence of his deeds, and there I found him a pemon pSLd lop ak fair words and to indulge in eveiy kind of frankness. So if he^possesses thisabi ty too, I am in sj^pathy with the man, and 1 would submit to bemrexamtaedby such a person with the greatest pleasure.
.
.
(188e - 189a)
Since ^rere means excellence, a man’s proficiency on the battlefield is a reasonable
criterion for his overall excellence in a warring world. In accordance with the Homeric
ideal of ^rete. Uches emphasizes a man's usefulness in battle, capacity for action, and
earned reputation over any internal qualities he might possess.*^
The mistake that Laches and the militaiy-poetic tradition make is parallel to the
mistake that Charmides and the aristocratic tradition made - they limit themselves to a
purely external conception of Before citing a military instructor's failure in battle
as evidence for his lack of 3/cte, Laches says outright that his obscivation of the man's
conduct in battle is what "makes it possible" to judge his arete (183c). It is not
surpnsmg, therefore, that Socrates accommodates Laches' insistence on action-evidence in
his objection to the first definition by pointing out that his heroic action at Delium was a
retreat. Although retreating soldiers are rarely glorified in battlefield hymns and lore,
history has shown them to be successful in battle. Having pointed out that if others had
emulated Socrates' retreat at Delium the city would have avoided disaster (181b), Laches
now finds himself in a pickle.^* Whereas Charmides learned that while quietness might
bring popularity, it was not always kalos, Laches discovers that boldness may lead to a
reputation for courage by sacrificing victory. Under Socratic examination, both men are
failed by their traditional conceptions of aiete.
All this concern about reputation and appearance not only deters people from
talking with Socrates, it also leads to an avoidance of apoiia once the conversation has
See Snell (1982, p. 158).
“a point not explicit in the text, but noted by many astute readers including Santas (1971, p. 185).
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begun. After learning that Lysimachus valued his friendship with Socrates' father
precisely because they had never disagreed (180e), Nicias feels compelled to warn him
about Socrates' habit of interrogating men about their personal lives (187d ff.). Being
reduced to aporia in front of an audience can easily damage a man's reputation.^^ Nicias
thinks that it is worth putting up with Socrates' treatment anyway, and he is summarily
mocked by Laches for trying to hide his perplexity:
So it looks to me as though Nicias is not prepared to be a gentleman and admit
when he's talking nonsense: he's twisting and turning to hide the fact that he's
baffled [ocTCopicxv]. You and I could have twisted in the same way just now if
we d wanted not to look as though we were contradicting ourselves. If we were
arguing in court, there'd be some excuse for such behavior, but when we're having
a friendly conversation like this, why would anyone waste time dressing himself up
with such {Laches, Lane translation, 196ab)
Critias, too, refuses to admit his aporia at 169c. At Apology 23de Socrates claims that
his prosecutors make false accusations precisely in an effort to "not seem at a loss;" that is,
they are avoiding aporia. Such resistance shows how overconcem with apperances is a
key obstacle to the pursuit of aiete.
4J,4 Craftsmen. Wisemen and the Kalon Connection
In both Charmides and Inches, later definitions connect arete with the mind
or soul.^® As I showed in chapter 1, Socrates shared his intellectualism with the sophists,
but differed from them sharply on the role of the intellect in aiete. Whereas the sophists'
belief that arete was intellectual excellence led them to assert that it could be taught,
Socrates' account of arete and its teachability is much more complex. With his
‘^This is part of the reason eristic skills were so important; see chapter 1.
‘“Santas (1973, p. 1 10) notes that in "Socratic and Platonic attempts to define the virtues: there is a
movement discernible in the list from definitions in terms of behavior or conduct to definitions in terms of
properties of the soul." He also claims (p. 1 18) that "in the second round of \ LacJics and Charmides ]
Socrates is examining his own favorite doctrines."
‘“Sec Jaeger (1939, p. 292).
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examination of intellectualist definitions of .retc in Ch^rmidcs and Uches. Plato
differentiates the doctrines of rival soph.sts while exploring the consequences of Socrates’
views.
At Apology 30ab, Socrates exhorts people to care, not for money or body, but for
^retc of the soul. Accordingly. Plato faulted the sophists lor failing to distinguish
.rt-re
from technical skills which, though designed to achieve reputation, wealth, or political
success, lacked the absolute conception of moral good and evil required lor true a^te.
Nicias echoes the sophistic connection between practical skills and arete at 182bc, when
he theorizes that instruction in armored fighting will make a man courageous (and
enhance hts appearance). There are repeated attempts in the Chaimides and laches to
highlight the difference between arete and techne. each of which turns on the
requirement that virtuous action be kalos.
When Socrates asks Laches to expand his account of courage to non-militaiy
cases, Laches comes up with a definition of andreia as endurance (192bc). Socrates
then gets Laches to commit to the principle that andreia is kalos and pushes him to
revise his definition to phronimos [(ppovipoq, wise, prudent, thoughtful] endurance
(192d), since foolish endurance could not be kaJos. Laches proceeds to claim that the
actions of a prudent investor, doctor, or soldier do not represent andreia, whereas those
of people who persevere despite their lack of relevant skills do exhibit andieia.
Santas (1971, p. 194) noticed rightly that what Laches misses in his judgment of
these examples is an analysis of the agent's values. To put a similar point in the terms of
my own argument, what Laches misses is the internal criteria for to kalon. He judges
these agents just as he judges soldiers — on the external appearance of their actions. The
inept diver is somehow more andreios than the skilled one because, other things being
163
equal, he faces greater odds. Bu, Cher th.ngs are ..r equal. At 192e, Socrates asks
whether wise endurance encompasses knowledge of "great and small" things.^ But
Uches only considers "small" things in h.s judgment of the examples; he focuses on the
particular tcchnai of the agents and ignores the gmater issue of the nobility of their
goals.^^
At 192cd, it is pointed out explicitly that andmfa is a noble or kahs thing. It
IS this fact that makes Laches' judgment of the examples inconsistent with the conception
of and,.ia agreed upon at 193d. This is because Laches ignores the internal criteria on
which the kaJon of the action hinges. The investor who raises money to buy more slaves
is morally different from the investor who raises money to feed hungiy children. The
unskilled diver, to use Santas' (1971) example, who plunges into a well to save a drowning
child's hfe IS certainly not foolish and docs not lack arete. The knowledge that makes an
act of endurance wise is not the craft-knowledge Laches recognizes, but a higher-order
knowledge which ~ as we shall see in the next section - may be exactly the amte
Socrates exhorts others to pursue.
In Chaimides, Cntias fails in a similar way to distinguish technical from moral
knowledge. In his Hesiod-based distinction between working and doing (163bc), Critias
recognizes that actions "accompanied by the admirable ( tokalon )" are favorably
distinguished from others. His faulty interpretation leads him to a strange conclusion:
yiastos (1994, p. 1 13-1 14) takes Socrates' distinction between great and small things to separate
practical from moral goods; "If it had dawned on Laches that the goods such people [doctors, divers, generals,
etc.] can procure would count as anything but 'great,' [hence moral] he would have seen that his proposal that
courage is wise endurance was proof against the counterexamples To miss this cue [When Socrates says
knowledge of all things, great and small?'] was to betray that he really did not understand the import of 'wise'
in wise^cndurance : in thinking that he did know, he was self-deceiv^, a victim of the conceit of knowledge."
Gould (1987, p. 273) points out that "the ambiguity over the syntactic role of "wisely" (or "unwisely")
- whether, that is, it modifies "persevering" or "(p-ing" - is evident in the Greek text [at Laches 192e]
The ambiguity eludes Laches, however, as docs Socrates' point about persevering. Thus, in the ensuing
examples, Socrates speaks of cp-ing as what is done (un)wisely, because that is how Laches views the situation
and Socrates is, after all, drawing out the implication of Laches' definition."
164
We ought to represent [Hesiod] as thinking that only things of this sort
belong toPeop e. ^e result is that we must suppose that Hesiod and any other manf sense calls the man who minds his own business temperate. (163c)
In this sense, being temperate amounts to disowning one's bad actions. Like Laches,
Cntias fails to see that the Jr^/on of an action depends on some internal state of the
agent. On Critias' account, actions happen, are judged externally for their success or
popularity, then disowned if judged to be bad.
Cntias' next definition of temperance as doing good things (163e) looks more
promising despite its Lachean emphasis on action. Socrates suspects that Critias is still
failing to look inside, however, and asks whether temperate men would then be ignorant
of their temperance. The illustrative example, which closely resembles an example put to
Laches at 192e, again shows that the of an action depends on something inside
the agent beyond technical knowledge. Socrates explains that a doctor's knowledge of
what will make a body healthy is not necessarily accompanied by knowledge of whether
making the body healthy is actually the right thing to do.
Then sometimes," I said, "the doctor doesn't know himself whether he has
acted beneficially or harmfully. Now if he has acted beneficially, then, according
to your argument, he has acted temperately. Or isn't this what you said?"
"Yes, it is."
"Then it seems that on some occasions he acts beneficially and, in so
doing, acts temperately and is temperate, but is ignorant of his own temperance?"
"But this," he said, "Socrates, would never happen.
. ."(164bc)
Critias' argument entails judging the doctor's action externally because it allows
that he may have acted beneficially by mistake. From the outside there's no
distinguishing between Dr. Frankenstein, who administers pill x because he believes it
will save a good man's life, and Dr. Jeckyll, who administers pill x because he makes a lot
of money from it. If pill x works, both doctors seem to have been temperate; but only one
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was actually JcaJos. If the pill fails, Dr. Frankenstein's action was still accompanied by
to kalon, while Dr. Jeckyll simply blames his mistake on Mr. Hyde. Socrates may here
be begging the question of whether the kalon in an action depends on values and
intentions, but Critias' vehement refusal to accept the consequences of his argument,
combined with his Hesiod-inspired view that to kalon is essential to sophmsune, shows
that he and Socrates agree that it does.
After Nicias enters the conversation with his definition of andreia as knowledge
of the fearful and hopeful. Laches proves that he still fails to see the distinction between
arete and techne by pointing out that technical experts like doctors and farmers know
the fearful and hopeful with respect to their crafts (195ab). Plato reiterates the distinction
once more by having Nicias reply:
He thinks a doctor's knowledge of the sick amounts to something more than being
able to describe health and disease, whereas I think their knowledge is restricted to
just this. Do you suppose. Laches, that when a man's recovery is more to be feared
than his illness, the doctors know this? Or don't you think there are many cases in
which it would be better not to get up from an illness? . . . But do you grant this
knowledge to the doctors or to any other craftsmen except the one who knows
what is and is not to be feared, who is the one I call courageous? (195cd)
The distinction is finally made clear, and the discussion moves on to ask what this second
order knowledge is and where it is to be found.
4,1.5 Discovering To Kalon in the Soul or Mind
Socrates gives the clear impression that he was swimming upstream in trying to
persuade Athenians that arete is part of the soul at Apology 30ab:
I go about doing nothing but persuading you, young and old, to care not for body
or money in place of, or so much as, excellence [ arete ] of the soul. I tell you that
virtue does not come from money, but money and all other human goods both
public and private from virtue.
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Both the Uches and Ch^rmides associate their respective virtues with knowledge of
good and evil, which in turn requires the seat of to be none other than the soul.
When N.cias connects andr^ia to knowledge at 194d (a connection subsequently
attributed to his association with sophists at 197d), Socrates asks him what the subject of
this knowledge is. Nic.as says the fearful and the hopeful (195a), and proceeds, through
an exchange with the still-confused Laches (195a-e), to distinguish this sort of knowledge
from the technical knowledge of the doctor. Nicias is then forced to admit that such
knowledge, and therefore courage, is veiy rare and distinct from the boldness of many
men, women, children, and animals. Laches retorts at 197c that Nicias is just trying to
deny that "those whom everyone agrees to be courageous" in fact merit the distinction.
But Socrates has already established that popular agreement is no basis for decision
(184e). Decisions should be made on the advice of an expert, if one is to be found, or on
principles derived from inquiry. Hence, Nicias' knowledge of the fearful and hopeful
amounts to a formidable and rare sort of wisdom: knowledge of good and evil.
In Charmides, Critias' journey toward the knowledge of good and evil begins
when the failure of "minding one's own business" and "doing good actions" inspires him
to shift into intellectualist mode and offer "knowledge of oneself" (165b), then
"knowledge of knowledge" (166c) as definitions of sophrosune. Critias derives
"knowledge of oneself" from an overly-confident interpretation of the Delphic inscription:
"Know thyself." Again, the agreement that episteme [eTaaxfipTi, knowledge, science]
must be knowledge of something precipitates the question of what its subject here is. This
leads to the hypothesis that sophrosune is a science of science or knowledge of
knowledge. When this account is construed as knowledge of what one does and does not
know, it proves the useful point that such knowledge is essential to education (172b).
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The account is problematic, however, because it fails to provide fora distinct object of
knowledge. Finally that object is supplied at 174b and the definition is revised to the
idealized "knowledge of good and evil."
Whether or not the knowledge of good and evil is a satisfactory definition of
sophrosune, or even arete in general, it does supply the missing link in the arete -
techne distinction that Plato defends in the Charmides and Laches. The Ion shows
that experts have the sort of knowledge that allows them to accurately evaluate and judge
particular instances of their craft. Earlier examples in Charmides and Laches show that
what makes an action kalos is a second kind of science or knowledge that transcends
technical knowledge. Sophists (like Hippias) who believe that aiete is a techne similar
to or even equivalent to rhetoric, fail to distinguish this second criterion, which provides
an absolute. As I said in chapter 1, what irked Plato most about the sophists was their
failure to recognize the moral neutrality of their art. They could impart skills but not
arete because arete requires a recognition of good and evil independent from the
externally determined success or failure of a man and his actions.
4.2 Intc llcctualizing. Unifying , and Idealizing Arete
If we know that we can improve someone's eyes by adding sight to them, and we
can, moreover, cause sight to be added to that person's eyes, clearly we know what
sight is, and we could advise people on the best and easiest means for acquiring it.
You see, if we didn't even know what sight is, or what hearing is, then as doctors
we'd hardly be worth consulting for advice on ears and eyes and the best way of
acquiring sight. ( Laches 189e - 190a, Lane translation; Socrates speaking)
Because Plato accepted arete as the proper goal of education, he needed to
distinguish his own coception of it from the traditional conceptions he rejected. As this
Loaches passage makes clear, Plato believed that the first step toward answering the
question of how education might achieve arete was getting a grip on just what arete is.
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Indeed, it is Plato's novel conception of arete that shapes their novel approach to
education. Amidst the critique of tradition in the and Charmides, there emerges
a new conception of arete that agrees with the tradition insofar as it takes arete to be a
power of the soul. Plato takes that power to be an intellectual, unified, ideal, however,
and insists that it must be developed inwardly rather than the opposite.^^
4.2.1 Arete as Intellectual: a Property nf Psyche
In the last section I argued that the connection between arete and to kaJon
identified the seat of arete as the soul or psyche [\l/\)Xri, soul, mind, intellect] of a man.
This move is actually less radical than it may at first seem. There was fairly wide
agreement, even among traditionalists, that particular virtues such as sophrosune and
andreia were qualities of the soul. Dover (1974, p. 166) points out that a reference to the
psyche of a man could be taken as a specific reference to his courage and that
eupsychia — the state of having a good soul -- was synonymous with andreia. Laches'
second definition of andreia as endurance of the psyche, then, was quite traditional.
Even the aristocrats, who took physical beauty to be a sign of arete, admitted that
particular virtues such as sophrosune were primarily qualities of the psyche. Critias
takes Charmides' beauty to be of both body and soul at 154d.
In addition to believing arete to be a quality of the soul, Plato was in in tune
with the tradition in viewing as a dunamis [St)vaiiiq, power, ability]. Hippias
agrees with Socrates at HippiasMinor 375d ff. that justice is a dunamis of the soul.
Republic IV defines dunamis as a that which enables us to do what we are capable of
doing (477bc) and, like Laches 189e (quoted above), uses vision as an example. Simply
“The inward approaich seems to separate Plato from Aristotle, as well. Aristotle believed that habitual
good action cultivates arete in the soul. For Plato, the direct development of the soul results in good action.
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put. ..... is something in a pemon tha, produces good action - as Chann.des and
Socrates agree at 160e - 161a:
"But,” I said,
[KOC^v] thing?"
"didn't we agree just now that temperance was an admirable
"Yes, 'we did," he said.
follow that temperate men are good?"
^ thing be good that does not produce good men*^"Ot course not."
"U^eeT
“ '^P^tance an admirable thing, but it is a good thing."
Lurking behind all this cohesion, however, there lies serious disagreement about the
nature of 'good.' For Plato, good men and good actions cannot be judged by appearance.
A man's goodness, or arete, is an invisible quality of his soul. An action's goodness
depends on the invisible intentions motivating it. The crucial component is wisdom, and
arete is reinterpreted as a distinctly intellectual quality.
One traditional criterion for arete that Plato intellectualizes is the stipulation that
there be harmony between a man's deeds and words. Laches, for example, judges a good
man on the alignment of his logo, ptoyoi, words, explanations] and eiga [^yo, works,
deeds, actions]
You see, whenever I hear a man talking about goodness or any kind of wisdom ~ a
real man, that is who lives by his principles ~ Tm overjoyed because, I can see that
the speaker is in true with his words and that the two go together.
. . But it pains
me to hear someone who is quite the opposite, the more eloquently he seems to
speak, the worse it becomes, and then it looks as though I hate discussions.
{LacJies 188c-e, Lane translation)
Laches is willing to talk with Socrates based on the philosopher's battlfield ei^a at
Delium (181b), and he recommends specifically against military instructors who haven't
proven themselves in war (183c). Socrates points out that harmony between words and
"SecO' Bncn (1971, p. 305).
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deeds is also required in argument, however (193e). Laches’ limitation of to actions
m battle, like Critias’ limitation of to actions later judged to be good ( Charmidcs
163b), fails to capture the full implications of anete as an intellectual dunam/s. On
Plato's account, arete engenders good action (barring physical impediment) regardless of
external judgments and circumstances, just as perfect vision allows us to see what is. It is
the thought behind an action that counts; not it's external manifestation.
Socrates reveals the potential scope of this intellectualist account of aiete when
he descnbes a "dream" in which temperance rules and everything is done according to
knowledge ( Charmides 173ad). In such a world there would be no deception and
therefore no conflict between appearance and reality, which would vastly improve health,
safety, and even the quality of consumer products. The future could be confidently
known as well, since impostors would be weeded out from the class of prophets and seers:
Now, I agree that the human race, given this, would do things and live as
knowledge directed -- because self-control would mount guard and wouldn't let
ignorance creep in and be a partner in our work. But that by doing things as
knowledge directed we'd do well and be happy, that is something we can't as yet
be sure of, my dear Critias.'
On the other hand, ' he said, 'you won't easily find any other complete
form of success, if you disregard doing things as knowledge directs.'
(Watt translation, 173cd)
Again, we have a double-edged "agreement" between Socrates and his interlocutor. In
his response to Socrates' doubt about whether this dream-world would guarantee
happiness, Critias equates happiness with success - a relativistic and externally judged
quality — and so he misses the idealism of Socrates' account. Arete, in the real world as
well as the ideal, must be an intellectual quality of the soul that produces good action but
Eq'a is commonly used to refer to battlefield actions, according to Liddell & Scott.
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does not guarantee public approval, political power, or even personal profit. Arete is an
internal, intellectual ideal; a quality of the invisible psyche.
4.2t2 Arete as Unified
Plato s unification of 3rete was a logical outgrowth of his strict interpretation of
the accepted association between ^/ere and psyche. According to Xenophon's
Memorabilia (iii 9.4), Socrates' refusal to draw a distinction between wisdom and
sophrosune, or any other of the virtues, surprised many.^^ Plato bridges the gap between
popular conceptions of the virtues and his own intellectual conception of them by having
Socrates exhibit both dimensions of the virtues in question in Laches and Charmides.
Socrates displays the traditional conception of sophrosune when he controlls his
emotional response to Charmides' beauty at 155c. He then exhibits the intellectual
sophrosune described at 167a by acknowledging his ignorance and continuing the
investigation at 165bc. Critias, in contrast, nearly halts the dialectic by refusing to admit
ignorance at 169c; his reputation for sophrosune is brought into doubt by his failure to
exhibit the virtue in its intellectual dimension.^* In Laches, Socrates is recalled as
having exhibited the traditional ideal of andreia on the battlefield. By admitting ap>oiia
and pursuing inquiry in discussion, he also shows the intellectual courage Laches lacks:
We said we were to show endurance. So, if you don't mind, let's stick to the
search and show some endurance, in case Bravery herself pokes fun at us for not
Gould (1987, p. 276): "Relativism, the view that moral claims express only individual or collective
preferences rather them true propositions, rears its head early in the Laches when Lysimachus expresses the
democratic opinion that a majority vote can decisively settle a question of moral education. Lysimachus'
suggestion implies the view, repugnant to Socrates, that there is no truth or falsehood about ethical matters.”
“The exact relationship between arete and wisdom in Plato is the subject of much scholarly debate,
and too complex a question to consider here. With respect to the Charmides and Laches, Irwin (1995, p. 39 -
40) notes that "Socrates never so much as hints that the identification of temperance with some sort of
knowledge is open to objection." Devereux (1992, p. 767) suggests that in the Laches, Plato softens Socratic
intellectualism as a "first step on the path towards his own no/7- intellectualist conception of virtue."
”See Dover, (1974, p. 125).
“Courage is connected to knowledge of knowledge in Apology : "For to fear death. Gentlemen, is
nothing but to think one is wise when one is not; for it is to think one knows what one does not know." (29a)
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bravely searching her, when
- 194a, Lane translation)
perhaps endurance is bravery after all. ( Laches 193e
While the great warrior succumbs to the heat of irrtellectual battle, Socrates ,s heroically
relentless in his pursuit of truth. At EutJ,jT,Aro 15d he declares: "I shall not willingly
give up until I learn."”
In both L^cAes and Charmides, the particular virtues of sophivsune and
andreia are eventually equated with the knowledge. Again, the stipulation that good
action be kalos forces the connection between and knowledge; because andivia
and sophrosune are kaJos, they must partake of wisdom. But the wisdom of an action
cannot be judged externally. At Chamndes 159c - 160d, Socrates shows that the
appearance of an action does not necessarily indicate arete in the agent, since a quick
thing might be just as kaJos as a quiet one. Then at Laches 192cd, the presence of
wisdom is required to distinguish kalos from shameful endurance. The
intellectualization and unification of arete transforms the meaning of kalos from the
traditional 'praiseworthy' to something internal and invisible like 'independently fine or
noble. If all virtues are kalai, and being kaJos requires wisdom, just how different can
the individual virtues be?
42.3 The Educational Impact of the Unification of Aret^
But our king Zalmoxis,' he said, 'who is a god, says that just as one should not
attempt to cure the eyes apart from the head, nor the head apart from the body, so
one should not attempt to cure the body apart from the soul. And this he says is
the very reason why most cases are beyond Greek doctors, that they do not pay
attention to the whole as they ought to do, since if the whole is not in good
condition, it is impossible that the part should be. Because,' he said, ' the soul is
“Allen translation. See Gould (1987, n. 2): "Most scholars discussing the Laches take 'kartena' as
endurance, which is an acceptable translation. But I think 'perseverance' better (even if inexactly) captures
the meaning of the dialogue, as it suggests an active rather than passive state."
^“Temperance is described as kalos at 160b, 160d, 160e, 169b, 175b, 175e. Courage is also repeatedly
described as kalos in Laches, for example at 192c. This connection is also noted by Santas (1973, p. 113).
^‘A transition Sprague deftly reflects by translating as 'admirable' in the Charmides passage,
and 'fine and noble' in the Laches passage.
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the body are to be heathy; (
°'
This piece of wisdom, ostensibly reported by Socrates from a Thracian doctor,
shows the educational importance of unifying the virtues. Socrates- intellectual.zation of
the virtues led to their close association with wisdom and the health of the psyche. But
when Socrates shows in both Leches and Chermides that technical expertise does not
affect the kalon of an action, both dialogues anive at the knowledge of good and evil to
describe the wisdom relevant to arete. Since both andreia and sophrosene are
products of the psyche, and both boil down to the same sort of knowledge, their
unification is almost inevitable. By implication, the other virtues arc similarly
connected.^ The pedagogical point for Plato is that moral education should focus not on
training for particular virtues, but on the the improvement of the psyche as a whole. If
the whole isn't in good condition then the part can't be. A rete turns out to be the general
well being of the soul.
In both Laches and Charmides, the investigation of a single virtue leads to a
general examination of virtue itself. This progression is not unexpected, either by Plato or
by his dramatic characters.” In the Laches, the stated goal is arete (179d); andreia is
investigated as a window to that whole:
Well, in that case, my good friend, let's not look at
[ arete ] as a whole straight
away - it might well be a rather lengthy business. Let's examine part of it first of
all and see whether we're in a position to know about that. We'll probably find
this makes our inquiry easier. (Lane translation, 190c)
“The exact relation between the virtues is another hot scholarly topic which I needn't delve into here.
Sec, for^example: Devereux (1992), Ferejohn (1982), Penner (1973b & 1992b), and Santas, (1971 & 1973).
Irwin ( 1995, p. 35): In both the OhBmi/des and the Laches the discussion settles on one particular
virtue because it seems the best way to answer a more general question about what makes a person good. "
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S.milarly, Channides . said by Cri.ias to be no, only ,he n,os,
.empera.e, bu, superior in
every Cher vrriue as well (157d). The educational potnt Plato wants to make is that the
appearance of a single virtue, such as temperance (154d), or trammg for a particular
virtue, such as military training for (181e, tf.) does not even produce the relevant
arete, much less the whole complement of them. Rghting skill and fighting words have
their places in war and politics, but erete is cultivated in the soul.
The ttJon connection linked 3retc to knowledge and hence links individual
virtues to each other. Wisdom is the common quality that binds all virtuous action." The
final apona of the Laches is caused by an apparent conflict between the idea that
andreta is merely one virtue among many, and the fact that their definition of it implies
all the virtues:
Socrates: Then does a man with this kind of knowledge seem to departfrom virtue in any respect if he really knows, in the case of all goods whatsoever,w at they are and will be and have been, and similarly in the case of evils? Anddo you regard that man as lacking in temperance or justice and holiness to whom
alone belongs the ability to deal circumspectly with both gods and men with
respect to both the fearful and its opposite, and to provide himself with good
things through his knowledge of how to associate with them correctly?
Nicias: I think you have a point, Socrates.
Socrates: Then the thing you are now talking about, Nicias, would not be
a part of virtue but rather virtue entire.
Nicias: So it seems.
Socrates: And we have certainly stated that courage is one of the parts of
virtue.
Nicias: Yes we have.
Socrates: Then what we are saying now does not appear to hold good.
Nicias: Apparently not.
Socrates: Then we have not discovered, Nicias, what courage is.
Nicias: We don't appear to. (199de)
Nicias admission that discovering the whole of arete when they were only looking for a
part is a failure, can only be a symptom of his docility (see section 4.1.5). Whether Plato
^'Sce Dcvercux (1992, p. 786).
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took ,he connic, ,o be a true ™paase,« is pedagogically less impcnan, than the effect th.s
exchange has on h.s readers. The effect seems to be that if you buy the argument that
a,^te is k3l3 and hence wise in a general sort of way, you are committed to some sort of
Identification among individual virtues.’‘ Just as Hippias' being good at many and varied
crafts did not make him a good man, training in skills associated with particular virtues
such as battle and manners will not yield arete. A healthy soul, however, engender good
action on the battlefied as well as in argument. Ultimately, the message is that we must
work on all the virtues at once by seeking to improve the soul.
4i2.4 What Son of Knowledge CorrespnnriR tp Arrtc?
The distinction between technical and moral knowledge that Socrates made in
HippiasMinor is reiterated in the Chaimides and Laches. Unlike Aristotle, Plato
never used technical terms to distinguish the two sorts of knowledge.^^ By sticking to
common terminology, however, Plato kept his philosophy accessible to the kind of
popular audience he hoped to influence in the early dialogues. Furthermore the
distinction between the lower level technical knowledge and higher level knowledge of
good and evil is as clear as it needs to be in Charmides and loaches. Socrates' dream in
Charmides 173a-d clarifies the hierarchy implying that moral knowledge would govern
the production of crafts, improving life by giving us the ability to discern good eiga from
evil ones.
The knowledge of good and evil, past, present, and future is a neat description of
moral knowledge, but it leaves much to be desired by any industrious student wishing to
Santas (1971, p. 202) does.
’‘Irwin (1995, p. 43), Fcrcjohn (1982, p. 18), Dcvcrcux (1992, p. 786), and Santas (1971, p. 202), all
reach some form of this general conclusion.
’’Vlastos (1994, p. 116) believes that this might have hampered his discussion of them.
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achieve it.» Although he was probably struggimg with the question himself, Plato does
offer some elaboration on what moral knowledge is in and Charmides.
Knowledge of knowledge is proposed first:
I
Well then; I said, 'tell me, what do you say about self-control?'
of itself
knowledges is the knowledge both
Itself and of the other knowledges.' ^
knowled'^e?^*'*
^ knowledge of ignorance too,’ I asked, 'if it is a knowledge of
'Yes, certainly,' he - plied.
u
sdf-controlled man alone will know himself and be able to examine
what he in fact knows and what he doesn't, and he will be capable of looking at
other people in the same way to see what any of them knows and thinks he knows
if he does know; and what, on the other hand, he thinks he knows, but does not.’No one else will be able to do that. In fact, that is being self-controlled and
self-control and knowing oneself - knowing what one knows and what one
doesn't. Is that what you are saying?'
'Yes,' he replied. ( Charmides 166e - 167a, Watt translation)
This account is clarified to mean that moral knowledge wouldn't be knowing what one
knows and doesn't know, but rather, that one knows and more importantly that one
doesn't know (170d; see also 170a, 167a). In contrast to sophists who claimed to know
eveiy craft, this knowledge of ignorance is just the sort of limited knowledge Socrates
admits he has in Apology. Here Socrates exemplifies arete construed epistemologically
as well as arete construed in its conventional dimensions as andreia, and sophrosune
— an important combination for convincing Plato's skeptical audience.^’
The importance of knowing that one doesn't know and the added caveat that each
individual is the only one who can know that about himself should be obvious to any
reader of Plato. Laches recognizes the likelihood that false conceit can make one a
laughingstock (184bc), but to Socrates, its potential to stifle social advancement is much
’'Kraut (1984, p. 260): "It is easy to explain why "knowledge of good and evil" is not a satisfactory
account of virtue: it fails to provide a usable standard for making practical decisions."
"Penner (1992b, p. 25 - 26) notes that ". .
.
Socrates’ thinldng that courage is the science of goods and
bads is no impediment to his claim to know (about goods and bads) only that he knows nothing. "
177
less threatening than its guarantee to stifle intellectual growth. False assumptions of
wisdom eliminate the motivation to inquire; they are fatal to philosophy. Knowledge of
knowledge, as Socrates points out at Charmides 172b, will help men to learn by
eliminating their resistance to inquiry. The knowledge required to judge one's own
possession of knowledge, to put it in the Ion's terms of technical knowledge, is perhaps
the most valuable sort of knowledge (and skill) a person could have.
Could it be that the humility inherent to philosophical investigation is necessary
for ancte ? Certainly, philosophical investigation is the preferred mode for developing
one s knowledge of good and evil. Since knowledge of good and evil is the description of
moral knowledge arrived at in Charmides (174c) and Laches (199c), it's reasonable to
suppose that Plato thought it promising. Furthermore, the dialogues establish that this
moral knowledge does not have a concrete subject as technical knowledges such as
medicine, basket weaving, and generalship do. The object of moral knowledge is ideal
and abstract. The Laches establishes that it is beyond time restraints of past, present,
and future (198 - 199). The Charmides establishes that it is a knowledge, not of all other
knowledges, but of the one thing that can't be removed from other knowledges (174bc).
The knowledge of good and evil differs radically from mundane technical know-how, yet
is essential to the virtuous practice of all skills.
4.2.5 Arete as an Ideal
Plato hints throughout the Laches and Charmides that arete may be an
unobtainable ideal. If Charmides indeed had arete he would be a man without equal
(154d). Since the courageous man must have time-independent knowledge of the fearful
and hopeful, Nicias could only be describing a god (196a). Such knowledge, Critias
agrees, would surpass the knowledge of every living man (174a). Furthermore, Nicias
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admits, such a mau would have evety virtue and not just one (199e). What sort of quality
could be then? Besides the example of Socrates, who is drawn to represent ame
on evety level, Plato offets another clue to the nature of aKte . the health analogy.
It seems as though no claim about the idealistic nature of moral knowledge is far
from a comparison to the ideal of health. In searching tor the sort of knowledge that
yields arete in Charmides, Socrates asks Critias:
Will it be the one by which he knows checker playing?"
"Oh for heaven's sake, " he said.
Well, the one by which he knows calculation?"
"Of course not."
Well, will it be that by which he knows health?"
"That's better," he said. (1 74b)
And next Critias proposes the knowledge of good and evil. When making the point that
moral knowledge must not be based in time in Laches, Socrates explains:
For instance, in the case of health, there is no other art related to the past
,
the
present and the future except that of medicine, which, although it is a single art,
surveys what is, and what was, and what is likely to be in the future. (198d)
Even at Meno 72de and again at 87e, health is used to describe by analogy some aspect
of arete. The health analogy neatly describes Plato's revised conception of arete.
Health can be thought of as a dunamis. since a healthy body produces good physical
action the way arete produces good moral actions. The analogy lends itself to Socrates'
intellectualization of arete, since the image of health had traditionally been applied to
the psyche. The literal translation of sophrosune is sound-mindedness; to be
sophron (temperate) is to be of sound or healthy mind.'’* Furthermore, a healthy
psyche seems capable of yielding each of the virtues in the relevant situations, barring
physical impediment.
See Snell (1982, p. 162).
A point noted by Santas ( 1 973, p. 112).
179
The health analogy also captures the unity of the virtues. A healthy body entails
healthy appendages and organs but it also implies a unity; a body with strong arms and
diseased legs may be "healthy" in some manner of speaking or to some degree, but it does
not fit the ideal of a healthy body. Similarly, a soldier who boldly challenges an enemy
from a pos.tion of weakness may be described as courageous on some account, but he will
not live up to the ideal of aKte. Training for amte, like training for health, must
incorporate all aspects of the soul;
u have probably heard about good doctors, that if you go to them with a pain inthe eyes, they are likely to say that they cannot undertake to cure the eyes by
themselves, but that it will be necessaiy to treat the head at the same time if things
are also to go well with the eyes. And again it would be very foolish to suppose
that one could ever treat the head by itself without treating the whole body. In
keeping with this pnnciple, they plan a regime for the whole body with the idea of
treating and curing the part along with the whole. ( Chaimides 156b)
So health, like arete, is an acknowledged ideal that resists definition and perfect
attainment. No human being is optimally healthy any more than any person is optimally
virtuous. Health is something that admits of degrees and it appears that Plato wants
arete (and knowledge) to be ideals that admit of degrees. Perfect knowledge of good and
evil would yield perfectly virtuous behavior, but no human being has such perfect
knowledge. When Socrates claims ignorance, he is referring to the absence of such perfect
knowledge - not to the absence of any knowledge whatever. Assuming that one has such
knowledge, like assuming that one has perfect health, can't help but lead to neglect and
disease. Health, like knowledge, is something that demands constant work on the part of
the individual. A doctor can't transmit health to his patient, he can only help the patient
to pursue it. Socrates is portrayed as a kind of doctor in the Charmides (155b, 158e), but
he can't transmit arete to his charge. Arete is a unified, intellectual ideal that must be
discovered, judged, and cultivated within oneself.
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4,3 In tSc^arcb of Kducatinn fnf
The unexamined life is not worth living for man
- Socrates, Apology 38a
An understanding of Plato’s revised view of and its implications for
education shows Socrates’ most famous quote to be an educational statement.
turns out to be an ideal approximating the timeless knowledge of good and evil. Such
knowledge can’t be transmitted by a teacher, since no mortal can reduce it to a
transmittable formula, and the gods choose to communicate in puzzles. Even people who
exemplify awtp like those who exemplify health, cannot pass the quality on to their most
dear mhentors. Education that has anete as its goal must be an exhortation to love
wisdom and to pursue it relentlessly; in short, to examine one’s life. Socrates asks his
friends not to teach his sons arete, but to see that they care for it above all else
{Apology 41e-42a). The way to care for arete is to tend one’s soul and to pursue its
perfection through inquiry. Socrates’ mission, his service to the god, was to get others to
look inside and cleanse their souls of inconsistent or unexamined beliefs. To the extent
that there can be a teacher of Plato’s revised arete, Socrates is the model.
4,3,1 Finding a Teacher of Arete
At Laches 184e, Socrates rejects the idea that the best education can be chosen
through a democratic vote and proposes instead that they search out an expert on arete :
So, what we should do now, first of all, is consider whether we have among us an
expert in the subject we’re discussing or not. If we have, we should take his
advice, albeit his alone, and ignore other people; and if we haven’t, we should look
for somebody else. ( Laches 185a, Lane translation)
At Charmides 169a, a similar search is proposed for "some great man" who can instantly
tell whether a thing is knowledge — a skill Socrates points out that he docs not have and
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suspects may not exist. In (89e - 96a), sophists, successful citizens, and poets are
rejected as teachers of because they can’t agree among themselves, fail to transmit
arete to their own sons, and hold internally inconsistent views. This fruitless search for
an expert on arete is Plato’s way of showing that cannot be learned the way a
conventional techne, such as shoemaking, is learned. Arete resembles a techne in that
It IS based in knowledge, but moral knowledge is something achieved through reflection
rather than instruction. One improves one's soul by looking inward, not outward.
The early Socratic dialogues are filled with failed teachers of arete. Lysimachus
of the Laches is reputed to have been given the best education his city could provide
{Meno 94a), yet he has failed to emulate the arete of his father and worries that his son
will never become a good man. The great men of Athens were notorious for failing to
transmit their virtue to their sons;^^ Critias and Charmides are examples of that failure.
Furthermore, technical experts may transmit their skills to students, but the skill fails to
engender the corresponding arete. While Nicias believes that military training will
produce andreia (182c), Laches points out that these military trainers not only fail to
exemplify andreia themselves in battle, they avoid the true military experts in an effort to
cultivate the false appearance of complete knowledge (182e - 184c). Their "expertise"
doesn't yield performance, but in fact makes their cowardice all the more conspicuous,
since people are more critical of those who smugly claim knowledge.
Given Laches’ mistrust of military trainers, it’s not surprising that he objects to
Socrates insistence that they start their educational investigation by looking for an expert
among themselves and their teachers:
What’s that, Socrates? Haven’t you ever noticed that in some matters people
become more expert without teachers than with them? (185e)
^^Sce, for example, Laches 179cd and 180b; note also that Nicias' son Niceratus was executed by the
Thirty Tyrants (Sprague 1992, p. 14, n.3).
182
Socrates replies that he has; indeed he takes pains in his speech at 186 - 187 to
distinguish between learning a thing from a master and discovenng it for oneself. He
quips that he would have liked to have studied with the sophists, but couldn't afford it.
Nicias and Laches had the means to pay for instruction, so they should have a better idea
of arete than he does. Of course, the dialogue shows just the opposite to be the case.
Socrates' idea of arete is distinct from particular skills or crafts, and so it demands
a different sort of teaching. Protagoras tells Socrates that his search for a teacher of arete
IS folly since arete is taught, like language, by everyone in the community { Protagoras
®tit Socrates argues that popular conceptions of arete, as represented by
Charmides, Critias, Laches, and others, are incoherent. Socrates' trial and conviction
themselves show he rejected arete in its popular definition, since he refuses to talk or pay
his way out of his indictment and he hasn't the "courage" to escape from jail. But
Socrates does exemplify arete in its ideal definition -- insofar as a mortal man can. He
admits his ignorance and pursues wisdom relentlessly. He also exhorts others to do the
same, as a service to the God. In this way, he has so carefully tended his soul that he is
utterly fearless of divine judgment after death.
Plato views education for arete as a lifelong process for which Socrates is the
exemplar and greatest advocate. People don't learn the meaning of arete from Socrates
and then become moral men. They learn to love arete and its manifestation in wisdom,
then, through constant examination of these things, they reject mistaken beliefs and
constantly climb closer to the ideal.^^ In both Charmides (161a) and Laches. Socrates
quotes the Odyssey 's claim that a needy man should not be modest, and in both cases he
^^Seeskin (1987, p. 144) makes a similar point.
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interprets neediness as a lack of 3rete and knowledge. The solution to this neediness is
not money, but investigation:
What I don t advise is that we allow ourselves to remain in the same condition
we're in now. And if anyone finds it amusing that men of our age think fit to go
back to school, I think we should appeal to Homer who said that 'modesty sits ill
upon a needy man'. Let's not take notice of what anyone else may say, and let's all
cooperate in seeing to our own needs as well as the {Laches 201ab, Lane
translation)
A similar need for the extended pursuit of arete is expressed at the closing of the
Charmides (176ac). Ideal arete is neither a skill nor a formula to be learned; rather, it is
a goal to be pursued.
443.2 Arete Is Not Transmittable
Plato makes it clear in both Inches and Charmides that stories, facts, skills,
rules, and even words of wisdom are teachable - but they don't yield moral knowledge or
arete. Despite being a paidagogos of Charmides, Critias denies having given him a
definition of sophrosune.
.
"What difference does it make, Socrates," said Charmides, "from where I
heard it?"
"None at all," I answered, "since the question at issue is not who said it,
but whether what he said is true or not." ( Charmides 161c)
This exchange serves as a quick reminder to the reader that while definitions and formulae
may be taught and learned, the wisdom that is arete is a product of personal
investigation. Plato's association of and epistemc [knowledge, science], seems to
imply that arete can be taught — as Socrates observes at Meno 87c. Here, however,
Plato wants the reader to question the missing middle term: the popular assumption that
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no one has shown that
all forms of episteme can be taught/' All we know so far is that
they know what arete is, let alone that they can teach it.
You can't teach what you don’t know; but what you know in a conventional sense
can't be arete. Socrates’ transformation of this message is simple: you can't learn what
you think you know. Admitting ignorance is the necessaiy first step on any path toward
knowledge. Socrates' avowed ignorance seems like a dubious product for such a
painstaking pursuit of knowledge, yet he regards it as a crowning achievement:
But, astonishingly, I have this single good point, my saving grace: I am humble
enough to learn, so I probe and ask questions, and am extremely grateful to anyone
who answers me. {^Hippias Minor 372c, Waterfield translation)
When Socrates exhorts his interlocutors to look within themselves, they think they're
fishing for bits of knowledge, whereas Socrates expects such inquiry to yield unfounded
opinions that wilt when exposed to the light of examination.'^
It is through the process of such examination and reflection that barriers are
lowered and progress is made toward understanding the true nature of things. This
process cannot begin, however, until opinions are articulated and laid on the table, as
Socrates exhorts Nicias to do in Laches :
The hopelessness of our predicament is obvious; but if you tell us what you think
bravery is, you'll get us out of this hopeless state, and you'll also confirm your own
thoughts by putting them into words. (194c, Lane translation)
The opinion that Nicias then offers is borrowed from Socrates himself. Nevertheless, it
receives the same examination all others do. The authority of the source is irrelevant.
The argument would be of the form: Arete is episteme, episteme is teachable, therefore arete is
teachable. Nehamas (1985, p. 299) points out that there was a question about whether sophia could be taught,
just as there was a question whether arete could be taught. See: DissoiLogoi (6.1). See also Protagoras
361a, and contrast Euthydemus 282c.
Hence Socrates does not teach arete by holding back answers he knows, as the slave boy passage of
X\\t Meno may seem to suggest. See Kraut (1984, p. 299).
'‘Socrates later compares this process to that of a midwife; see especially TTieaetetus 148e ff., 210b-e.
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Reflection excludes the unquestioning adoption of opinions from an outs.de source while
eliminating the internal barriers of false conceit.
Socrates’ Skill as a
In fact I have never been a teacher to anyone. If, in speaking and tending to myown affairs, I found anyone, young or old, who wished to hear me, I neverbe^udged him; nor do I discuss for a fee and not otherwise. To rich and poor
alike I offer myself as a questioner, and if anyone wishes to answer, he may then
hear what I have to say. And if any of them turned out to be useful men. or anydid not, I cannot justly be held responsible. To none did I promise instruction and
none did I teach; ( Apology 33ab)
The fact that the Greek word didasko [6i6d(TK(0, to teach] is the origin of our
own word 'didactic' provides a helpful hint as to why Socrates should deny that he is a
teacher. Didactic speakers are preachy. They try to foist specific lessons and ideals on
their audience and they resist questioning. Poetry provides a didactic form of education,
so it's not surprising that the poets were called the teachers of Ancient Greece (Liddell &
Scott). When Socrates denies that he is a teacher, he is denying that he fits the popular
ideal of a teacher: one who transmits knowledge.'*^ When Charmides and Critias demand
explanation of one of his theories, Socrates proposes an examination instead:
'How is that?' he said. 'Explain! We too want to know what you mean.'
Tm sure Fm talking nonsense,' I said. 'All the same, one must examine any
thought that occurs to one and not dismiss it without due consideration, if one has
even a little respect for oneself.' ( Charmides 173a, Watt translation)
Socrates may be an expert with a skill to teach, but that skill and his expertise are not
arete. Socrates is an expert at inquiry, at searching for wisdom.^®
^^For a similar view see Kraut (1984, p. 10)
^'Santas (1971, p. 181-2) says that "Far from abandoning the pursuit for an expert (at Laches 186 -
90), Plato proceeds, through Nicias and Laches, to establish Socrates credentials [as] an expert in a search for
the nature of courage."
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It is, after all, in this search for wisdom that Socrates' arete is most notably
manifested. A description of the temperate man in Charmides seems to describe
Socrates' mission:
So the self-controlled man alone will know himself and be able to examine
what he in fact Imows and what he doesn't, and he will be capable of looking at
other people in the same way to see what any of them knows and thinks he knows,
if he does know; and what, on the other hand, he thinks he knows, but does notNo one else will be able to do that. In fact, that is being self-controlled and
self-control and knowing oneself - knowing what one knows and what one
doesn't. Is that what you are saying?'
'Yes,' he replied. (166e - 167a, Watt translation)
Of course, Socrates doesn't possess knowledge of what he and others know and don't
know, but he does possess skills that enable him to examine both himself and others.
Whether or not the elenchus can be considered an integrated techne, Socrates honors
specific criteria while performing the elenchus which represent useful tests for
knowledge. Socrates insists that the beliefs examined be truly those espoused by the
interlocutor (i.e. Euthyphro 9d). He requires that belief sets be internally consistent (i.e.
Laches 199e). He wants definitions to cover all and only relevant examples and isn't
beyond using counterexamples to disprove them (i.e. Laches 190e - 191e).'*^
Insofar as Socrates "teaches" he examines opinions and exhorts others to do the
same. He has a reputation for examining others' ways of living:
You don't appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with
Socrates and associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he
began by conversing about something quite different in the first place, keep on
being led about by the man's arguments until he submits to answering questions
about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lived
hitherto. And when he does submit to this questioning, you don't realize that
Socrates will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail.
{Laches 187e - 188a)
^’similar criteria are noticed by Santas (1971, p. 122).
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But Socratic conversation is best seen as a kind of team effort to understand and clarify
the nature of existence by examining particular lives and beliefs (see chapter 5). Just as
the intellectualization and unification of the virtues allowed Socrates to learn about
arete by examining its parts, examination of individual beliefs and lives sheds light on
the ideal dimension.*® Socrates' examinations, like Plato's dialogues, are not only for his
own sake, or that of the interlocutor, but rather for the benefit of everyone:
How can you believe,
' I exclaimed,
' that if Fm trying my hardest to refute you, Fm
doing it for any other reason than that for which Fd investigate what I say myself!
You see, my great fear is that I may sometime not notice that Fm thinking I know
something when in fact I don't. And this, I tell you, is what Fm doing now:
looking at the argument mostly for my own sake, but perhaps for the sake of my
friends as well. Or don't you think that it is a common good for almost all men
that each thing that exists should be revealed as it really isT ( Charmides 166de,
Watt translation)
Cryptic Expressions: Clues to the Discovery of Ar^tp
What can we make of the fact that arete doesn't seem able to be put into words?
Socrates gets Laches to agree that knowledge must be expressible in words.:
Socrates: We say then. Laches, that we know what it is.
Laches: Yes we do say so.
Socrates: And what we know, we must, I suppose, be able to state?
Laches: Of course. 190c)
Charmides also admits that he should be able to define sophrosune verbally if he
possesses it. Both interlocutors then fail to find acceptable definitions. Laches proclaims
at 194b that he still thinks he knows what andreia is, but can't understand why he is
unable to pin it down in words.**
“See Penner (1992, p. 145).
Vlastos (1971b, p. 15) disagrees with Socrates' idea that virtue is knowledge on the basis of the fact
that the bravest man he knows cannot articulate the knowledge behind his courage. But is the ability to
articulate knowledge really a Socratic criterion for it? Perhaps the reason virtue (and hence knowledge) can’t be
taught is that it can’t be reduced to a universal formula to be passed on; it must be discovered individually.
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That Socrates reduces his interlocutors to a loss for words should be seen as a sign
of progress because the inarticulability of something may be an ironic sign of its true
nature as an ideal. When Socrates refutes Critias' claim that sophrosune is knowing
what one doesn't know, Platonic scholars may be disappointed because that principle so
closely resembles a central tenet of Socratic philosophy:
We made that terribly generous concession without even considering the
impossibility of a man's knowing in some sort of way what he does not know at all;
for we allowed that he knows what he does not know, and yet I think nothing
would be stranger [o^coywrepov] than that. ( Charmides 175c, Watt translation)
The word Plato uses here, alogoteron [aXoyayxepov], could mean either "irrational" or
unutterable. The words, taken at face value, make no sense. Still, they may represent a
kind of unspeakable truth.
Socrates describes Charmides' statement that sophrosune is minding one's own
business at 161c as ainigmati [aiviypaxi, enigmatic, riddling, cryptic], which is the
adjective from the verb ainissomai [aiviaaopai, to speak darkly or in riddles, to hint],
and which is also used at Apology 21b and 27de to express a dark meaning or riddle.
The imperfect, hanitteto [fiviTTexo] appears again in reference to the saying at 162a.
The noun ainigma [aiviypa] then appears at 162b. Clearly, Plato is drawing our
attention to some dark truth in the statement. "Doing one's own job" is, after all, offered
as a definition of justice at Republic 433a.
As I showed in section 1.3.4, what attracts Plato to these ainigmai is that they
demand investigation. When the obvious interpretation of 'minding one's own business'
has failed as a definition of sophrosune, Socrates comments:
Well, as far as I can see, he propounded this as a deliberate puzzle [aiviypa] for
us, for no other reason than that he thought it would be difficult for us to find out
what on earth doing one's own job is. ( Charmides 162b, Watt translation)
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Here, he sarcastically assumes that the riddler (Critias) knows the meaning of his riddle.
Socrates himself is often misinterpreted as being exasperating in his refusal to give a
straight answer. Good riddles, however, hint at an answer that evades articulation; threby
acting as vortexes to the world of the inarticulable ideal.
Critias interprets the Delphic inscriptions "Know thyself" and "Be self-controlled"
as the god speaking cryptically, ainigmstodesteron [aiviypaTCoSeaxepov], as a prophet
would:
So this is how the god speaks to the people who enter his temple, and not in the
way men do. At least, that's what I think the man who dedicated the inscription
intended by the dedication. He says to whoever enters nothing other than "Be
self-controlled." Or rather, he expresses himself more cryptically, as a prophet
would, because his inscription implies as I maintain, "Know yourself" and "Be
self-controlled" are the same thing, though one might perhaps think that they are
different, as I believe, the people who dedicated the later inscriptions "Nothing in
excess" and "A pledge is the next thing to ruin." actually did. In fact they thought
that "Know yourself" was a piece of advice, not a greeting from the god to the
people entering. ( Charmides 164e - 165a, Watt translation)
Since the exhortation "Know thyself" was originally believed to be a warning against
hubris,^^ Critias' interpretation of it as a "greeting" equivalent to "Be self-controlled"
reveals a disturbingly smug attempt to wield the divine words for his own benefit. When
Socrates, by contrast, heard the divine proclamation that he was wisest of men, he
puzzled over what the words could mean and then began an inquiry that lasted the rest of
his life (^Apology 21b).
Cryptic statements are treasures that are easily abused. The belief that they hold
truth is not confined to Socrates and Plato. At Protagoias 339-347, there is long passage
in which Socrates interprets part of a poem that Protagoras takes to be contradictory.
Socrates takes the apparent contradiction to have a deeper message and points out that
brief statements, like the one they are discussing, were the characteristic expression of
” See Snell (1982, p. 179).
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philosophy among the ancients (343b). Accordingly, at Meno 95-96, Socrates shows
how an apparent poetic contradiction holds some cryptic truth. The poem says at one
point "The good will teach you to be good," then says that "never by teaching will you
make the bad man good." There is an ambiguity here in the first sentence. If "the good" is
read as good people, there is a contradiction. If "the good" is rather the good itself, or the
good inside people indirectly teaching others, the two sentences can be consistent. In
Lysis, too, Socrates interprets cryptic sayings:
'Well then,' in my opinion, Lysis, this is what people mean when they say, in their
cryptic way [aiviTTOVxai] that like is friend to like: friendship exists only
between good men, whereas the bad man never achieves true friendship with
either a good or a bad man. {Lysis 214d, Watt translation)
In both Charmides and Laches seers or prophets are put forth as possible
examples of arete because they have knowledge of good and evil, or more correctly, they
have access to the divine realm of ideals. In Socrates' dream, the elimination of deception
in the mantic arts assures that humans would act on knowledge and never ignorance
(173c). Next it is agreed that the knowledge that is arete would not be the technical
know-how of an artisan but rather the transcendent knowledge of the seer (174a), or of a
man who knows good and evil. Laches recognizes immediately that if andreia is the
knowledge of the fearful and hopeful, it is only the seers who will have it (195de). Nicias
doesn't deny that this may be the case, and indeed his eventual death was blamed on
excessive reliance on seers.
Divine words should induce us to reflect. Socrates says he liked Prometheus in
the m3hh better than Epimetheus,^^ and so follows his lead and investigates as a means of
taking forethought for his life {Ihotagoras, 361d). Socrates reminds Nicias, just as Plato
”Epimcthcus opened Pandora’s box because he failed to reflect on whether the gift might be evil, as
Prometheus had warned him.
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frequently reminds his audience, that we must reflect upon the riddles of prophets for use
as guidance in our endeavors and not be led blindly by hasty assessment of their
proclamations:
And I suppose that both of you could bear witness that, in the case of the affairs
of war, the art of generalship is that which best foresees the future and the other
times - nor does this art consider it necessary to be ruled by the art of the seer, but
to rule it, as being better acquainted with both present and future in the affairs of
war. In fact, the law decrees, not that the seer should command the general, but
that the general should command the seer. {Laches 198e - 199a)
Charmides' soul must be cured by the "charms" of the Thracian doctors of the god
Zalmoxis, which are beautiful words (156d - 157a). Likewise, our own souls respond to
the beautiful words of the divine in the form of cryptic expressions and riddles. The
paradoxical and aporetic conclusions of the early Socratic dialogues should not be seen as
failures but as cryptic charms that induce us to inquiry by hinting at the truth within
them. The gap between our acknowledgment of ignorance and the truth encrypted in
divine riddles can only be bridged through personal investigation and reflection.
^,5 The Pursuit of Wisdom: Education as Philosophy
Plato's intellectualization, unification, and idealization of arete create the need
for new attitudes toward any education designed to produce good men. Arete becomes a
goal in itself, rather than a quality that produces the conventional goals of wealth and
glory. No longer is arete something one inherits at birth or gains through technical
instruction. Idealized arete is something one pursues throughout one's life: the
perfection of one's soul. Accordingly, the group of people seeking arete in Charmides
and Inches runs the gamut from the youthful Charmides and the adolescent sons of
Lysimachus and Melesias, to the seasoned generals, Nicias and Laches. Part of Plato's
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point in these works seems to be that the pursuit of (i,e. education), is a lifelong
journey.
The dialogues suggest there was popular resistance to the idea that adults should
continue learning. At Euthydemus 272c. Socrates describes how he disgraced his harp
teacher by being ndiculed for tiying to learn at an advanced age. His solution is to
persuade other old men to join him in his lessons. Plato saw a connection between the
adult resistance to education and an unwillingness to risk one's reputation by admitting
ignorance. Indeed it is precisely Socrates' conviction of his ignorance that motivates him
to seek instruction, despite his age. At Euthydemus 293b, he wiyly explains that if the
sophists can demonstrate that he possesses knowledge, he won't have to learn it.
It is not surprising that established men who have painstakingly cultivated the
appearance of wisdom are loath to have their reputations shattered by being reduced to
babble by Socrates. Happily, Laches displays true Socratic courage by submitting himself
to the philosopher's questioning despite their differences in age and fame (189a). Nicias
also professes his willingness to risk criticism, citing Solon as moral support:
I enjoy [Socrates'] company, you see, Lysimachus, and I don't think there's
an>dhing wrong in suggesting that we haven't acted properly in the past, or that
we're not doing so now. On the contrary, you're bound to be more careful about
your way of life in future if you don't shrink from his treatment, but believe, as
Solon said, that it's right to go on learning as long as you live. ( Laches 188a, Lane
translation)
All the same. Laches can't resist mocking Nicias' ignorance, and at 195a Socrates must
reprimand him: "Well let's instruct him instead of making fun of him." Even at their
relatively tender ages, Charmides and Critias demonstrate an overconcem with
appearances that hampers their search for wisdom.
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An unending education is the only sort possible for an ideal like Platonic arete
that simply cannot be transmitted or learned conventionally. Bodily health, likewise, is
something pursued but never possessed. Socrates' language reflects the belief that arete
is pursued, and not acquired from a teacher. In Euthydemus. for example, the implicit
goal is not to give a man wisdom or virtue, but rather to get him to love and pursue these
things. Socrates says that he hopes the sophists can persuade Cleinias to practice
wisdom and virtue, not that they can somehow give him those things:
Then put off the rest of your display to another time and give us a demonstration
of this one thing: persuade this young man here that he ought to love wisdom and
have a care for virtue, and you will oblige both me and all the present company.
(275a)
At 278d, the verb is "devote himself to," at 283a, "practice" is used again. It is the love of
arete that should be the goal of education, not the wholesale acquisition of it.
Of course "love of wisdom" is just the literal translation of philosophy and herein
lies the most basic explanation for Plato's connection between philosophy and education.
Since Early Greeks equated happiness with advantage and fortune, it is not surprising
that Socrates should exhort people to love wisdom rather than wealth and glory; he was
trying to change their conception of happiness. In fact, Socrates claims that wisdom will
offer advantage eventually and that wisdom can only make wealth greater, so he isn't
really departing from the tradition (^Euthydemus 288de). Socrates even
believed that wisdom rather than physical beauty should be the ultimate attraction
between lovers.^^ He confesses in the opening sequence of Protagoras, that he's more
interested in Protagoras' wisdom than in Alcibiades' beauty:
Friend: And this stranger struck you as such a handsome person that you
put him above the son of Clinias in that respect?
^'Scc Snell (1982, ch. 8).
“See also Lysis 222ff.
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Socrates: Yes. Must not perfect wisdom take the palm for handsomeness?
{Protagoras, Guthrie translation, 309c)
Again, the contrast boils down to a conflict between reality and appearances.
I have argued that the traditional values of the aristocrats, poets, warriors, and
sophists failed to distinguish between true arete, which is always tala, and its external
manifestations in physical beauty, military victory, or political success. In Laches and
Charmides. Plato shows arete to be a unified, intellectual, ideal that cannot be
transmitted or even articulated. He shows the difference between technical and moral
knowledge. And he offers Socrates, self-avowedly ignorant yet divinely proclaimed the
wisest of men, as a prototype "teacher" of his revised ideal arete. In the end, though,
Socrates does not teach arete, philosophy does. At the closing of Euthydemus,
Socrates exhorts Crito to educate his boys not by looking for a philosopher to teach them,
but by reflecting upon philosophy itself:
Then don't do what you ought not to, Crito, but pay no attention to the
practitioners of philosophy, whether good or bad. Rather give serious
consideration to the thing itself: if it seems to you negligible, then turn everyone
from it, not just your sons. But if it seems to you to be what I think it is, then take
heart, pursue it, practice it, both you and yours, as the proverb says. (307bc)
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CHAPTERS
EDUCATIONAL AIMS IN EUTHYPHRO AND LYSIS
I have shown that Plato accepted as the proper goal of education, and how
he established it as a moral quality - an intellectual excellence of the soul which, like a
techne, would allow its possessor to identify and judge right and wrong actions. The
body of knowledge required for arete was importantly different from the technical
knowledge proper to craftsmen. JCnowledge of good and evil is at best elusive, perhaps
unachievable, and certainly not teachable in any conventional sense. The question thus
arises: what will the goals and methods of an education aimed at Platonic arete be?
Euthyphro and Lysis offer important insights into the shape that moral knowledge
might take and further clarify the goals of Plato's educational project.
S.l The Nature of and Need for Moral Directinn in
Euthyphro is a dialogue about philia [(paioc, love]. Specifically, it discusses
human love for the gods and the gods' love of human beings, but the general issue is one
of aim. How do we decide what shape our expressions of phih'a for the gods will take?
How can we know what they want? How could they want anything we can give? Since
piety is part of arete, the discussion of how we aim to please the gods sheds light on the
larger issue of how we direct our pursuit of arete. Euthyphro claims to be an expert on
and true judge of piety, on the basis of his knowledge of poetry and myth. Socrates
hopes that he can get a definition or standard for piety from the expert that will help his
defense in court. What the dialogue shows, however, is that no man can be the ultimate
judge of what the gods love. Nevertheless, Euthyphro continues to prosecute his father on
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behalf of the gods, while Socrates decides that the gods and not the jury will be his
ultimate judge.
^.1 The PubiQU^i Ftnsuits of Futhyphro and
FutJjjphro is set on the porch of the King Archon's court as Euthyphro pauses
before prosecuting and Socrates before defending. Despite its legal setting, the language
and imagery of the dialogue conjures up the scene of a hunt. The Euthyphiv is about
pursuits and the goals we aim for in our actions; as such it is a dialogue about ethics and
education. Euthyphro, Meletus, and Socrates are all hunters pursuing different objects.
When the primary meanings of ancient Greek legal terms are included in the translation, a
matter-of-fact conversation about Euthyphro's presence at the court reveals the greater
scope of the dialogue;
Soc.; Are you pursuing/prosecuting [blWKeic;] or fleeing/defending
[(pebyciq].
Eu.: Pursuing/prosecuting [AicoKCO].
Soc.: What/whom [Tiva]?
Eu.; Something/someone [ov] I am again thought mad to pursue/prosecute
[5v6kcov]" (3e - 4a)‘
On the one hand, popular opinion finds it astounding that Euthyphro would
prosecute his own father in the name of piety, on the other hand, Plato finds it astounding
that Euthyphro pursues sinners while neglecting the very principle on which he bases his
own actions. Like Socrates' prosecutor Meletus, Euthyphro has taken the most important
things for granted and directed his attention toward human battles. Socrates, by contrast,
pursues piety and justice themselves. He seeks a definition or paradigm of piety that can
be used as a standard to judge individual cases (and possibly earn his acquittal, 5c).
Socrates redefines ethical activity as the pursuit of moral wisdom.
‘All Euthyphro translations are by Allen (1984) unless otherwise noted.
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Given this underlying theme, Euthyphro’s surprise at finding Socrates at the King
Archon's court and Socrates' vehement confirmation that he would never be there to
indict another (2a) becomes more than a minor point about Socrates being out of place in
public life. The idea of Socrates as a legal prosecutor is absurd precisely because he lacks
the prerequisite for charging another with impiety: a definition of what piety is. Since
Euthyphro's confidence in his knowledge of piety is so great that he feels compelled to
swim against the tide of accepted custom and filial duty to enforce it, Socrates seems to
have lucked into finding an ideal teacher. Not only will a true account of piety satisfy
Socrates' pursuit of moral wisdom, it will allow him to defeat the charges against him and
to always act piously in the future. Although Socrates' quest for definitions may take on
more metaphysical and ontological significance in later dialogues, in the Euthyphro its
purpose is practical and normative.^
Socrates is glad to have found an expert like Euthyphro in part because he
seriously doubts that his own accuser has sufficient knowledge of piety to justify his suit.
Meletus' description as young, not prominent, and without much of a beard (2b) suggests
both the likelihood of ambition and the unlikelihood of knowledge. There is no mistaking
Socrates' irony when he describes the charge:
Charge? One that does him credit, I think. It is no small thing for him, young as
he is, to be knowledgeable in so great a matter, for he says he knows how the
youth are corrupted and who is conupting them. No doubt he is wise, and
realizing that, in my ignorance, I corrupt his comrades, he comes to the City as to a
mother to accuse me. (2c)
Euthyphro's claim to knowledge is taken more seriously. Like Socrates, he challenges
popular opinion and acknowledges the depth of wisdom required to pursue the case:
^Several commentators, including Allen (1971, p. 320), Guthrie (1975, p. 121), and Robinson (1971),
have acknowledged the ethical focus of Socrates' search for a definition in the Euthyphro. Even Aristotle
( Metaphystes I, 987b ) points out that Socrates' search for universals concerned ethical matters. For a
contrasting view, see White (1976, p. 11).
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Soc.; Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, the majority of people must be
Ignorant of what is right. Not just anyone would undertake a thing like that. It
must require someone quite far gone in wisdom.
Eu.: Very far indeed, Socrates. (4ab)
Euthyphro's seriousness contrasts with the youthful Meletus, whom Socrates
accuses at Apologyr 24c of dealing frivolously with serious matters, lightly bringing men
to trial, and pretending to care for things he never cared about. Euthyphro 2c suggests
that political stature is the true object of Meletus' hunt; in prosecuting Socrates, he hopes
to win popular approval and eliminate critics. Meletus' effort to impress the multitude is
confirmed during Socrates' cross-examination of him at Apo/o£[F 24de. When Socrates
asks Meletus to name the improvers of youth, Meletus is silent at first, then he points to
the laws, all (500) judges present at the trial, the audience, council, members of the
Assembly.
. . everyone except Socrates. Socrates replies that Meletus does not care about
the youth, or about a single expert being best at improving them (as with horses and most
other things); the implication is that Meletus cares only about the multitude and his status
in it. The multitude improves youth, the multitude judges piety, the multitude confers
political power, so the multitude is the proper object of Meletus' attentions as it was for
Critias, Charmides, Hippias, and no doubt countless other Athenians.
Euthyphro, by contrast, is refreshingly skeptical about the power of the multitude
and derides Meletus' suit as an effort to slander Socrates in court, where religious matters
are so easily "misrepresented to the multitude" (3bc). That said, Euthyphro is no less
self-assured than Meletus in his knowledge — indeed he distinguishes himself from the
multitude precisely on the basis of his knowledge;
Soc.: But in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think you yourself
know so accurately how matters stand respecting divine law, and things holy and
unholy, that with the facts as you declare you can prosecute your own father
without fear that it is you, on the contrary, who are doing the unholy thing?
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Unfortunately, Euthyphro's condi,tonal statement turns out to be ttue: he doesn’t know all
matters respecting divine law with complete accutacy and so he is not of much use or
much different from the majority of men.
For now, however, Socrates is prepared to take Euthyphro's claim to knowledge at
face value. After all, Socrates has much to gain both in court and in life if he can learn
from Euthyphro just what piety is. And indeed, Euthyphro bases his claim to wisdom on
extensive familiarity with the poetic myths and legends which were widely accepted as
standards for piety.' The conventionality of Euthyphro's wisdom did not guarantee public
acceptance of him as a religious expert, however. At 3e - 5a Euthyphro acknowledges that
the multitude have no respect for his expertise and that they laugh at him when he tries to
tell the future (3c). He must also have provoked laughs from Plato's original audience, or
at least doubts about his wisdom, when at 3e he foretells Socrates' acquittal.
While Plato plants the seeds for Euthyphro's eventual refutation, Socrates sets up
the standards for a proper knowledge of piety. Euthyphro encourages Socrates' rigor,
acknowledging the importance of accurate knowledge and even turning the tables and
pointing out that justice must be valued above custom and opinion:
It is laughable, Socrates, your thinking that it makes a difference whether or not
the man was a relative, and not this, and this alone: whether his slayer was
justified. (4b)
For Socrates, there is only one thing to do with someone who claims to know the very
thing he has spent a lifetime searching after: ask him for instruction. At ApoJog}^ 26a,
^See section 5.1.2 below and Weiss (1986, p. 438 - 450).
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Socrates exhons Meletus to associate with him and teach him rather than prosecute him.
Socrates responds to Euthyphro’s claim to know the holy and unholy likewise:
Well then, my gifted friend, I had best become your pupil. (5a)
LI,
2
Mimes is gnd Mora l ity: Socrates’ Request for a Definitinn
Socrates has a very clear idea of what he wants to learn from Euthyphro: he wants
a universal definition that identifies holy and unholy actions as such:
So now in Zeus' name, teP me what you confidently claimed just now that youknew: what sort of thing ao you say the pious and impious are, with respect to
murder and other things as well? Or is not the holy, just by itself, the same in
eveiy action? And the unholy, in turn, the opposite of all the holy - is not like
Itself, and does not everything which is to be unholy have a certain single
character [i5eav] with respect to unholiness? (5de)
Whatever relation this use of [i6ea, form, character] has to Plato's eventual theorv'
of forms, it here communicates a very definite idea of the kind of knowledge to be sought
in an educational pursuit of ,3/ierc. By asking for a single character or idea that is piety,
Socrates is making a strong ontological statement about moral qualities that sharply
challenges the relativism of the sophists.^ His question suggests that piety is a universal,
present in all its instances, and constant, the same in all its instances. By 6de, we find
further that the holy is that quality which (an instrumental dative) holy things are
holy.^ This ontological sketch of piety allows a definition to be used as a standard or
paradigm for determining what things are and aren't holy. As Aristotle confirmed,^
Socrates' interest in universals is merely part of his ethical (and educational) project.
'Sec Section 1.2.3 above and Guthrie (1975, p. 124).
^This grammatical point is made by Allen (1971, p.321), reprinted in Allen (1984, p. 30). For a similar
analysis see Guthrie (1975, p. 121).
^ Metaphysics M
,
Ross translation, 1078b 17 - 19: Socrates occupied himself with excellences of
character ( tas hathikas aretas ) and in connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal
definitions.
. . See also: Metaphysics I 987b.
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Euthyphro has a ve^- simple answer to Socrates' question: "the holy is what I'm
doing now," prosecuting (pursuing) murder, temple theft, and the like. Keeping in mind
the fact that Socrates is trying to learn what the holy is and therefore how to be holy,
Euthyphro's reply suggests that Socrates imitate these holy actions. The imitation of
examples was a time-honored prescription lor moral behavior in Ancient Greece (as I
showed in chapter 1). Indeed Euthyphro offers as justification for his behavior the
behavior of gods in poetic myth, adding that other people have accepted his proof:
ow Socrates, examine the oroof I give you that this is a dictate of divine law Iave offered it before to other people to show that it is established right not to let
off someone guilty of impiety, no matter who he happens to be. For these samepeople worship Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods. They agree that
father had in turn castrated his father for similar reasons. Yet me they are
angry at for indicting my father for his injustice. So they contradict themselves:
they say one thing about the gods and another about me. (5e - 6a)
The deficits of a poetically based education are apparent in Euthyphro's "proof."
He has failed to separate himself and his situation from the story in several ways.
Euthyphro apparently sees no relevant differences between his prosecution of his father
over the (apparently) accidental death of a slave, and Zeus’ putting his father in bonds for
the swallowing of his sons.^ Not even the minor distinction that Zeus is a god and
Euthyphro a mortal can shake him of his conviction that the myth justifies his action.
Given Euthyphro's later concessions that holiness is a part of justice and that holiness
concerns man's seance to the gods, it's unclear how his "expertise" in holiness (which
amounts to familiarity with myth) can justify a clearly secular case involving man's
relationship to man. Even if one ignores the point that the behavior of gods who disagree
about holiness (as Euthyphro claims they do) can hardly serve as a reliable model for
’Robb (1994, p. 171) says Euthyphro’s argument by loose analogies and metaphor is typical of "an
orally conditioned mind."
® Wei.ss ( 1 986, p. 449 ) makes a similar point.
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as different from the gods is difficult to
imitation, Euthyphro's failure to "know himself"
swallow.
Socrates chokes on Euthyphro's reply immediately, mocking his arrogance:
I wonder if this is why I am being prosecuted, Euthvphro because
says such tlnngs, I End tt diff.cul, to accept? Perha^^Sit why pi” Sa™Tanspess. But as it is, if even you who know such things so well LceSt thempeople like me must apparently concede. What indeed are we to say. Se who'ourselves agree that we know nothing of them. (6ab)
Perhaps Euthyphro buys into the ecstatic model of Greek religion in which human beings
can achieve divine or nearly divine status,’ but his achievement of that status is based on
knowing stories and myths about the gods. Socrates believes that the gods are wholly
moral,^° but he seriously questions the validity of the myths:
Do you believe that there really is war among the gods and terrible enmities and
battles, and other sorts of things our poets tell, which embellish other things sacred
to us through the work of our capable painters, but especially the robe covered
with embroidery that is carried to the Acropolis at the Great Panathenaea? Are
we, Euthyphro, to say those things are so? (6bc)
Socrates' repeated question about whether ws? can judge stories about the gods
challenges his interlocutor to include himself among mortals, but Euthyphro replies that
he believes the stories and offers to tell even more wonderful and amazing things that the
multitude doesn't know. But Socrates isn't asking to be amazed by stories about the gods,
he is asking w'hether human beings have a basis for believing such stories. It never occurs
to Euthyphro to doubt the truth of the stories, his own divine status, or the justification
the stories provide for his actions.
Morgan (1992, p. 232) thinks that Plato accepts the ecstatic model, but "he replaces the emotional
character of the ritual process with cognitive content. For Plato, that is, a life aimed at salvation takes the form
of a life of rational inquiry, a philosophical life."
Sec ApoJog^v 21b and Phacdo 62d - 63c. MePherran (1985, p. 231 ) believes that Socrates' refusal
to see the gods as quarreling and imperfect makes them more rather than less believable; he thus differs from
the Sophists atheism and the "amazing" accounts of traditional gods.
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Even If Socrates were to accept the truth of Euthyphro's stories, he cannot accept
Euthyphro's offering of instances to be imitated as moral wisdom. Socrates wants an
independent standard for behavior;
Do you recall that I did not ask you to teach me about one or two of the manyhmgs which are holy, but about that characteristic [eI8og) itself by which all holy
things are holy? For we agreed. I think, that it is by one character fiSeal thatunholy things ate unholy and holy things holy.
. . . Then teach me what this very
character [l6eav] is, so that I may look to it and use it as a standard by which,
s ould those things which you or someone else may do be ot that sort, I may affirmthem to be holy, but should they not be of that sort, deny it. (6de)
Again, Socrates’ ethical goals should be emphasized. He rejects Euthyphro's offer of myth
as alleged instances of holy behavior to be imitated because of doubts about the validity
of moral justification by analogy; in this case, Euthyphro’s equating himself with Zeus.
Scholars who worry that Socrates has committed himself to the circular notion that a
definition is necessaiy to determine instances^ miss Socrates’ moral objective which
requires only that the definition be sufficient forjudging instances.^^ Belief in an ethical
ideal above and beyond poetic myths and popular opinions is central to Plato’s
educational project and the object of Socrates’ pursuit.
ixl.3 First Definition; The Case of th e Missing Standard
Having been exhorted to produce a standard definition from which to judge piety,
Euthyphro says at 6e that the holy is what is dear to the gods and the unholy what is
hated by the gods. He then confirms the earlier agreement that the holy and unholy are
not the same but opposites. From this it follows that the same thing could not both be
"For example: Robinson (1953, p. 53), Geach (1966, p. 371), and White (1976, p. 21).
"Artfully explained by Santas (1979, p. 1 17) and Benson (1990, p. 34 - 35). Ferejohn (1982, p. 16)
points out that Socrates did not require the definiens and definiendum to be interchangeable. Beversluis (1974)
claims that Socrates cannot coherently refuse examples as a response to the "What is X?" question and then
use counterexamples to refute definitions. If the purpose of Socrates "What is XT' question is to discover a
standard for action or judgment, however, examples won't do because Socrates wants to know how the formula
or standard that determined the example, and counterexamples will do because they nullify the reliability of the
standard. Allen (1971, p. 323) also acknowledges that the search is for an ethical standard.
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loved and hated by the gods, a consequence that conflicts with Euthyphro's earlier claim
that the gods quarrel and disagree. Socrates suggests that such disagreement would
indicate the lack of a standard:
mv f •
disagreement which causes enmity and anger about
nn r I ^ I about a question ofumber, about whch of two sums is greater, would our disagreement cause us tobecome angry with each other and make us enemies? Or would we take to
counting in a case like that, and quickly settle our dispute?
Eu.: Of course we would,
Soc.: So too, if we disagreed about a question of the larger or smaller wewould take to measurement and put an end to our disagreemenfquickly?
’
and lightoT
^ about heavier
Eu.: Certainly.
Soc.: But what sort of thing would make us enemies, angry at each other
if we disagree about it and are unable to arrive at a decision? Perhaps you cannot
say oilhand, but I suggest you consider whether it would not be the just and
unjust, beautiful and ugly [Ka>vOV Ktti aiaxpov], good and evil. Are not these
the things, when we disagree about them and cannot reach a satisfactoiy decision,
concerning which we on occasion become enemies - you, and I, and all other
men? (7b -d)
It should be recalled that Socrates resists Euthyphro's claim that the gods quarrel and
disagree at 6ab and elsewhere in the dialogues. In this passage he emphasizes that men
disagree when they lack referent standards and points to ethical matters as a place where a
lack of standards leads to disagreement and enmity. Turning back to the issue of enmity
among the gods, Socrates concludes that if the gods were to disagree, it would be for
similar reasons (7d); but his doubt about the antecedent of this conditional is clear.
In the subsequent exchange, Socrates tries to defuse Euthyphro's poetically-based
belief in enmity among the gods with rational argument. Euthyphro's quarreling gods
must disagree about what is just, beautiful, ugly, good and so forth. Like men, they must
lack standards for these things. Since gods must love what they think good or just, the
same thing could be loved by some gods and hated by others. That would mean that a
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single action, such as Euthyphro's prosecution of his father, could be loved by Zeus and
Hephaestus but hated by Cronos and Uranus making it, on Euthy-phro's definition, both
holy and unholy. Euthyphro's reply that surely none of the gods would disagree about the
holiness of his prosecution (pursuit) misses Socrates' logical point. It makes no difference
that Euthyphro thinks his case uncontroversial,'- gods who occasionally disagree about
right and wrong, just and unjust, are not even reliable when they happen to agree.
The problem with enmity among the gods is that it indicates a lack of principles or
a lack of knowledge of principles that could just as easily result in mistaken agreement
about what is holy as it could in disagreement.” Men, Socrates points out during his
response to Euthyphro's objection from 8b-9a, don't disagree about whether a man who
has done wrong should be punished for it.
.
.
But I imagine that those who disagree - both men and gods, if indeed the gods doisagree - disagree over particular things which have been done. They differ over
given actions, some claiming they were done justly others unjustly. (8e)
Since men and, if they disagree, gods lack a standard for justice which enables judgment
of particular cases, they can no better claim Euthyphro's suit pious than any action at all.
Euthyphro holds fast to conviction in his rightness, even while his logical ground
erodes beneath him. He is sure that his prosecution is holy, there could be no
disagreement about that. But Socrates points out that even if Euthyphro could convince
him that all the gods believed Euthyphro's father's action to be wrong, Socrates would not
have learned more about the holy. From an instance, he could not derive the standard.
Euthyphro then tries to define the holy as what all the gods love, but this appeal to
unanimity is doomed if the gods still lack a standard. A jury could unanimously convict a
Benson (1990, p. 31 - 32) is right to worry about Beversluis, Santas, and Nehamas' claim that
knowledge of the principle is necessary only for discerning controversial cases. Since what makes a case
controversial is popular opinion, the lack of controversy is no better reason for action than popular approval is.
‘^A similar point is made by Weiss (1986, p. 441)
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defendant w.thout refemng to any type of standard that would be useful rn judging other
cases.
^.4 Miss ing Paradipms and Wanderinp Wnrrj^
Although Euthyphro's appeal to unanimity in uncontroversial cases (like his)
doesn't solve the basic conflict, it does give Socrates an idea. If the gods' love were always
unanimous perhaps it could by itself provide the standard. This possibility is considered
m a discussion about whether the holy is loved by the gods because it is holy; or holy
because it is god-loved (10a ff.). The overall significance of this exchange to the dialogue
is, again, to emphasize the importance of independent standards and the distinction
between human imperfection and divine power.
The first part of the argument addresses one of Euthyphro's misguided
assumptions about the holy, namely that a thing is holy precisely because the gods love it.
The linguistic distinctions made here are more natural to Greek than to English,^^ but they
reveal the nature the holy's dependence on the gods' love for its holiness:
And so it is true here as it was before: it is not because a thing is being loved that
there is loving by those who love it; it is because of the loving that it is being
loved. (10c)
This distinction presses Euthyphro to give up the idea (no doubt derived from his amazing
stories about the gods) that the gods' love might be capriciously based on arbitrary
preference.^^ If chocolate is the favorite ice cream flavor on Mount Olympus, does that
fact by itself make chocolate good and vanilla bad? Is holiness is to be conferred upon
' Cohen (1971, p. 168 - 169) offers an edifying interpretation the argument distinguishing active from
passive and inflected passive participles which yields the following conclusion: 'The fact that someone loves x
is an informative and logically sufficient condition for x’s being called a loved thing; but the fact that x is a loved
thing does not explain why someone loves x. It cannot be anyone’s reason for loving x that x is a loved thing."
Allen ( 1 97 1
,
p. 323): "The definition [of piety as what is loved by the gods] still proceeds in a sense by
example: it specifies a group of individuals - things, actions, persons (7a) - marked off from the rest by being
loved by the gods. And it is the individuals, not their distinguishing mark, which are identified with holiness. "
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acs or persons by the arbitrary preference of inrperfec. gods? Having elrmina.ed the
possibility that the gods love the holy simply because it is loved, the crucial question
arises: Why do the gods love the holy?
The rejection of the possibility that the gods' love is arbitrary, like the rejection of
the Idea that they disagree about what is holy, projects an image of gods who are
supematurally perfect and rationally moral.'' This rationality and unanimity forwards
Socrates’ agenda to discover some characteristic of actions that makes them holy and
compels the gods to love them; some standard or ideal beyond arbitrary preference.'* And
so at lOd, Euthyphro agrees that a thing is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is
loved. This statement conflicts with his proclamation that the holy is what is dear to the
gods, because what is dear to the gods is so just because of their love while the holy is so
because it is holy (11a). The passage is a bit of a toungue-twister but it points up. like the
Other arguments, a need for an independent standard of holiness.
The problem with Euthyphro's claim that the holy is holy because it is loved by
the gods is that it eliminates the possibility of an independent paradigm. The lack of such
a paradigm not only suggests moral relativism, it destroys the possibility that holiness is
knowable at all. Socrates seems to doubt whether humans can ever know holiness, but he
IS certainly not a relativist and, in this dialogue, the push to confirm some paradigm for
holiness - even one that is knowable only to the gods - is strong. Given such a paradigm
and the gods' perfect adherence to it, the statement, "If the gods love something, then it is
" See Vlastos ( 1 99 1
,
p. 1 62).
Vlastos (1991
,
p. 165) makes a similar point: ”[At EutJiyp/iro 10a, Socrates] is assumine. that what
piety IS depends no more on what they, or anyone else, feel about it, than does the nature of fire depend on
what anyone, god or man, happens to think that fire is. Piety, and by the same token, every other virtue, has an
esserice of its own which is as normative for the gods as it is for us: if determines what is virtue in their case as
strictly as it does in ours. " As Cohen ( 1971, p. 159) notes, this is also a rejection of authority; Euthyphro can
appeal to the gods authority but they must appeal to some rational standard. See also Burnyeat (1971, p. 221).
Cohen (1971, p. 174) shows that although Socrates equivocates on the meaning of hot/ (because), he
does not commit the fallacy of equivocation in his argument. It is Euthyphro who fails to distinguish between
the two sorts of ’because’ and so draws the faulty inference that god-loved is equivalent to ’pious’.
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holy." can stand. Serious doubt about Euthyphro's knowledge of the paradigm also
stands. Even though human ability to determine holiness is restricted by our limited
access to the paradigm, it can shine over and guide moral education like a north star.
The denouement following the argument confirms its main thrust. Socrates is
compared to Daedalus who made statues move:
Then apparently [Kiv5t)ve<)Co], my friend, I am even more skillful IxeYViivl thanmy venerated ancestor, inasmuch as he made only his own works moveTher^ Iseems riot only make my own move but other people's too. And certainly the
’
most subtle feature of my art is that I am skilled [ao(p6(;] against my will. For I
rea y want arguments to stand still, to stand fixed and immovable. I want that
more than the wealth of Tantalus and the skill of Daedalus combined, (lid)
Words move and make no sense unless there are standards, definitions, to tie them down.
What Socrates has done is to destroy Euthyphro’s smug illusion of fixity and certainty.
Likewise, Socrates' argument that reverence entails fear attacks Euthyphro's confidence:
For if you did not know the holy and unholy with certainty, you could not
possibly undertake to prosecute your aged father for murder in behalf of a hired
man. You would fear to risk the gods, lest your action be wrongful, and you would
be ashamed before men. (15d)
Euthyphro's lack of fear can only indicate a lack of true reverence. There is a certain
humility required before the gods and also before knowledge; Euthyphro has confidently
claimed piety and knowledge yet remained unfazed by his inability to show either.^®
Next, the holy is intimately connected to the just and the significance of the
dialogue for the discussion of snete, and therefore education, becomes apparent:
Soc.: If the holy is part of the just, it would seem that we must find out
what part of the just the holy is. Now to take an example we used a moment ago,
if you were to ask what part of number the even is, and what kind of number it is, I
would say that it is number with equal rather than unequal sides. Do you agree?
^"MePherran (1985, p. 234) sees the connection between humility, piety, and philosophical activity:
"This active humility and caution are called for, since as Socrates’ practice of the destructive mode of the
elenchus has repeatedly demonstrated {^Apology 21b - 23b), that men are constantly in danger of supposing
they have certain knowledge of both divine and human matters, and that they are thus in no need of
improvement. Euthyphro serves as a paradigm case of this danger. "
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Eu.: Yes, I do.
me what part of the just is holy, so
id not to indict me for impiety,
gs are pious and holy and what are
Here the holy is related to the just and compared tellingly to mathematics
,
which makes
distinctions by dear paradigms and definitions. Again Socrates asks Euthyphro to teach
him, and again he requests instruction in the form of a definition. He plans to use the
definition in a practical situation - to defend himself against the charge of impiety.
5J.5 The Possibility of Moral Expertise
The Idea that Socrates seeks a definition of piety to be used as a craftsman uses his
technical knowledge - to make judgments about instances of his art - is supported at 12e
ff. where Euthyphro calls piety ministering to the gods and so compares it to a techne.
The pious take care of the gods the way horsemen and huntsmen take care of their
animals. Piety, like these technai, is beneficial - but it differs in that it cannot actually
improve the gods. Euthyphro then refines his idea of ministering, calling it a service to the
gods (13d). Keeping a techne analogy in mind, Socrates compares such service with
service to a physician which would aim at helping him or her to achieving the goal of
health. But while doctors, shipbuilders, house-builders, farmers, and generals all have
readily definable products, Euthyphro cannot name the gods' product.
Then in the name of Zeus, tell me: What is that fine product which the gods
produce, using us as servants? (13e)
It's worth recalling at this juncture that while Euthyphro's memorization of
amazing stories about the gods' likes and dislikes has left him without an idea of their
product, Socrates' contemplation of the god's riddle has sent him on a definite mission to
serve the god. At ApoJog}' 23a, Socrates says specifically that he questions those he
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thinks wise "on behalf of the God" and when i
help the God and prove it." Indeed, Socrates’
It seems to him that they are not wise, "I
examination of Euthyphro is part and
parcel of his senrice ,o ,he god. Does this mean ,ha, Socrates can name the gods' product
whereas Euthyphre cannot? No, nccessanlyd* Socrates se„es the god by investigating
the oracle's proclamation that he ts w.ses, of men, by maintaining h.s humility despite that
proclamation, and by refuting others so that they may achieve a similarly wise state of
acknowledged ignorance.^ Socrates' mission encourages others to "know themselves."
The one product that the gods need human help in achieving is beautiful human souls."
The details of Socrates' mission may provide a due to the point Euthyphro
approached before wandering off (see 14c), but it's impossible to say w-here Socrates
thought him to be headed. Euthyphro's actual path leads him to another definition of the
holy as knowing how to say and do acceptable prayem and sacrifices (14b). Again the
model IS analogous to a techne
;
piety is some body of knowledge which allows us to
judge particular instances - in this case prayers and sacrifices. That this late definition
could not cover Euthyphro's prosecution of his father may be indicative of Plato's belief
that impiety was an improper subject for civil courts. The initial promise of this definition
soon gives way to the familiar wony about a lack of moral standards.
Socrates quickly shows (14c ff.) that Euthyphro's suggestion that piety is
knowledge of how to pray and sacrifice boils down to a knowledge of how to ask from
and give to the gods "rightly." Moral terminology has crept back in. though no paradigm
for it has been found. How do we know what they need? How could they need anything
McPherran (1985, p. 228) says that with respect to Socrates' question about the product of the eods:
I submit, that we cs/7/iotk/iow (other than that it is good)."
Socrates seems to see philosophy as a pious act at Apology 29e - 30b, 36c, 38a.
See Taylor (1982, p. 113): Plainly the gods don’t need human help in creating and maintaining the
natural world, assuming those to be divme tasks. But there is one good product which they can't produce
without human assistance, namely, good human souls. "
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from us (15a)? Euthyphro counters that we must give what is acceptable to them, rather
than wha, is beneficial, and again he associates this with what is loved by them.
Euthyphro seems satisfied to have completed the circle and ended up where they started,
Socrates, for his part, reacknowledges his aporis and suggests they begin the
investigation again:
rZ ZZ i certainty, you could notpossibly undertake to prosecute your aged father for murder in behalf of a hired
Zu T"" be wrongful and you
kn°''
before men. But as it is, I am confident that you think youow with certainty what the holy is and what it is not. (15d)
Socrates is right, Euthyphro does think he knows what the holy is and so he declines
Socrates' invitation and hurries off fearlessly on his prosecution.
The two men’s different perspectives are indicative of their respective pursuits.
Euthyphro has no true desire to find standards to justify his actions, because he doesn't
think they exist. Euthyphro sees piety as a popularity contest judged by gods who have
no particular standard, disagree about what they like, and are irrational, even "amazing,"
in their behavior and preferences. Euthyphro is an expert on these gods because he knows
more stories about them than anybody and has every confidence in the stories' validity.^'
His reverence is devoid of fear, he distinguishes himself from the multitude as the gods'
favorite. Euthyphro accepts the conclusion that the holy is what is dear to the gods
because he's so sure that he is dear to them. He's free to pursue ... his father.
Socrates, by contrast, is dissatisfied. The discussion repeatedly showed the need
for a definition of piety and yet they stopped short of finding one. The idea that we must
Weiss (1986, p. 451 ) connects the gods' enmity with the importance of poetry: "Gods who disagree
are gods who either have no absolute standards or who do not strictly adhere to objective principles, and who
are therefore susceptible to human influence. With such gods, it becomes important to become thoroughly
versed in legends about them so that one may please them and prosper, and it makes sense to speak of a man,
like Euthyphro, being an expert on holiness.”
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leam what is dear to the gods by uncritically accepting dubious stories that come filtered
through poets and rhapsodes (see section 3.1) is hardly satisfactory for Socrates. He
declares that he will not willingly give up until he learns (15d) and yet he feels abandoned
by Euthyphro at a crucial moment when Meletus’ suit threatens his mission. Socrates'
discussion with Euthyphro does not reveal the substance of a moral definition or
paradigm for piety, but it points up their existence and importance as guiding objectives in
moral education. In the end, Euthyphro flees wisdom to pursue his father while Socrates
refuses to abandon his pursuit of wisdom in order to flee unjust prosecution.^^
5.2 Educational Relationships
The Euthyphro and Lysis are both dialogues about philia, the former concerns
the gods love and the latter human love. The two dialogues are rarely connected in this
way, rather the Lysis is conventionally compared to Plato's later dialogues on love:
Symposium and Phaedrus. I submit that the Lysis has more in common with the
Euthyphro than the later dialogues on love because the phiiia considered here is
intimately connected to questions of education, teaching, and the pursuit of arete. Lysis
and Euthyphro explore the phiiia appropriate to the pursuit of aiete, which is the
phiiia inherent in the word 'philosopher.'
5,2.1 Philosophy. Friendship, and the Pursuit of Wisdom
A few scholars have recognized Lysis' brotherhood with Euthyphro as a reply to
Socrates' accusers; one that answers the second charge that he corrupted the youth.^^
Knowledge of piety is needed to justify Euthyphro 's and Meletus’ suits. See Benson (1990, p. 36 - 37)
^‘This interpretation was no doubt encouraged by debate about Lysis
'
authenticity and dating, which
peaked among nineteenth century German scholars. Ast aind Socher rejected it for its sophistry and eristic.
Others placed it before Socrates death. Eventually, Taylor (1948) cited Aristotle’s references to Lysis as
evidence for its authenticity, which is agreed upon by nearly all 20th century scholars. See also, the appendix.
”TTiese include Bluck (1949) and Levin (1971).
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Indeed the Lysis' iusx half (203a - 212a) ,s offered as a demonstrat.on of how a man
should speak to a boy. The context is sunousis. a traditional educational relationship
between and man and a boy with definite erotic overtones.^®
'Weir I said 'what an absolutely noble and splendid love it is you've found.Hippothales. Come on, give me a demonstration [e7ri8ei^ail of what vou'vegiving these fellows here. I want to find out whether youlTi l;';! lover
[mi6iKCOV], TO his face or to others. (204e -
Eventually, it is Socrates who gives the demonstration to Hippothales and a crowd of
others, but his demonstration does not conform to the conventional idea of sunousia.
Socrates' demonstration questions the goals and pursuits not only of the boys
Lysis and Menexenus, but implicitly those of the Hippothales, the sophist
Ctesippus, Lysis' parents and paidagogoL and even the poets and purveyors of proverbs.
I have argued that the Euthyphro is a dialogue about individual pursuits. The LysE
concerns the pursuits of educators; specifically, it questions the goals of those pursuits.
The first words Socrates hears in the dialogue are "Where are you off to? Where are you
coming from." The first thing Socrates says is that he's on his way from the Academy and
making straight for the Lyceum (203ab). It may only be coincidence that these sites later
became the schools of Plato and Aristotle, respectively, but at the dramatic time they were
gymnasia and no doubt known as philosophical hangouts.^® The Lysis compares the
philosophical pursuit with the aims of traditional educators.
It is an interesting feature of Lysis that Socrates both asks for and offers a
demonstration rather than a definition of (what amounts to) teaching. Eventually the
Marrou (1956, p. 29 - 30) says that Sunousia "was to provide classical education with its material
conditions and its method. For the men of ancient times this type of love was essentially educative: kai
cpjxarej^pa/dcuan -- "It’s aim is to educate" - as Plato says (at Symposwm 209c)." See also chapter 1.
All translations of Lysis are by Watt (1987) unless otherwise noted.
For more on the connection between gymnasia and philosophy, see chapter 1.
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or friendship’, but even then, it is not asked
"What IS it?” question will be asked of 'friend'
in the spirit of Eutfyphro, Uches. or Chamides. The L}sis is not a definitional
dialogue in the conventional sense of an attempt to define one of the virtues. Those
dialogues sought a paradigm or maxim that could serve as the knowledge - component of a
technical conception of virtue. In the Eurhy-phro, was clear that if Socrates could learn
a definition of piety, he could use that knowledge to make reliable judgments about
actions and even to defend himself in court against the charge of impiety. At Euthyphro
5a-c, Socrates even jokes that if he learns a false standard for piety from Euthyphro,
Euthyphro could be prosecuted for corrupting the old.
The conventional model of a teacher-pupil relationship in which an expert
transmits his knowledge to the student fares no better in Euthyphro than it did in
Laches or Charmides. The repeated failure of "experts on virtue” to transmit their
knowledge to a most willing Socrates cannot help but create doubt about whether virtue
can be learned by conventional means at all. Arete may be analogous to a techne, but
it is not learned like one. Accordingly Socrates is analogous to a teacher, but he denies
that he is or ever has been one in the conventional (^Apology 33ab). Even in
Lysis, where Socrates admits expertise of the subject and actually volunteers to judge
Hippothales' w^ork,^^ the philosopher refuses to teach his knowledge to the others.
Teaching, friendship, love, and philosophy all seem to be rolled together for
Socrates, w'ho reveals the scope of his analysis of friendship not least by referring to his
pupils as "friends.” Throughout the earliest dialogues, but in the Lysis particularly,
Socrates seems to be rethinking the educational relationship. The confusion in these
dialogues over who is the teacher and who the student is in itself instructive. Socrates'
^'Hippias, by contrast, could teach tcciwdj; his mistake was equating those tedwai with arete.
Ion’s mistake was in failing to differentiate between the arete of Homer's heroes and his own.
”Sce Lysis 204bc and Syniposiu/n 177d.
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instruction” of others is always coincidental with his own pursuit of wisdom. Education,
like philosophy itself seems to be a kind of hunt. Socrates isn't even the undisputed
leader of this hunt, "the questioner must follow the answerer wherever he leads." he tells
Euthyphro at 14c. Socrates docs have an idea of the direction he wants to travel,
however, and he does tiy to get others to help him find the path.
The Lysis opens with a little debate about direction." Socrates is busy following
his own pursuits when Hippothales begs him to detour:
As I approached them, Hippothales spotted me and said, 'Socrates, where
are you off to? Where are you coming from?'
replied
^ ^ Academy and going straight to the Lyceum,
' I
'You should come here.
' he said, 'straight to us.
us? It'll be worth it, you know.' (203ab)
Aren't you going to join
If education and philosophy are some kind of a hunt, it is already clear that the objects of
that hunt are different for Socrates that they are for Hippothales. Socrates is not pursuing
the young men, although Hippothales says he should be heading straight to them rather
than to the Lyceum. When he says that the detour will be worth it, there is a double
meaning. Hippothales thinks Socrates will enjoy the physical beauty of the boys, but
Socrates enjoys their souls - via inquiry - rather than their bodies. Hippothales and
Socrates are described as hunters, respectively, at 206a and 218c. Whereas Hippothales'
quarry is the boy Lysis, however, Socrates is tracking the truth about friendship.
Love or philia is the central motivation in both kinds of hunt. Hippothales' love
for Lysis, in accordance with traditional sunousia, is erotic.^^ Hippothales is referred to
as the erastes and Lysis the paidlka. There are clear contrasts between Hippothales'
eros for Lysis and the simpler philia shared by Lysis and Menexenus. Socrates exhibits
P/iae^ws, likewise, opens with Socrates asking Phaedrus where he has come from, and is heaidcd.
^'Watt (1987, p. 1 19 - 120) points out that erotic terminology is used to describe Hippothales’ love.
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phiha as well, but it is a phiJia primarily directed at wisdom and only secondarily at his
interlocutors, who help him to pursue that primaiy goal. Socrates' philia for wisdom is so
strong that he often wears out his interlocutor: "Since you seem to be lazy and soft." he
tells Euthyphro at 11c, "I will come to your aid and help you teach me about the holy."
At 193e. Socrates exhorts Laches to display courage and endurance in inquiry. Socrates'
phiha then is inherent in his being a philosopher and his commitment is unquestioned.
"I shall not willingly give up until I learn," he declares at Euthyphro 15d.
Whether or not Socrates' philia can be clearly distinguished from that of the
others, the objects of his philia most certainly can.^^ The problem is not so much the
general object of the others' desire, but rather the inadequacy of understanding on which
they base their particular desires.^' At Lysis 204b, for example, it's pointed out that each
of the youths has his own opinion about tis ho kaios [xiq 6 Ka?ioq] which can mean (in
context) which boy is most beautiful, or more generally, what is the beautiful. The fine or
beautiful is a most laudable goal and certainly one of Socrates' own. What is disturbing
here, aside from the fact that the youths are confining their pursuit of beauty to beautiful
boys, is that it doesn't faze them in the least that they have no single conception of beauty
beyond their emotional preferences. Hippothales is even reluctant to tell Socrates which
boy is his favorite, perhaps because he has no definite idea of beauty by which to justify
his choice. While beauty is a laudable goal, the youths are so busy pursuing beautiful
boys that they end up ignoring the beautiful itself. Losing sight of one's higher goals
allows one's desires to be seduced by mundane goods like wealth, fame or political power.
^^Friedlander (1958, p. 51 and 1964, p. 92 - 104) attempts to define' Socrates pJii/ja as educative.
^*See Gould (1963, p. 63): "[Socrates] had a unique vision of the disastrous inadequacy of the
understanding on which most men base their desires. Unhappiness is (by definition) that which we do not want,
yet here we are, most of us, drifting straight toward it like lemmings to the sea."
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It is his unique aim, the abstract idea of moral arete, that determines Socrates'
educational method. The Bathyphro and other dialogues make clear that insofar as
conventional teaching is possible, it offers standards; so the teaching of mathematics,
measurement, even eristic argumentation is possible. But there are no readily available
standards for arete. The educational project, then, is a not a teaching of arete but a
directed pursuit of arete. Plato offers dramatic evidence, if not argument, for the theory
that Socrates’ pursuit of the greater ideals of has resulted in Socrates exemplifying
arete. Socrates then is the paradigm of human arete that Plato offers to his readers. In
Lysis,, Socrates is revealed as a new kind of teacher: an ideal guide and companion in
the individual pursuit of arete.
^2 Rgsemblances among Socrates
. Sophists, and Pederasts
One need not look beyond Aristophanes' CJouds to realize that the charge of
corrupting the youth was based on a perception of Socrates as a teacher. Indeed
Aristophanes portrait seems to be a caricature of every misguided educator known to
Athens, rolled into one and given the name ’Socrates.’ Plato certainly felt that Athenian
worries about sophists, pederasts, and traditional educators were well-founded. He
wanted to distinguish Socrates from these people, however, and ultimately, he did it by
distinguishing Socrates’ aims.
Sophists were the object of much ire in Athens (see Meno 92b ff.) and also
much admiration (see HippiasMinor how people felt about them depended laigely
upon their personal values. Anytus’ complaint in the Meno is based on their challenge
to the tradition of education via sunousia within a small social and familial circle. The
fact that many sophists were foreigners exacerbated his worry, but Socrates was not
excluded from the charge and in fact Anytus participated in Socrates’ indictment in
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399bc. Indeed Socrates' challenges to familial educational authority in Lysis range from
hypothetical questions about Lysis' parents' love for and control over him (207e - 21 Oe),
to a physical battle with parentally-appointed guardians at the end of the dialogue.^^
Even m Plato's decidedly positive portrait of Socrates, there is something to make parents
uneasy.
At Metaphysics V 1004b22 ff., Aristotle says that sophism closely resembles
philosophy but that they differ in proairesis biou [TCpoaipeaiq pio\)], the choice,
purpose, or plan in life. Despite Socrates' manifest resemblance to the sophists, his
purpose or aim is always different, not least in its depth and fixity. The sophists
specialized in rhetoric and eristic argument — skills focused not on Socrates' ideal of what
is, but rather on what can be made to appear plausible. "Never mind the truth ~ pursue
probability through thick and thin in every kind of speech" is a sophistic maxim cited with
derision in the Phaedrus. Euthydemus is said to be able to refute any argument
whether it is false or true,” and Aristotle derides Protagoras at Rhetoric 1402a23 for
teaching his students to make wrong appear right. Socrates' ignorance about what is
good or right is easily, but mistakenly, confused with the sophists' dismissal of the
objective existence of such concepts. For the sophists, standards for good and bad rest in
popular opinion: the vote of the jury or the adulation of an audience. These were the
things that brought wealth and power.
^''Bolotin (1979, p. 85 - 86) argues that Socrates encourages rebellion in Lysis: "Given this aspect of
Socratic education, it is not difficult to see why parents might consider it corruption of the young." Robb (1994,
p. 198) says that Athenians saw Socrates' method as a threat to the established social power of boys’ parents.
Phaedrus 272de, Hamilton translation.
Euthydemus 272a.
Dover (1971, p. 55 - 56) cites several examples of sophistic relativism, including the Tetralogies,'
ascribed to Antiphon, a fifth-century exercise in presenting both sides of a case with equal conviction and
ingenuity. Lysimachus viii.,1 1 says: "and I thought that they were simply philosophizing about the case and
putting the case for the opposite." Isocrates xv, 15 faces the accusation 'that I can make wrong appear right.'
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Those who joined Socrates m rejecting sophistic relativism typically did not share
his acknowledged ignorance about the true nature of the good. Rather they looked to
poetry and myth for paradigms and precedence for action. Euthyphro, as I showed in
section 5.1., weaves an analogy between his own case and one drawn from epic. Ion. too.
takes his memorization of Homer's poetry to be an inventory of his personal values and
skills (section 3.1). Socrates is given to the analysis of poetiy and proverbs as well but.
again, his aim is different from that of the literary traditionalists.
Well, Euthyphro, should vve examine this in turn to see if it is true? Or should we
et It go, accept It from ourselves or anyone else without more ado, and agree that a
thing IS so if only someone says it is? Or should we examine what a person means
when he says something? (9e)
Euthyphro and Ion accept the superficial meaning of poetry and prophecy, treating them
as moral authority.^^ Socrates, by contrast, treats words as puzzles to be questioned and
analyzed in the process of trying to understand the greater ideal that is the true
authority. Poets, like Socrates, are guides along the path toward wisdom:
I think we ought to follow the path which we turned along before, and look at the
question according to the precepts of poets, who are, so to speak, our fathers and
guides in wisdom. (213e - 214a)
In the language of Lysis, literary traditionalists mistake literature for the ultimate good
when it is, at least in Socrates' eyes, merely instrumental to that goal.
Part of Socrates complaint about sophists, traditionalists, and even pederasts is
that their aims are ultimately self-serving. Their educational activity, like their personal
activity is designed to bring pleasure, glory, or wealth to themselves. At 206a, Socrates
criticizes Hippothales' aim in pursuing Lysis:
See Robb ( 1994, p. 170) and Despland (1985, p. 22): 'Traditionalists hold on to the view that words
mean what they mean. .
.
[words] have a sort of divine sanction or absolute authority."
^^See section 5.3.4 and Euthyphro 12a, where Socrates uses logic and counterexamples in his
disagreement with the poet who was unwilling to insult Zeus, since "where there is fear there is also reverence."
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hrfno“v““'’l
' boy you’re talking of, what you've said and sung of him will
iT
®
°u
eulogies in honor of you as victor, in that you got
von'
^ be slips through your fingers, the greater the eulogies
y ve pronounced on your boy have been, the greater will the blessings of beautyand goodness seem to be of which you've been deprived, and so you'H^eem
^
ridiculous. Any man who knows what’s what when it comes to love, my friend,does not praise the boy he's in love with until he's caught him. (205e - 206a)
Besides showing that Hippothales is interested in his ovvm social and probably sexual
benefits rather than the welfare of the boy, this passage makes an implicit statement about
the pursuit of wisdom. If wisdom is pursued with an eye to personal gloiy, an admission
of Ignorance will be all the more difficult and disappointing. It is much better to wait
until you've achieved your goal before you claim its benefits. Socrates fixes his gaze on
the ultimate goal and avoids both distractions of intermediate benefits and the temptation
to claim knowledge by virtue of an incompletely understood authority.
5 .2,3 Friendship in Education
Socrates' view of the teacher-student relationship is necessarily affected by his
unconventional view of worthwhile pursuits and his rejection of conventional authority.
Since Socrates rejects all authority except the absolute authority of the good itself, his
educational relationships will recognize only that authority as well. At Lj/s/s 208c, the
point is made that tutors ( paidagogoi ) and teachers are Lysis' masters despite their lower
social standing. Socrates, however, considers himself one of the boys (223b) and claims
no authority based on age, knowledge, or social status. At 212a, he treats the boys as
authorities on friendship based on their experience. Lysis, by contrast, is very conscious
of social hierarchies. His first reason for not having freedom is that he is not of legal age
(209a),'*^ but he soon admits that his restrictions are based on a lack of knowledge (209c).
^’Bolotin (1979, p. 123) notes that Mencxenus’ "unquestioning trust in the Athenian poet and lawgiver
(Solon) is parallel to Lysis' initial reliance on his parents' "wisdom" and love. The poets are themselves
ancestral authorities who . . . have "legislated" our most comprehensive opinions."
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Socrates’ rejection of conventional authority (including poets, parents, social
standing, and popular success), enhances his focus on the authority of the good with
respect to which we are all deficient in our knowledge. Socrates treats Euthyphro,
Hippias, and other alleged experts as authorities until he realizes that their expertise about
arete is just that - alleged. In the absence of such an expert, teacher, student, and all
other human beings have an equal claim to authority: none. They are friends.
Another educational convention Socrates rejects is flattery. Flattery aims at
pleasing rather than understanding and, at the same time, artificially quells the natural
desire to be good. At 14b, Euthyphro confuses pleasing the gods with being of service to
them. An educator whose aim is to entertain may likewise please his or her students but
be of little service to them. The problem with flattery is that it discourages people from
understanding and refining their desires by giving them what they think the want. At
Goigias 463b ff„ Socrates calls rhetoric a form of flattery which makes the soul seem
healthy when in fact it is not. Accordingly, while Socrates admits at 206c that Lysis'
beauty makes him deserved of the aristocratic title kalos te kagathos [koc^6(^ ts
KOtyocGoc^, handsome and good], he hardly assumes that the boy has achieved arete.
Hippothales, on the other hand, is so busy praising Lysis that his flattery has
stunted the intellectual growth of them both. Hippothales is thought a fool by his peers
since he constantly sings poetiy praising Lysis. Ctesippus mocks him:
How isn't it ridiculous that a man who is a lover and thinks of virtually nothing
but the boy he's in love with should have nothing original to say that even a boy
himself might not come up with? (205bc)
Socrates warns Hippothales that his flattering verse can't be good poetry if it harms the
poet himself (206b). When everyone meets at 206e ff. it becomes obvious that the
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situation IS doing no one any good. Lysis is descnbed as being "at a loss" [littopEt] about
whether to go and talk to Socrates. He looks around in obvious cunosity, but his desire to
preserve an unaffected appearance keeps him from the inquiry at first.** Hippothales
hides in the crowd, afraid to even annoy the boy much less challenge him in discussion.
Socrates’ rejection of the conventional educational staples of flattery and authority
points to the overarching need for humility in the pursuit of wisdom. Socrates is famous
for his personal disavowal of knowledge, examples of which can be found at
21b,21d,22d; C7ct^v>x 506a, 509a; Mt/ro 71b; Euth}-phro 15d; and Hippias Major
304b. While some commentators have taken this disavowal to be insincere,*’ none less
than Aristotle recognized Socrates’ disavowal as having greater implications for
knowledge than for Socrates himself ( Topics 183b7-8). The fact that Socrates saw his
acknowledged ignorance as an essential asset in his search for wisdom is confirmed by the
fact that he spends most of the early dialogues trying to get his interlocutors to progress to
the same level.
An assumption of wisdom represents the failure to appreciate wisdom's stature as
the ultimate authority and goal and, worse, destroys the desire to pursue that goal by
creating the false impression that it has been achieved. "As I said, you are lazy and soft
because of your wealth of wisdom," charges Socrates at Euthyphro 12a. Socrates refutes
his interlocutors in an effort to bring them to the point where they can begin leaming,^^ to
^’Bolotin (1979, p. 79) makes a similar analysis of Lysis’ behavior here.
'^For example, Beck (1964, p. 192) and famously, Robinson (1953, p. 8 - 9). Santas (1979, p. 70 - 72)
rebuts Robinson with the help of Vlastos (1991
,
p. 84) who marvels at how Socrates' disavowal,"may be
voiced at the conclusion of an entirely successful elenctic argument in which Socrates has to all appearance,
proved his thesis to the hilt (cf. Got^tas 508e - 509a)." Irwin (1995, p. 28) says Socrates' claim to human
wisdom may simply amount to a claim that he recognizes that his convictions do not really count as knowledge.
See Dewey (1993, p. 42): {The} beginning of learning {is} a consciousness of ignorance which
follows upon convictions of inconsistency or self-contradiction, and which proceeds through particulars to the
discovery of the universal or unity which alone can give consistency of meaning." Burnycat (1971, p. 13) claims
that Socrates’ refutations are designed "to free the other person’s mind from the mistaken beliefs which stop
him trying the Socratic approach to the problem at hand."
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help them ,o appreca.e w.sdom as a form.dabie and compellmggoal and. hopefully, ,o
get them to join him in the pursuit of it. When Lysis admits his ignorance at 210d,
Socrates considers his demonstration to Hippothales on how to speak to the young
complete. He has achieved his goal as a teacher.
This Socratic image of teacher as generator of ignorance is an ironic reversal of the
conventional model of teaching as the transmission of information from the knowing
teacher to the unknowing student. Meno's characterization of Socrates as a torpedo fish
that infects others with its ignorance (80ab) seems much more appropriate than calling
Socrates a teacher. Given the nature of the Socratic pursuit of arete, however, it is
difficult to see how any other sort of teacher could help. In the absence of knowledge that
can be transmitted, ridding someone of the obstacles that keep him or her from knowledge
IS perhaps the greatest service a teacher or friend can do; it's a kind of love to be spread
among friends. Lysis wants Menexenus to have Socrates' benefit as well:
'Socrates, say what you've been saying to me to Menexenus too.'
So I said, 'You can tell him that, Lysis. I'm sure you were paying close
attention.'
'I certainly was,' he replied.
'Well then,' I said, 'try to remember it as well as you can in order to tell him
it all clearly, and if you forget any of it, ask me again the next time you run into
me.'(211ab)
When Lysis insists that Socrates speak to Menexenus, who is described as eristic
or combative in argument, Socrates tests Lysis' motivation by asking whether he hopes
Socrates u ill make a fool of himself w'ith Menexenus (211bc). Lysis replies that he wants
Socrates to teach Menexenus a lesson, presumably the same lesson he just taught Lysis.
Socrates retorts that Menexenus is a "formidable opponent" and points out the presence
of his teacher, Ctesippus, who soon after interrupts and asks to join the conversation.
There is a sense of challenge in this scene; the rivalry between Lysis and Menexenus
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reflects Socrates' rivalr>^ with the sophists/' There is telling ambiguity in Lysis' request: to
the extent that he wants to better or embarrass his friend, he is showing a misdirected and
self-centered sort of love. To the extent that he wants Menexenus to acknowledge his
Ignorance, he is behaving like a true Socratic friend and aiding Menexenus in his own
pursuit of the good.
Much is made of the rivalry in Lysis and Menexenus' friendship and indeed
competition among friends can easily degenerate into a shortsighted battle for esteem. An
essential part of an educative friendship, however, is challenging one's friend to better
himself. Again, the distinction is based on aim. The goal for both friends is to become
better than they were, not to become better than the other friend. The standard against
which they measure themselves should not be each other, but rather an objective ideal of
arete. At 207c, Socrates brings out the friends' rivalry:
I looked at Menexenus and said, 'Menexenus, which of you is the elder?'
'We disagree about that, he replied.
Would you dispute which of you is the nobler, then?' I asked.
'Of course,' he said.
'And the same goes for which is the more handsome.'
They both laughed at that.
'Anyway, I shan't ask which of you is the wealthier,' I said, 'because you're
friends, aren't you?'
'Of course,' they replied.
'And friends are supposed to have all things in common, so in that at least
there will be no difference between you, provided you're telling the truth about
your friendship. (207c)
Friends are supposed to have all things in common, but Lysis and Menexenus
compete not only about which is more handsome, but also about things that seem easy to
settle such as age and wealth. Socrates laments that he doesn't get the chance to ask
which is more wise or just, but his final comment seems best applied to those
"Who may be represented by the eristic Menexenus and his contentious teacher Ctesippus (see 204c).
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charactenstics rather than easily determined worldly qualities like age, looks, and
monetary wealth. If Lysis and Menexenus are truly friends in the educative, Socratic
sense, they will have the ultimate goal of apete in common.''® With respect to arete,
there will be no difference between them; they will both acknowledge that they have not
achieved it and will share their pursuit of it. In this sort of friendship, competition and
cooperation coexist in the effort to achieve an external goal, the same way teammates
share the goal of winning a game.^®
5,2.4 The Ro le of Philia in Kducation
Having reworked the educative relationship into a kind of friendship, Socrates
examines how philia operates in this relationship. He begins by asking Lysis about his
parents’ love. Lysis agrees that since his parents love him, they must want him to be as
happy as possible, and he agrees that a man isn't happy when he's not allowed to do what
he desires. This naive conception of happiness as doing what one desires prompts
Socrates to challenge Lysis with the following:
'Then if your father and mother love you and desire your happiness, it's
absolutely clear that they must do their best to make you happy.'
'Of course,' he said.
'So they let you do what you want and don't scold you at all or stop you
from doing what you desire.
'Heavens, no, Socrates, there are lots and lots of things they stop me doing.'
(207e)
This exchange involves some exaggeration and feigned naivete on Socrates part, but the
issue hits veiy close to home for Lysis and the other boys present, piquing their interest in
the relationship between love and discipline.
'“McTighe (1983, p. 70) claims that the condition of friendship at 207cl 1 expresses doubt about
whether the proverb is true, not whether the boys are telling the truth. He attributes this to an error in the text.
’’Jaeger (1943, p. 58 - 58) recognizes that friends "need one another for mutual benefit . . . But they also
strive to attain the same ends and therefore compete with one another."
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This discussion is easily interpreted as a challenge to the sovereign authority of the
parents over their children, and in a sense, it does reject arbitraiy authority. The real
issue, however, is the aim or purpose of discipline. Superficially, and from Lysis’ initial
point of view, the conditional seems to say: if your parents love you, they will let you do
what you want. More accurately, however, the conditional says that // happiness is
doing what one desires, and loving someone is desiring their happiness, then (since Lysis’
parents love him) they should let him drive the chariot, work the loom and so on. Lysis’
parents' love for him is never seriously challenged; what is questioned is the idea that
happiness is doing whatever one wants. Discipline is in order - for parents, teachers, or
any sort of friend — when the value of the goal, what one wants, is questioned.
Lysis initial explanation for his lack of freedom is based on law; he is not yet of
age. Socrates points out that legally inferior slaves are given freedoms he isn't and
eventually Lysis connects freedom to knowledge:
So, Lysis, what on earth can be the reason for their not stopping you in
those cases, whereas they do stop you in the ones we were speaking of just now? ’
'I suppose it's because I know about those things but not the others,’ he
replied.
'Well,' I said, 'Excellent! So your father is not waiting for you to come of
age to trust everything to you, but on the day he considers that you know better
than himself, he'll trust both himself and his property to you.'
'I expect so,' he said. (209bc)
The familiar platonic interplay between knowledge, happiness, and the proper aim in life
soon gives way to an issue always lurking the shadows of these discussions; the conflict
between real knowledge and the appearance of it. Lysis goes on to say that his neighbors
and even the Great king of Persia would trust them with their affairs "as long as we
seemed to him more expert than they" (210a). Having already considered the sophists'
emphasis on seeming over being, the examples used in this passage reveal serious potential
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for abuse. Shoveling salt into the king's soup or putting ashes into rather than around his
son's eyes could be the actions of sham-experts, or just as easily, true experts with dubious
goals. So while technical knowledge may inspire trust, a knowledge of or at least respect
for what is good and evil is necessary to truly merit trust and freedom. At this point,
Socrates exchanges the phrase "doing what one desires" for "doing what one wishes."^'
The latter locution is reserved for those who are knowledgeable about what they want.
2^,5 The Pursuit of Wisdom
Socrates closes the discussion with an ambiguous statement that accommodates
various interpretations and challenges readers to find the right one:
'So if you become wise, my boy, everybody will be a friend to you, everybody will
be close [oiKeToi] to you, since you'll be useful and good; but if you don't, neither
your father nor your mother nor your close kin [oiKCioi] nor anyone else at all will
be a friend to you. (210d)
If Lysis becomes wise (or at least appears so) in a technical sense, others will love him for
his utility; if not, even his parents will reject him. From the king's point of view. Lysis
would not be a friend if the skills he claims are not real or, more importantly, if his
ultimate aims aren't truly beneficial. Philosophically, if Lysis becomes wise to the extent
that he recognizes his ignorance, he becomes akin to everyone pursuing the good. To the
extent that he fails to recognize his ignorance, however, he will be a friend and kindred to
no one, including his relatives, since he is no help on the path to the good. Lysis no doubt
interprets Socrates on a more superficial level, seeing knowledge as an opportunity to be
loved by everyone. Even this is a notable advancement from Lysis' previous state in
which his physical beauty and social stature sufficed to attract friends. It is a mistake, I
^"Bolotin (1979, p. 95) sees the danger: "The King, compelled by his beloved heir's illness and by his
own Ignorance of medicine, must trust someone to cure his son. It is possible, then, that he might leave his son
in the hands of a quack. Or what is also possible, the physician might use his skill to take the boy's life."
^‘Noticed by Bolotin (1979, p. 91).
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think, to interpret this passage as a claim that a man's utility in an educative friendship
depends on his having some piece of knowledge that he can pass on to his beloved.^^
If Plato were to make arete his educational offering, just as sophists, music
teachers, and pederasts do, what could be the reciprocal currency of exchange? It is
repeatedly made clear that Socrates rejects the traditional rewards offered to educators,
whether financial or sexual,^' not to mention the fact that he disavows having any
knowledge to transmit. That said, Socrates does provide his fnends/students with a most
useful service: he challenges them to aim at knowledge, virtue, and the good, and he
relieves them of the false and inconsistent assumptions that artificially quench their desire
or deter them from the true path. To Lysis, he has just shown the importance of
channeling his desire for friends into a pursuit of knowledge.
Socrates goal in educative friendship has been to cajole his interlocutors onto a
path aimed at knowledge of the good and to motivate them in the pursuit by getting them
to admit their ignorance.^'' He achieves that goal with Lysis at 210d:
And is it in fact possible, Lysis, to pride oneself on things which one has
not as yet any knowledge?
'How could it be?' he asked.
'And if you need a teacher, you do not as yet possess knowledge.'
'True'
'So you don't pride yourself on knowledge, if you are in fact without any as
yet.'
'Heavens, Socrates, ' he said, 'I don't think so'
When I heard him admit that, I looked at Hippothales and almost put my
foot in it. It was on the tip of my tongue to say, 'There, Hippothales, that's how
one ought to talk to one's boy, making him humble and unaffected, not, as you do,
making him conceited and spoiled.' (210de).
”Watt (1987, p. 120 -121), Dover (1978p. 202 - 203 ), and Versenyi (1975, p. 197-198) cite knowledge
as the traditional benefit to the student in sunousia.
”For Socrates’ refusal of money, see EutJnphro 3d; of sexual favors, see S}’wposjum 216c - 219c.
^Wersenyi (1975, p. 197): "[Socrates'] two methods, of love and education, are in fact the same.
Aiming at turning the beloved into a seeker and a lover, a knower (of himself) who will love and pursue rather
than neglect his natural object {phuseioikewn ) of love, this method of starting the beloved on the right rocid
tow'ard self-improvement is simply the Socratic method of education."
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And so Socrates’ demonstration of a proper educative friendship ends in Lysis’ admission
of Ignorance and, therefore, in his acceptance of the pursuit of uisdom rather than of
fnends. Socrates’ own philia for wisdom has inspired him to instill a similar philia in
Lysis; to get him to seek knowledge as his goal rather than simple admiration.
Now Lysis joins Socrates as a friend, an equal in deficiency with respect to the
good. Flattery and authority are rejected in favor of humility. In Euthyphro, a
traditional model of education fails when the preeminent expert on piety was unable to
transmit his knowledge to the eager student Socrates. Simultaneously, the educative
friend Socrates tries to direct Euthyphro's aim from winning popular approval in court to
understanding the wishes of the gods. Euthyphro refuses to disown his poetically based
knowledge and join Socrates in his pursuit of something greater.*^ Lysis, on the other
hand, does admit his ignorance and is thus released from worldly concerns and free to aim
his soul toward its perfection in the good.^^ He is now like Socrates, an ignorant pilgrim in
search of the good.
5,3. Dirgcting the Love and Pu rsuit of Wisdom in r,vsis
I have characterized the first part of the Lysis (203a - 21 Id) as an exploration
and demonstration of educational relationships in their Socratic permutation as a joint
pursuit of the good that occurs as friendship. The the second "philosophical"^^ half of the
dialogue begins with Socrates describing the object of his own pursuit:
Ever since I was a boy I've always desired to acquire a certain thing. You know
how different people desire different things: for example one man desires to
^Taylor (1982, p. 1 13): "For a good human soul is a self-directed soul, one whose choices are informed
by its knowledge of and love of the good. A good world must contain such souls and hence if the beneficent
divine purpose is to be achieved, human beings must play their part by knowing (and hence loving) the good
and acting in accordance with that knowledge. True Jiosiotes, the real service of the gods, turns out to be
nothing other than aivtc itself. See also Dover (1974 pages 250 - 254)
“Bolotin (1979, p. 66) notes that Lysts is also a Greek word meaning a "releasing," as from chains.
”Von Arnim divides Lysis at 21 la into a "protreptic" introduction and a "philosophical" main body.
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S'" dogs; another, gold; another, honors. I'm quiteifferent to those things, but I do passionately love acquiring friends. (21li)
This declaration is an appropriate turning point for the dialogue because it looks forward
and backward at once. In some sense, the friend that Socrates seeks is the student/partner
in the educational relationship just described. The contrasting examples of horses and
dogs are useful in other sorts of hunts - pursuits aimed at worldly objects such as trophies
and honors. Just who or what this friend Socrates seeks is remains provocatively
ambiguous. There is the abstract "certain thing" which could easily be the good, and the
definite plural "fnends" which clearly suggests other people. I submit that the ambiguity
IS intentional and its resolution the objective of the remainder of the dialogue.
^,1 Teachers, Friends , and the Objects of frive
The Lysis is often described as a definitional dialogue about friendship, but there
are significant differences between it and Euthyphro. Channides. and Laches. For
starters, friendship is not traditionally considered a part of arete as piety, courage, and
temperance are. This is not to say that friendship plays no role in the acquisition and
achievement of arete, friendship was a characteristic of the virtuous man in Homer^^ and
philia is essential to the Socratic pursuit of arete as I have described it. The
instrumental role of philia in the pursuit of arete may help to explain why Socrates does
not specifically ask what friendship is, but rather how to acquire it:^^
Whereas I'm so far from acquiring one [a friend] that I don't even know how one
man becomes the friend of another. That's what I want to ask you about, in view
of your experience. (212a)
^®See Bolotin (1979, p. 214).
^Guthrie ( 1975, p. 152) notes; "In contrast to the Lac/ics, the relationship is not
described as that of form and instance at all, nor is the primary phiJon called the single form in all phiha by
which they are p/nJia ( Euthyphro ), or 'that whose nature runs through them all ( Laches ).”
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Readers should immediately find it odd that Socrates says he has failed to acquire
a friend. Socrates has plenty of friends including Crito, Plato, Hippothales, even by
dialogue's end, Lysis and Menexenus themselves. Notice also that Socrates asks about a
'friend' not about 'friendship'. To the extent that the 'What is X?' question is asked in
Lj^sjs, it is asked of friend.' This is confirmed by Socrates' concluding statement at 223b,
that they have failed to find precisely what a friend is. Admittedly, Socrates' treatment of
the boys as experts on friendship contains some ironic flattery, but readers should be
cautious about projecting their own sense of educational hierarchy onto the text. Socrates
already set up Lysis and Menexenus' friendship as conditional (207c): // the two are
friends in the highest sense, then Socrates can learn from them. Furthermore, if they all
three are to be friends in the Socratic sense, he must not set himself above them. A louder
bell should ring in the minds of Plato scholars when Socrates confesses his distance from
the goal: Socrates is famous for his desire for and lack of knowledge. Mightn't the
ambiguous 'friend' Socrates has failed to acquire be knowledge of the good?
The Greek words pMi3 [(pi>.ia, love, friendship] and philos [(pRoq, friend,
beloved, what is dear] certainly are ambiguous enough to cover human and abstract
objects of love.^° The possibility that this friend might be the abstract object of
philosophical pursuit is allowed by a shift in word choice. In the erotic terminology
favored in the first part of the dialogue, "the lover"
[ hoerastes ] was identical with "the
one who loves"
[
hoeron ]. Hophilos, favored in the second part, need not be the same
as hophiJon, the active partner in a friendship. The adjective philon can mean not
only "friendly to" (active), but also "dear to" (passive).^^ So the good can be dear and the
‘“Robinson (1986) argues that Plato failed to acknowledge the complexity of ' phiha
'
and so ended up
with a failed dialogue. Guthrie (1975, p. 137), Hoerber (1959, p. 18) and Levin ( 1971, p. 244) allow that Plato
did recognize the ambiguity of the word. See Hyland (1968) for a summary of Plato's use of pM/a in Lysis.
"'See Levin (1971, p. 244).
232
useful can be dear (210c), but one need not be loved by the good or be friendly to the
good to hold It dear. Indeed the eristic exchange at 216c to 221d can be made clear if
read as an attempt to answer the question "What is a friend?"
[
ti estin Tophilon: ], taking
phiJon in its passive sense as a goal or objective.^'
The distinction between human and objective friends squirms around in the can
of worms opened at 212a. Socrates asks Menexenus when a man loves someone [Tiq
Tiva (pi>.fj; also when someone loves something] which is the friend of which? The
argument plays upon the active and passive senses of philos. The possibility that one
could be hated by his beloved leads to requirement that both friends love one another and
the conclusion that nothing that does not love in return can be dear to what loves it.
From this we learn that horse-lovers, wine-lovers, and even philosophers (wisdom-lovers)
cannot qualify as friends since the objects of their affection don't love them back.
Here Socrates sophistically plays on the scope of the word phiJia by using
examples of non-human objects of affection to reject a principle reached while
considering friendship among human beings. He's not merely being eristic with
Menexenus, however, he is tacitly comparing the two senses of the word, since philia
among humans will be crucially different from philia for the good. In the argument at
212b - 213d, for example, the possibility that the beloved may hate the lover is presented
as a reductio to exclude the possibility that the lover is the friend of the beloved. Note,
however, that if the beloved is inanimate, like wisdom or the good, it cannot hate its lover
and so the objection disappears. Socrates is challenging Menexenus to distinguish human
“Robinson (1986, p. 74) characterizes this passage as "an inquir>' into what objects are phila in the
sense of being valued or pursued or approved. I shall translate the question tj estw tophiJon; in this sense as
"what is the object of the pursuit," since this I think suits most of the examples Plato mentions. I hope to make
sense, then, of the rest of the dialogue by treating it d& discussing for most of the time no longer "what is
fnendship"? but "what is the object of pursuit"? Even though the terminology seems unchanged, the examples
discussed force us to read it in this way.
"
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and objective friendship, just as he challenged Hippias to distinguish technical skill from
arete. The challenge applies to the audience as well, who should not be so wedded to the
reciprocal nature of human friendship that they fail to consider or value love for an
abstract or inanimate thing like wine or wisdom.^^
The words of the poet and statesman Solon are juxtaposed against the
dialectically established principle that philia must be reciprocal at 212e, and Menexenus
quickly defers to the traditional authority. This impasse leads to the proposition that the
one who is loved, as opposed to the one who loves, is the friend. But that principle, when
extended to enemies (w^hich it seems can only be human) again leads to absurdity and the
opposite position, that the one w^ho lov^es is the friend, is reconsidered:
That will mean, then, that we must allow' exactly what we allowed earlier in our
discussion, that a man is often the friend of what is not his friend, and often of
W'hat is actually his enemy, when he either loves what doesn't love him, or loves
what actually hates him; and that a man is often the enemy of what is not his
enemy, or of what actually is his friend, w'hen he either hates what does not hate
him, or hates w^hat actually loves him. (213bc)
This statement recalls the discussion about Lysis' parents' tough love and reminds us that
a man may love the flatterer who in fact hates him but loves his money. Likewise, he may
hate the teacher whose love, like Socrates', makes him appear a bumbling fool. More to
the point, a man may love and pursue an object that w'ill not bring happiness. Socrates
concludes the discussion of reciprocity with a question about a higher friend:
'What are w'e to do then,' I asked, 'if neither those w'ho love, nor those who are
loved, nor those who both love and are loved are to be friends. Shall we say others
remain, over and above these, who become friends to one another? (213c)
Scholars, including Aristotle (see Annas 1977, p. 534), Hoerber (1959, p. 22) and Bolotin (1979 p.
1 1 ), have tenaciously tried to preserve reciprocity in all friendship. Bolotin says the suggestion that friendship
is based on lack or longing eliminates the generosity and reciprocity associated with friendship. I disagree.
There is no human being who lacks nothing, and friends have various needs which can be reciprocally
addressed. Furthermore, those who think they know may be generous with their knowledge, but authority is not
a beisis for friendship.
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To this Menexenus has no idea what to say. Another example of Socratic
un-teaching has left his student at a loss for words. Socrates questions their method of
investigation and suggests that they consider the proclamations of traditional educators
(peers), and of sophists,-> that like ,s attracted to like (214ab). Socrates questions Lysis
about the meaning of these words, wondering aloud whether we truly understand them.
He IS asking for analysis, not acceptance, of the theory; treating the statement as riddle or
enigma (214d) — just as he treated the god’s words at Apolog}' 21b.
Socrates illustrates a conflict between the myth that God makes friends by
bringing men together and the phenomenon of bad men becoming friends and
exacerbating each others’ badness. His solution to the conflict is to limit the scope of the
poetic/sophistic statement to good men [or good things, dya0oi]. He points out that it is
the argument that yields their conclusion, not the authoritative statement (214d). The
poets’ unanimity and hence authority is challenged again when Hesiod is shown to
contradict the "like loves like" theory at 215c. Socrates asks Lysis and Menexenus to
question and analyze Hesiod's claim (216a). If the poets disagree, as Euthyphro’s gods do
(see sec. 5.1.3), they cannot be taken at face-value as guides in the pursuit of wisdom.
The theory that like is friend to like begins to erode with a worry about the utility
of friendship among men who are equally good.
Are two people who are alike friends in so far as they are alike, and are two such
people useful to each other? To put it another way, what benefit could two
things which were alike hold for each other, or what harm could they do to each
other, that they could not do to themselves too? What could be done to them that
could not be done to them by themselves too? How w'ould such things be held in
affection by each other when they could give each other no assistance? Is it
possible? (214e - 215a)
‘”’Our wisest men” who write about nature and the universe. It’s worth noting here, as Bolotin (1979,
p. 128) does that "By using the neuter rather than the masculine gender, these writers indicate that the scope of
their assertion extends beyond the human, or even the animate”
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The boys agree that self-sufficient men could not be friends and Socrates asks again
whether they have been wrongly conducting their investigation. He brings up the
Heraclitean idea that like is greatest foe to like (215c) and supports it with Hesiod's claim
that "everyone who was ignorant felt affection lor and loved the man who possessed
knowledge [tov eiSota]" (215d). This line of argument suggests that opposite is friend to
opposite, a conclusion that opens them to the wrath of the sophists (216a).
In the course of this final consideration of the idea that opposite is friend to
opposite (215d - 216a), Socrates sneaks away from human friends by switching to
inanimate qualities like the wet, dr>% cold, hot, sharp, blunt, empty, and full. At 216bc
Socrates introduces virtue-language into the discussion, reminding readers of the scope of
friendship being investigated here and challenging them to consider seriously the
dichotomy between human and objective friends:
'Well, is the just friend to the unjust or the self-controlled to the undisciplined or
the good to the bad?' (216b)
This is a provocative question because of its examples. There is telling ambiguity between
a just, self-controlled, or good man and the abstract ideas of justice, temperance, and
goodness ( arete ). This ambiguity parallels the argument's ambiguity with respect to
human and abstract objects of love. The unjust, or here imperfectly just, man should be
friend to the Just, that is, he should desire and love it — but the unjust man is not
necessarily a friend to the just man (if such a perfectly just man exists anywhere but in his
own mind).
Socrates was right at 213d and 215c to worry about the conduct of the
investigation. The problem was not, as it may seem to have been, one of consulting the
‘^Gliddcn (1981, p. 45): "The use of the neuter here is instructive, as it often is throughout the Lysis.
The attraction of opposites concerns the character which makes someone or something p/iiJos : what sort of
character must one have to love, what sort of thing must it be to be loved."
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wrong authorities among poets, statesmen, scientists, and sophists. Nor was it simply a
problem of misconstruing
'dissimilar' for 'opposite' and 'similar' for 'identical'.^^ Rather, the
problem is that they don't understand their object. They still don’t know what a friend is
or even what sort of thing it is, since wisdom can be as much a friend as Socrates can be.
If we take the model of philosophy as love of objective wisdom and take Socrates
to be fnend of anyone sharing that pursuit, the paradoxes resolve themselves. Two
philosophers may be alike in their acknowledged ignorance and shared goal of wisdom.
They could still help each other to overcome their deficiencies, not by filling them but by
asking questions, offering perspective, and exhorting each other toward the mutual goal.
Likewise, a man does not love or desire anything he thinks he already has. The
self-described wise man will not love wisdom, nor another man whether wise or naive,
since he has nothing to gain from it or him.*^ The unknowing, however, love the knowing,
whether as an apprentice loves the shoemaker who passes on his craft, or as the
philosopher loves wisdom because he recognizes it as something akin which he lacks.
5j3i2 Thg Connections among Friendship. and Philosophy
That the pursuit and goal in question has made a steady progress from sunousia
and traditional educational structures to philosophy in particular is supported by
Socrates' move at 216c, wherein good is the stated goal and an intermediate state with
respect to that goal (and not the other friend) is posited:
“Watt (1987, p. 124) follows several commentators is characterizing the discussion of reciprocity (212 -
215?) as "mercilessly sophistic" and "eristic" since [Socrates] champions the first hypothesis and then its
opposite and then achieves refutation by forcing terms such as 'like' and 'unlike* to mean absolutely identical or
absolutely opposite rather than 'similar' and 'dissimilar'. Watt notes that such absolutes are unobtainable in the
human sphere. Perhaps Socrates doesn't really have the human sphere in mind. See also Hoerber (1959, p. 23).
‘^Except possibly the glory, favors, or money sophists and traditional pederasts seek. As Bolotin (1979,
p. 133 - 134) notes: "Socrates' argument compels us to consider our human friendships as a sign of neediness
or imperfection as well as of our worth. [Since] men more commonly regard the possession of friends as a sign
of their excellence alone. Someone with many friends often believes himself for that reason to be a good man. "
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'iMhatTh!!?k
”1" >ha' we’re even more mistaken, the truth
s t at w at IS a fnend is none of these, but that it is what is neither good nor badhat becomes, in some cases, the friend [(pi/iov] of the good. (216c)
Again, the mistake they’ve been making in the inquiry is to confuse human love wnth love
of Ideals. Socrates betrays his concern with goals by beginning his explanation with a
misquotation of the proverb: "What is beautiful is loved." as "the beautiful is the friend"
(216cd). He goes on to delineate three categories of things: the good, the bad. and the
neither good nor bad. He reminds us that previous arguments ruled out the good being
friend to the good or the bad to the bad, so he concludes that:
... if anything is friend to anything [eiTcep xcp xi eaxiv (piXov], it is what is
neither good nor bad that is the friend either of the good or of the sort of thing it is
Itself, since nothing surely would be a friend to the bad. (216de)
The wide scope of the neuter phiJon, or thing loved, clearly transcends individuals here,
as it should. Since philosophers love knowledge which is good, and each other who are
neither good nor bad, loving the bad on this scenario would entail loving ignorance.
I submit that this intermediate state, which I have described as the state of the
philosopher, is the ideal state of learning. It is intermediate in its combination of humility
and hope. Keeping Socrates' idea of arete as the health of the soul (confirmed to be
relevant here by a body-soul comparison at 218c), we can use the health analogy offered
in Lysis to better understand the educational implications of the intermediate state.
Just suppose we take the instance of the healthy body. It needs no medical care or
any other form of assistance, since it is sufficient, which means that no one, when
healthy, is a friend to a doctor because of his health. Is he? (217a)
Now recall from the argument that the self-sufficent man needed no friend and compare it
to Socrates’ interlocutors' reluctance to explore issues they assume themselves to know. If
the body, which is neither good nor bad, loves medicine and the doctor because of the
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presence of disease (217b). the corresponding soul would love wisdom and a teacher
because of the presence of (acknowledged) ignorance. The conclusion holds for both;
'So, w'hat is neither bad nor good becomes the friend of the good because of the
presence of The bad. .
. but obviously before it becomes bad itself through the bad
It possesses. Once it had become bad it would certainly not desire the good, or be
Its friend any longer, because we said it w'as impossible for bad to be friend to
good.' (217c)
The soul will love the good because of ignorance, but it must do so before total ignorance
sets in. What sort of ignorance could destroy the love of knowledge? None other than Dr.
Socrates biggest nemesis: conceit — the ignorance of one's true state of ignorance.
The subsequent "presence" argument, despite its independent ontological
significance, here distinguishes the appearance of knowledge (w^hich may fool others
and win their trust) from its true presence in a soul;
Well let me put it this way,' I said. 'Suppose someone smeared your fair
hair with white lead. Would it then be w'hite, or just seem so?'
'Just seem so',' he replied.
'And yet whiteness would be present to it?'
'Yes.'
'All the same, your hair wouldn't be any whiter at all as yet. Though
w'hiteness is present to it, it is not more w'hite than it is black.'
'True'
'But when, my friend, old age brings that same color to your hair, it
becomes at that time the same sort as W'hat is present to it — white by the presence
of white.'
'Of course'
'Well, that is the question I'm asking you now. When one thing is present
to another, will w^hat possesses what is present to it be of the same sort as it? Or
only if it is present in a certain way, but not if it is not?'
'The latter rather,' he said.
'So sometimes, when bad is present, what is neither bad nor good is not
bad as yet, but there are times when it has already become bad.'
'Of course.'
'When it's not yet bad, then, though bad is present, this presence of bad
makes it desire good; whereas the presence of bad which actually makes it bad
Bolotin (1979, p. 151 ) agrees that this argument is best analyzed in context: "Socrates is concerned
here above all with . . . the corrupting effect of evil [which] while it docs take time, depends also and decisively
on the manner of its presence. Only when an evil is present in such a manner as to appear as an evil to the
sufferer is the host not bad itself. "
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deprives it of both its desire and its feelings of friendship for the good, because it is
to good7(2r7d"218lr'*°'^'
The connection between age and wisdom tells us much about the thrust of this discussion
concerning age and white hair. The appearance of knowledge may fool others, but it docs
not constitute true knowledge. Worse, if the bearer believes appearance to be as good as
true knowledge, he no longer loves the good and is stuck in his ignorance with no hope of
escape. This interpretation is confirmed by the next paragraph:
That's why we'd say that those who are already wise, whether they are gods or
men, no longer love wisdom, and that those who are so ignorant that they are bad
do not love wisdom either, because no bad or stupid man loves wisdom. So, we're
left with those who possess that bad thing, ignorance, but have not yet been
rendered foolish or stupid by it, in that they still believe they don't know what
they don't know. Consequently those who are still neither good nor bad do, in
fact, love wisdom; whereas all those who are bad, as well as all those who are
good, do not, because, as we decided earlier in our discussion, neither is opposite
the friend of opposite, nor like the friend of like.
.
.
[So] We say that in the soul, in
the body, and any'where else it is what is neither bad nor good that is the friend of
the good because of the presence of the bad. (218a-c)
Here philosophy, the love of wisdom, is defined as an intermediate state in which
a man recognizes the bad present in him: ignorance, and consequently loves and desires
the good: wisdom.^^ The man in whom the bad, ignorance, is so rampant as to make him
ignorant of his own ignorance will not love wisdom. Also the man or god who already has
wisdom will not be a philosopher; but does such a perfectly wise man exist? Every wise
man Socrates encounters turns out to be wise only within the confines of his own
self-conception; such a man better fits the description of the bad man than the wise man.
But what of those who have yet to be overcome by ignorance? They are in need of
philosophic education, of Socratic doctoring, the benevolent goal of which is to help
^’Versenyi (1975, p. 189) has a similar interpretation: Plato’s Lysis argues that " the cause of love is
man’s consciousness of his deficiency; that all men are lovers because they arc all between the two poles of
perfection (total deficiency and total self- sufficiency); and that all love what they consider good - beneficial,
fulfilling, belonging to their nature but not yet possessed. "
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people recognize their ignorance and so love wisdom faithfully. Socrates' medicine is
often hard to take, but both Lysis and Menexenus admit their ignorance and so become
acknowledged kin of Socrates by the end of the dialogue.
The Emergence of an External Tde;^i
At 218c. Socrates declares the satisfaction of a hunter who has gotten the object of
his hunt within his grasp. It should be clear to the audience now that Socrates was not
hunting for sexual favors, victory^ in argument, or even the adulation of the crowd. Rather
he was trying to understand what a friend is, and in this, great progress has been made -
though his quarry still w'rithes in his grasp and threatens to bolt aw'ay. Objective
friendships aimed at the good will now be showm to spawn human friendships also aimed
at the good.
Beginning at 218d, the 'friends' discussed seem to be exclusively human while an
external thing, "because"
[ dia ] or "for the sake of which" [ heneka ] they are friends
emerges. It is then asked whether that external thing is also a friend (passive) or neither a
friend nor an enemy. A doctor analogy is again used to illustrate. One is a friend of the
doctor "because of" disease (bad) and for the sake of health (good). The conclusion is
generalized to: 'What is a friend (active; body or soul) is the friend (active) of what is a
friend (passive; medicine, philosophy) for the sake of what is a friend (passive: health,
wisdom) because of what is an enemy (passive: disease, ignorance) (219a).
Notice that the "because of" factor (disease, ignorance) is diametrically opposed to
the "for the sake of" factor (health, wisdom). Human beings (body or soul) are neither
good nor bad. The discussion now focuses on the ultimate friend for the sake of which all
other friends are friends. Accordingly, from 219c until 220e the friend discussed is always
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passive, just as any inanimate friend must be. This passive friend turns out to be the
greatest sort of friend, however:
T T 'hing that IS a
fl, , ?u
f^tds in name only; whereas what is really a friend should be
at thing tn which all those so-called friendships terminate. (220a)
Enter the concept, central to Socratic education, of instrumental and ultimate objects of
love. Instrumental friends are stops along the way or even allies in the pursuit of the
ultimate frtend. Having established the existence of this ultimate friend, Socrates asks
about the good in the same breath. This is a not-so-subtle hint at a not-so-surprising
conception of what the ultimate friend must be:
Well then, that's settled: it is not for the sake of a friend that what is a friend is a
friend. So, is the good a friend?' (220b)
This is the sort of comment that tempts scholars to believe that Plato here has in
mind his theory of forms. It is important to realize, however, that the Lysis' proton
phiJon need not be a transcendent ideal, nor the only end in itself. The good can be the
ultimate friend in a formula describing the termination of chains of instrumental goods,
without its strictly being the only thing loved for its own sake — a consequence deemed
fallacious by scholars.^® Take, for example, our two paradigm cases: health and wisdom.
Both fit into the formula of friendship as ultimate goods and termination points in their
respective chains. Health and wisdom need not be instrumental to The Good itself in
some higher chain, how’ever. Health is Good with respect to the body and therefore the
ultimate friend for the sake of which all instrumental bodily goods such as doctors and
^°Anna.s (1977, p. 537 - 538) claims that it is a fallacy to assume that there is just one thing wanted for
Its own sake. She says that it’s disputable whether Aristotle commits that fallacy in the Mconiachean Ethics,
but fairly clear that Plato commits it in Lysis 219d. She later acknowledges that Plato distances himself from
the single good later. I reply that Plato has a certain kind of desire in mind here, the kind found in the phiHa
component of philo.sophy and so doesn’t think he’s covering all Wpes of phiha here. The desire for food, for
example, cannot be reduced to the same desire for the good can it? cf. 221b and Versenyi (1975, p. 192 - 196).
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medicine, are loved. Wisdom is Good with respect to the soul and therefore the ultimate
fnend for the sake of which all instrumental goods pertaining to the soul like Socratic
gadflies and argument are loved.
Health need not be seen as instrumental to wisdom. Socrates' willingness to
accept the death penalty suggests that philosophy does not even require a body. This is
appropriate because health is goodness with respect to the body and wisdom is goodness
(i.e. arete ) with respect to the soul. Other things might represent goodness uith respect
to other dimensions and so there may be many different ultimate goods ending various
chains of instrumental goods. Just how' many such things there are and how they are
related to "the good" need not be determined to rescue Plato from the objection that the
good cannot be the only thing loved for its own sake. The good can still retain its singular
distinction as the first friend insofar as a concept of the good can direct our pursuits in
all fields, the way the north star directs travelers wishing to reach home.
5-3-4 Aiming for the Good : Obstacles and Manifestations
Plato's fondness for using the analogy of an archer may be explained by the fact
that the good is something aimed at in all our pursuits, rather than something specifically
achieved. In the field of medicine, if we aim at the good, we try to achieve health. In the
field of philosophy, if we aim at the good, we try to achieve wisdom. Our desire for the
good, how'ever, is created by the (acknowledged) presence of evil in its relevant form:
Then is the good loved because of the bad? Is the following the case? Suppose of
the three categories we were speaking of a minute ago — namely good, bad, and
what is neither good nor bad — two were allowed to remain and the bad were
removed and did not interfere with anything, body, soul, or the other things which
we say are in themselves neither bad nor good. Wouldn't the good be of no use at
all to us in that case, but have become useless? You see, if nothing harmed us any
more, we'd have no need of any benefit, and in this way it would then become
obvious that we felt affection and love for the good because of the bad, the good
being a remedy for the bad, the bad being a disease; and if there is no disease, a
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remedy IS not needed. Is that the nature of the good? Is it because of the bad that
..sown saklwdr
"
The image presented here of neutral human beings between the polar opposites of good
and bad, reopens the important question of motivation and utility. There is a suggestion
that the bad is a kind of friend insofar as it creates our desire for the good. If there were
no bad, if humans were perfect, the good would be an object of neither desire nor utility.
The good, in this hypothetical scenario, would be of no use for its own sake. If we recall
the educational theme of the dialogue and especially the discussion showing the
importance of humility in philosophy, we will soon realize that this hypothetical scenario
simply does not exist! There are no perfectly good or knowledgeable humans. There is no
person completely devoid of evil or ignorance and for whom, therefore, the good of
wisdom is useless. There is a sense in which evil is our friend: our ignorance, as long as
we acknowledge it, is responsible for motivating us to pursue its polar opposite: wisdom.
This sense in which evil ignorance (the objective of Socratic elenchus) is our
friend provides the best explanation for Plato's anomalous transposition of the hou
heneka "for the sake of which" and dia ho "because of which" a friend is a friend at
220e4. Here he says a true friend appears to be a friend "for the sake of" an enemy where
we expect him to say "because of" an enemy.
'So that thing that is a friend of ours in which all others terminated - we said those
things are friends for the sake of something else that is a friend - is quite different
from them. They've been called friends for the sake of a friend, but what is really
a friend seems of the completely opposite nature to that, because we showed that
it is a friend
[
heneka, for the sake of] an enemy, and if the enemy were removed,
it would appear to be no longer a friend. (220e)
Scholars often call this anomaly a careless slip, attributable to a scribe, or even to Plato
himself.^* To some extent, the expressions have similar meanings and their transposition
^‘See Shorey (1930), who interprets the transposition as an attempt to produce aporta in Menexenus.
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here should not cause too much concern/' On the other hand, the use of kindunei for
'appears' in this clause is a clue that one risks error in taking the passage lightly.
Perhaps Plato means this reversal as a reminder that in philosophic education, the
acknowledgment of evil ignorance is as important as the recognition of the good in the
pursuit of wisdom.'^ Indeed, if we take the true friend in this passage to be Socrates, it is
apparent that his elenctic examinations are performed for the sake of producing
(acknowledged) ignorance. If that enemy (ignorance) were removed, Socrates’
examinations would just be a nuisance. There is also an important sense in which
ignorance is our friend, and Socrates' production of it is therefore benevolent. It is easy to
interpret Socrates as a destructive teacher in search of negative results. What Plato is
asking his readers to understand here is that Socrates' negative project is essential to
producing the motivation requisite to the individual pursuit of wisdom.
It is not enough for Socrates to produce desire though, he must produce desire for
the proper objects, both instrumental and ultimate. Again he makes a bodily comparison;
Well, anyway, we do know this, that as things are, it is possible to be harmed by
being hungry, though it is possible to be benefited by it too. (221a)
Hunger and thirst are evils in a sense - deficiencies in the body causing the desire for food
and drink which are, in turn, essential to the ultimate bodily good: health. Ignorance,
likewise, is a deficiency in the soul that causes the desire for understanding, which is, in
turn, essential to wisdom. If one's goals are mistaken, however, one's desire may take a
harmful shape; for example, when one pursues junk food or personal glory rather than
truly instrumental goods. Furthermore, if the hunger or ignorance become overwhelming,
”Watt (1987), for example, calls it "rhetorical confusion" and translates haieka as "because of."
Bolotin (1979, p. 161) calls the usage "a deliberate anomaly, introduced in order to awaken an
especially close attention to the difficult question of why the ultimate good is loved." Versenyi (1975, p.l95)
maintains that "it makes no difference whether we say that the good is loved because ( dia ) of some evil or for
the sake of ( Iieneka ) getting rid of some evil. Good and evil being necessary correlates it is irrelevant which -
the attainment of some good or the elimination of some evil — we regard as means or end. "
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the agent might gorge himself on worthless food or information (remember the size of
Hippias' mental inventory^ thereby harming the body or soul rather than helping it.
The problem with overconsumption of low quality food or knowledge is that it
gives a false sense of satisfaction where true nourishment has not been achieved. So
returns the specter of the man who thinks he has knowledge and therefore loses his desire
to attain it. As was argued at 215ab, the self-sufficient man needs nothing, so feels
affection for nothing, and so is a friend to nothing. Accordingly, one who takes himself to
be sufficient in wisdom cannot be a lover of it, i.e. a philosopher. His denial of ignorance
does not change the fact of his ignorance and yet his desire is tragically destroyed. The
pursuit of the good, then, needs the bad to provide its fuel.
The interrelation of bad, good, and friendship becomes more complicated at 221bc
because phili3 among humans is considered alongside the philis man feels for wisdom:
Is it possible, then, for a man who desires and adores something not to love
what he desires and adores?'
'I don't think so.'
'So, it would appear that even if bad things have been destroyed, there will
still be some things which will be loved.'
'Yes.'
'But not if the bad were the cause of something being a friend. The one
thing would not be a friend to the other, once the bad had been destroyed,
because once the causal factor has been destroyed, it would surely be impossible
for the thing of which it was the cause to exist any longer.' (221bc)
It has already been established that the bad (ignorance) is the cause of our love for the
good (wisdom) and that its removal would destroy that love (philosophy). Lysis'
friendship with Socrates, on the other hand, has led to Lysis' admission of aporia and
hence his love and desire for knowledge. The bad things must be acknowledged for the
light of wisdom to shine through. Maybe Socrates is also saying that our lack of wisdom is
what makes life as humans worthwhile; if we didn't lack it we wouldn't love anything.
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It s important to recognize the difference between the love of wisdom which
requires and is caused by the evil of ignorance, and love among philosophers which is
based on that shared deficiency but not caused by it. 221d-222a makes clear that the
cause of love, desire, originates in deficiency ( cndcia ). One loves only insofar as one is
deficient ( endees ) and one is deficient because one is deprived of or separated from what
belongs to one by nature. Scholars have objected to this formula because it seems to
disallow friendship among sufficiently good people by requiring some utility in philia.
I think the worry about friends needing to fill mutual needs is well placed, but why must
friends' deficiencies be satisfied by one another? Mightn't friends be similar precisely in
their deficiency with respect to the good? The friendship would still be based on
deficiency, but the friends wouldn't look to each other to overcome it.
This is the Socratic educational relationship as I have described it. The teacher
and student are friends, equal in their deficiency with respect to the good and in their
commitment to the pursuit of wisdom, but each unable to fulfill the others' deficiency.
The "knowing lover" at 222a does not know some matter of fact that he can offer to his
beloved; he knows himself and his own deficiencies and recognizes a similar lack in his
beloved. He helps his beloved to recognize that lack and to pursue the good with him. At
Eudemian Ethics 1237b23, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of reciprocity in
friendship with the statement that wanting to be friends does not make men friends any
more than wanting to be healthy makes men healthy. But certainly wanting to be healthy
with respect to the soul, that is, wanting to be knowledgeable and recognizing that you are
^^Pohlenz and von Arnim led this revolt, ignoring the possibility that are no such perfectly good men.
Annas (1977, p. 538) tries to reconcile Aristotle's insistence on friendship between good men by taking the
primary object of philia to be loved for its own sake "quite independently of the agent's seeing himself as being
in an undesirable state. . . so it cannot be the case that philia requires there to be something bad because of
which the agent desires something good. Bolotin (1979 p. 225), however, says : 'There is no evidence in the
Lysis for a kind of possible friendship which is wholly independent of human wants and needs."
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not, IS as necessary a precondition for philosophy as the desire to be well is for medical
treatment. Likewise, philosophic friends must share the goal of wisdom the way
teammates and training partners share goals; they help each other toward a mutual goal
without being able to fulfill the goal for each other. Philosophic education-friendship is
based on a shared need among souls that are similar precisely in that need.
^.3.3 Kindred Souls in Search of Wisdom
The concluding section of Lysis focuses on loving one's own, or more literally, the
object of love as something oikeios [oiKctoq. akin, belonging to a household].
'So the thing which is in need is the friend of what it is in need of?'
'I think so.'
'And it finds itself in need of what is taken away from it.'
'Of course.'
'It would appear, then, Menexenus and Lysis, that the object of passionate
love, friendship, and desire is, in fact, it seems, what is akin [oiKetov].' (221e)
The idea of love as a need for something taken away is consistent with Plato's later theory-
of recollection insofar as that object of love is wisdom. The criterion is also strikingly
similar to Aristophanes' description of eras at Symposium 189c-193e. Many forms of
love result from the type of deficiency suggested in this passage. Since humans are
kindred in so many ways, the question arises: which type of kinship is most important?
In the educative relationship I have just been describing, philosophers are akin precisely
in their acknowledged deficiency with respect to the good — that is, their ignorance.
Although the concept of kinship applies to love for inanimate objects like wisdom
and health, Plato uses the concept to focus on the relationship between human friends.
Already in the first two appearances of oikeios at 210d, the term is associated with
phi/os in the active, and therefore human, sense.^^ The word oikeios in its most
"This noticed by Levin (1971, p. 245).
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traditional sense means kinship among family members but Plato challenges this meaning
implicitly m the discussion about Lysis' relationship with his parents and explicitly in
Socrates’ physical challenge to Lysis' familiy-appointed guardians at the end of the
dialogue. Others, including the Stoics, understood oikeios as the kinship all humans
should feel in regarding themselves as members of an extended family Platonic kinship,
based on shared ignorance and pursuit of the good, is similarly expansive. Socrates is akin
in this sense not only to Lysis and Menexenus, as he affirms at the dialogue’s end, but also
to his audience, those reading the dialogue, and anyone else who pursues wisdom.
Plato s desire to add philosophical kinship to traditional forms is suggested by the
next passage in which human friends are said to be akin with respect to their souls:
'And boys,’ I said, 'if one r . n desires another or adores him, he’d never desire or
adore or love him, if he weren’t in some way in fact akin to the man he adored,
either in his soul, or in some disposition of his soul, or in his conduct, or in his
looks. (222a)
Hippothales’ delighted reaction to this conversation, which ends with Lysis and
Menexenus agreeing that a true lover ( erastes ) should be loved by his boy, should not be
taken as a Platonic endorsement of Hippothales’ aims. Plato emphasizes that "the
genuine lover, though not the fake one [JtpoaTCOiflTCp]" should be loved. Plato’s
audience should realize, even if Hippothales does not, that a genuine philosophic
relationship will take the form just demonstrated by Socrates. The flattery and coyness
displayed by these two at the beginning of the dialogue should be replaced by a shared
acknowledgment of ignorance and pursuit of wisdom, not gloiy or physical pleasure. If
the man loves the boy for the sake of wisdom, he is akin to the boy in the sense that he too
lacks wisdom, and by sharing this love they can better pursue it together.
^‘Glidden (1981, p. 40) contrasts Plato's view with the Stoics, but on my interpretation, it is not far off.
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This model of an educative friendship resolves Lysis' dilemma between loving
something for its own sake and loving it for its benefits by allowing two different objects
in one friendship. Aristotle's resolution of the conflict is based on a case in which the
lover and beloved are one and the same but can be extended, theoretically, to a case in
which a man attaches equal importance to his own desires and those of his friends.^^ I
think Aristotle's solution is already implied by the Lysis. My friendship with B may be
based on a desire we both have to reach the summit of a mountain we are climbing. Our
friendship is based on a shared deficiency (not being at the top of the hill), but we both
recognize that removing this deficiency must be done individually. Still, we may
encourage one another, offer different perspectives (you look as if you need water), and in
many ways help each other to attain a common goal. In this case we each recognize the
others desire to be identical to our own, and we aid and encourage one another in
achieving it, all the while knowing that the goal must be achieved individually.
The requirement that perfection of the soul is an individual achievement is not
specifically argued by Plato, but it is suggested both by common sense and by Socrates'
own behavior. Recall Socrates' question to Euthyphro about how humans could possibly
be of assistance to the gods (14e - 15a). In fact, the perfection of my soul is the one thing
the gods truly need my help in achieving. Furthermore, since each of us has a unique row
to hoe in the perfection of his or her soul, no expert can be paid nor teacher found to
complete the unique project for us.^®
^^This interpretation is forw’arded by Annais (1977, p. 542 - 543) who subsequently expresses these
doubts: "While this defense is plausible, it shows up the strangeness of Aristotle's approach all the same; in
making (in effect ) Plato’s primary object of love a person's own self, Aristotle might well be thought to make
egoistic desires conceptually prior after all, because altruistic desires only enter in as a matter of psychological
fact." Perhaps combining humans and wisdom as objects of love, as in my interpretation of educative phiha,
softens the blow of pure altruism being excluded.
Bolotin ( 1979, p. 176) emphasizes the individual nature of our projects as well: "The real friend, for
each of us, is 'himself,' or himself as he would be if he were free of evils."
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Friends akin in state and disposition of soul, however, need not be so similar or so
different that they can't help one another to achieve individual goals/' In order to show
how friends may be similar and still useful to one another. Plato distinguishes being akin
from being alike at 222b:
'If what is akin is in any respect different from that which is like, I think. Lysis and
Menexenus, we'd be saying something significant about what a friend is; but if
what is like and what is akin are in fact the same thing, it is not easy to reject the
earlier argument, that like is useless to like by virtue of their being alike; and it's
wrong to allow that what is useless is a friend.' (222b)
Since partners in a philosophic friendship recognize that their souls need perfecting and
agree on the general shape that perfection will take, they can exhort and encourage each
other in the process. Aristotle's Nicomachesn Ethics VII, 1 and IX. 9 claims that friends
can contemplate others' actions better than we can our own; so if the good man lacked
good friends whose activities he could gain pleasure from contemplating, his life would to
that extent be lacking something w'orthwhile. I think Plato would disagree with Aristotle
about whether there is a perfectly good man, but it's useful to notice how both recognize
the importance of another perspective for enhancing one's self-improvement.
It's not difficult to see how in a philosophic friendship, I may notice that you are
neglecting your soul and point that out; I would hope you'd do the same for me. But my
helping you to perfect your soul need not be dependent on your being able to help me to
perfect mine. There is a benevolent sense in which helping another to perfect his soul is
nearly as great a service to the gods as perfecting one's own soul is. Socrates' mission
seems to recognize this nuance. Socrates cannot perfect his interlocutors' souls for them.
”See Levin (1971, p. 24 6); "Affinity does not preclude mutual need. In fact, it was in the explanation
of how (‘pifjiuitna ou aj) r/jdeea J?ai (desire for what is lacking) operates as a cause of friendship. . . that to
o/keion was brought into the discussion. For to o/kdan here means not only 'that which is akin by nature,'
but also, if the implications of possible synonymy with to endecs may be included, 'that which is one's own but
of which one has been up to now bereft.’"
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but he can help them to see their ignorance and so start them on the path toward better
souls which, from the gods point of view, is nearly as big a help as Socrates' work on his
own soul. Socrates inquires after wisdom for his own benefit, for the benefit of his
interlocutors, and above all for the benefit of the gods themselves.
The concluding aporia of the dialogue is brought about by a recurring confusion
between interpersonal relationships and our personal relationship with the good. Socrates
asks whether they should assume that what is good is akin to everything, or whether they
should say that good is akin to good, bad to bad, and neutral to neutral. The boys opt for
each thing being akin to its counterpart -- a choice that seems to commit them to the
rejected idea that the unjust man is akin to another unjust man. But this is a desired case;
as long as the men recognize themselves as neither perfectly just nor completely unjust,
they are philosophically akin in that respect. Furthermore, the equation of 'good' and
'akin' leads to the rejected case in which the good man is only a friend of the good man -
a seemingly useless relationship even if such perfectly good men actually existed outside
their own minds. The temporary conclusion that being akin is different from being alike is
well taken: men can be akin in their deficiency but not alike because they are deficient in
individual ways that must be remedied individually.
The Lysis ends with the contradictory image of avowed friends who cannot say
what a friend is; they are philosophic friends to be sure:
'Lysis and Menexenus, we've now made utter fools of ourselves, an old man like
me and you, since these people will go away and say that we think that we're
friends of one another — for I consider myself one of your number -- though we
were not as yet able to find our precisely what a friend is, (223b)
This apparent confusion is tempered by the fact that the dialogue has revealed Socrates as
a friend of the boys - not a teacher, not a sophist, not an erastes. While Hippothales
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wants the boy's bodies, Qessipus wants them to win atguments, and parents and
paidag^oi want to control them, Socrates wants to explore wisdom with them. He first
gets them to admit their ignorance and then goes on to talk about love. He is akin to the
boys in acknowledgment of their ignorance and the only sort of teacher they could have
since he aims at the highest goal: wisdom. The end of the Lysis suggests the dawning of
a new philosophical friendship. Even Aristotle, who diveiged from Plato in his own
explanation of friendship, says at Eudemian Ethics K, that the best sorts of friends are
those with whom one has studied philosophy
.
.
.
Plato's project for education in the early Socratic dialogues should now be in view.
It involved a challenge to traditional values and modes of education that focused on
awakening the Greek mind from its dogmatic adherence to poetic myth and social
approval. It reshaped the idea of arete as a uniquely moral quality of the soul and
challenged its audience to acknowledge their deficiency with respect to that ideal and to
pursue it in dignified ignorance. Finally, Plato’s project redefined education as a lifelong
pursuit of wisdom that needed to be directed by a particular idea of the good. The
traditional role of teacher in this pursuit would be replaced by the role of a friend and
guide, someone able shake people from lesser pursuits and direct them toward the ideal.
Socrates emerges from these works as the new paradigm of a teacher-guide who has
himself exemplifies the arete desired as the object of education. He is a philosopher-hero
who dies not in defending existing society, but in challenging it to be better.
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APPENDIX
SELECTING THE DIALOGUES
Although Plato's project for educational reform is relevant to all of his writings, in
this dissertation I focus on the earliest Socratic dialogues. This appendix will explore how
various characteristics of the Apology, Crito, Chaimides, Laches, Ion, Hippias Major,
Euthyphro, and Lysis tie them together. The eight works share similar lengths and
subject matters, which suggests that Plato had a particular audience and particular goals
in mind while writing them. The dialogue form itself and dramatic techniques such as
setting and characters also contribute to the educational goals of these works.
Throughout the early works, Plato employs a myriad of tools in an ingenious effort both to
educate and to change popular ideas about education.
Scholarship on Plato's educational theory has almost completely overlooked the
Apology, Cn'to, Charmides, Laches, Ion, HippiasMajor, Euthyphio, and Lysis. ‘ These
dialogues share several characteristics, however, that suggest they were written for an
educational purpose: they are commonly identified as "Socratic;"^ all except Apology
and Ciito end with the characters in a state of perplexity and so are "aporetic;" and they
all deal with one or more of the interconnected and educationally relevant issues of
arete virtue], sophia [CTOtploc, wisdom], and technosune [Te%va\)vr|,
expertise]. Furthermore, the interlocutors represented in these dialogues are all of
educational concern. They range from the young and impressionable Lysis and
Charmides, to the resolute and dogmatic Euthyphro, to the Homeric rhapsode Ion and the
sophist Hippias, to the aging generals Laches and Nicias (who are called upon to give
educational advice to two concerned fathers).
‘a rare exceptions is Teloh (1986) who examines the educational relevance of Apology and Onto.
^Sec, for example, Irwin (1995, p. 10) and Penner, (1992, p. 124).
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My calling these works Plato's earliest dialogues stems from the statistical
tendency by stylometrists and scholars to place them as such (see table A.l).^ While
general agreement about chronology remains elusive, stylometric research provides several
important clues as to why and for whom Plato wrote these dialogues. The most striking
statistical characteristic of this group is their length; all are under 20 Stephanus pages long
(again, see tableA.l).'** Their length may be an indication of time-limits placed on speech
and drama competitions,® but it more likely reflects the short attention span of the
intended audience.
The fact that scholars have tended to look beyond Plato's earliest Socratic
dialogues for something more philosophically substantial to chew on may just be another
clue that the works were written as part of an educational project for an unphilosophical
and possibly antiphilosophical audience. How many of those same Platonic scholars
were originally inspired by one of these short but impressive works? The thing that most
distinguishes this group of early works is their accessibility to the untrained. Their
subjects and characters are popular and recognizable, their style is colloquial, humorous,
and entertaining, and their structure dispels false complacency while motivating and
encouraging further inquiry. Whether performed, recited, or read, these dialogues better
than any others attract an unsophisticated audience to philosophy the way Socrates lured
a crowd to his conversations in the Agora.
’Tabic data is derived from Vlastos (1992, p. 135), Kahn (1981) , and Brandwood (1992) who
summarizes the findings of Dittenbcrger, Schanz, von Amim, Ritter, and Ledger.
* CritJas, at 1 1.2 pages, also fits the length description, but it is almost universally placed as late and
shares few of the other criteria my dialogues do. Closer to fitting the criteria are Meno at 23.3 pages and
H/pp/iLSMajor at 22.9. I am excluding these on the basis that they seem to be written for a slightly more
advanced audience. I consider them to be very close in purpose to my selection, however.
'Ryle (1966, p. 39 - 40) points out Aristotle’s reference in Poetics VII, 6 to competitions regulated by
the water clock and suggests that such timing may explain the uniform length of certain groups of dialogues.
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Table A.l: Length and Chronology of the Dialogues
Dialogue # of pages Vlas-
tos
Kahn Ditten
beiger
Schanz von
Amim
Ritter Ledger
EarlySocratic
(1)
Apology 19.7 1 1 1 1 1 1
Crito 9.5 1 1 1 4 2 1 1
Charmides 18.1 1 2 1 4 1 1 2
Laches 17.8 1 2 1 1 1 1 3
Lysis 14.9 2 2 3 1 1 2 1
Ion 12.2 1 1 1 — 1 1
Hippias Minor 10.1 1 1 1 — 2 1 1
Euthyphro 11.7 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Transitional
(2)
Hippias Major 22.9 2 2 — 4 2 2 1
Protagoras 39.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Gorgias 61.6 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
Meno 23.3 2 2 2 4 2 1 2
Euthydemus 27.9 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
AEddle
(3)
Republic 194 3 3 3 2 3 3
Phaedrus 39 3 3 3 2 3 4
Symposium 39.3 3 3 3 1 2 2 3
Cratylus 42.3 3 3 2 2 2 3
Phaedo 49.2 3 3 2 1 2 2 2
Late
(4)
Theaetetus 53 4 4 3 2 3 3
Parmenides 31.2 4 4 4 4 3 3
Philebus 43.2 4 4 4 3 4 4
Sophist 39.6 4 4 4 2 4 4
Statesman 43.2 4 4 4 3 4 4
Timaeus 53 4 4 4 3 4
Critias 11.2 4 4 4 4 4
Laws 236.8 4 4 4 4 4
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